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Addressing a perceived absence of critical attention to changes in the war film brought 
about by the advent of the digital, this thesis aims to construct an original study of 
contemporary (post-2001) US war cinema by exploring the shifting relationship 
between embodiment, subjectivity and digital (military-technological) mediation. In 
order to update the critical framework necessary for comprehending how the war film is 
altered by the remediation of digitised military interfaces, I draw on a highly diverse set 
of approaches ranging from journalistic accounts of the wars in Iraq (2003-11) and 
Afghanistan (2001-present), studies of military technologies from Paul Virilio to Derek 
Gregory and Pasi Väliaho, as well as film/media studies work on ethics and 
spectatorship. The corpus is similarly diverse, encompassing mainstream genre films 
such as Zero Dark Thirty (2012), documentaries, and gallery installations by Omer Fast 
and Harun Farocki, thus offering a comprehensive and inclusive portrait of 
contemporary cinematic trends. The thesis begins by identifying the genre’s post-
Vietnam turn to embodied, subjective experience and explores the continuation of this 
tendency through films such as The Hurt Locker (2008) and its complicity with 
phenomena such as journalistic embedding. Subsequently, I trace how drones and 
simulations radically alter conventional cinematic constructions of subjective perceptual 
experience through readings of Omer Fast’s Five Thousand Feet is the Best (2011) and 
Harun Farocki’s Serious Games (2009-10), noting in particular the emergence of the 
virtualised yet embodied ‘presence’ of the drone operator and the conditioning of trans-
subjective, cybernetic networks via CG simulations. Finally, I turn to the remediation of 
various digital interfaces in films such as Redacted (2007), comparing the emergent 
models of military subjectivity discussed in the previous chapters with the spectatorial 
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1. Introduction & Literature Review 
 
Over the last decade, numerous film and media scholars have begun to explore 
and theorise the changes wrought by the advent of the digital, through debates largely 
focussed on issues of convergence and the supplanting of film’s indexical recording 
capacities. Yet, despite the proliferation of digital imaging technologies within the 
military apparatus, there remains a curious critical lacuna around the impact of digital 
technologies on the contemporary war film. This was recently highlighted by David 
Slocum’s review essay “9/11 Film and Media Scholarship”, which explicitly critiques 
academic work on the post-9/11 war film for a perceived ‘dearth of attention to the 
intersection of military discourse, film and other media over the last decade’ (187-188). 
Questioning ‘whether the critical frameworks developed for the analysis of the Second 
World War, Vietnam, or even the Cold War are appropriate to the war on terror’, 
Slocum calls for a wider focus upon ‘how cinema’s role has changed amid the 
transformation of the larger media ecosystem’, particularly in relation to ‘the new 
technologies, fragmentation, and interactivity increasingly characterising twenty-first 
century media’ (192; 184; 181).  
The reasons for updating film scholars’ ‘critical frameworks’ in this context are 
manifold. Firstly, as Slocum acknowledges, the process of convergence effected by 
digital media has ‘enabled an enormous capacity to reproduce images […] shorn of their 
provenance or original context as they circulated nearly instantaneously across media 
platforms’ (190). Given the increasing porousness of medial boundaries, the war film, 
like any other domain of film studies, can no longer be considered a technologically 
discrete object of study. The longstanding alliance between cinema and the military, 
developed through the propaganda campaigns of WWII and other conflicts, is beginning 
to be eroded by the formation of new alliances between the gaming industry and the 
military use of (gaming-derived) CG training applications, as well as new digital forms 
of war reportage such as military video diaries or embedded journalist reports whose 
speed of transmission lends them a greater degree of immediacy than the traditionally 
distributed war film. Even within the diegeses of Iraq War films such as Brian de 
Palma’s Redacted (2007) or Nick Broomfield’s Battle for Haditha (2007), there appears 
to be a growing recognition that an understanding of contemporary conflict is 
inseparable from the digital modes by which it is mediated, as these films draw 
extensively on the digital aesthetics of online video platforms, social media, 
surveillance and embed reports (to cite just a few examples).       
7 
 
While some of these issues affect the entirety of contemporary cinema, many of 
them are especially pertinent to the context of war. In particular, the burgeoning of 
digital modes of imaging warfare such as CG training simulations or the interfaces of 
remotely operated weaponry systems (drones, for instance) render the war genre as one 
perhaps most urgently in need of an expanded framework to theorise the effects of this 
digitisation. As such, I believe this study constitutes a highly specific, as well as 
politically- and ethically-charged, manifestation of the relationship between cinema and 
digital technologies, with the terms and implications of the debate reaching well beyond 
the reductive and polarising questions of cinematic indexicality and digital simulation 
by which the subject is often approached within the broader field of film studies.  
The first step in this process of updating the critical framework for approaching 
contemporary war cinema is therefore to provide a fuller, more precise delineation of 
what Slocum refers to as ‘the intersection of military discourse, film and other media’ 
(188). This will constitute the first section of this introductory chapter, in the form of a 
literature review of recent works on military modes of imaging war by James Der 
Derian, Roger Stahl, and Tim Lenoir – all of which are significantly underpinned by the 
works of Paul Virilio and Jean Baudrillard. While Virilio and Baudrillard are 
occasionally invoked in contemporary analyses of war cinema, Der Derian, Stahl and 
Lenoir remain relatively unacknowledged. Yet their studies of how military imaging has 
evolved since Vietnam from the ‘cinematic’ (as per Virilio) to a virtualising network of 
digital interfaces offer precisely the kind of contextual update required for addressing 
cinematic representations of war in the digital era.     
These studies of military imaging will be followed by a survey of several 
contemporary works on the war genre. This (deliberately) disjunctive juxtaposition will 
enable the identification of this thesis’ research questions by exploring the 
discontinuities (or underlying continuities) which arise from reading these accounts of 
the war film and of military imaging as parallel, interconnected histories. Specifically, I 
aim to extrapolate from the identification of the war film’s post-Vietnam turn to 
subjective experience, considering the extent to which this foregrounding of individual, 
embodied perception may be posited as a reaction to the virtualising distanciation of 
remote imaging technologies such as satellites and drones. 
Finally, I will turn to Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin’s Remediation: 
Understanding New Media, the works of Mark Hansen, and Marie-Laure Ryan, Alison 
Griffiths and John Belton’s studies of immersion, in order to construct an expanded 
framework for conceptualising the remediated relationship between cinema and digital 
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technologies. These three sections of the literature review will thus draw on a highly 
diverse range of discourses, incorporating studies of the history of technology, film 
history, new media, and theories of immersive subjectivity and embodiment. Since 
these fields have largely tended to function in relative isolation from each other, there is 
an inevitable degree of disjunction in terms of their terminology and range of 
references. Following an overview of their arguments, however, my discussion and 
formulation of research questions will aim to create an innovative dialogue between 
these diverse fields and thereby initiate productive new lines of enquiry for studies of 
cinematic representations of war. 
My corpus for this study will comprise US war cinema from 2001 to the present, 
a period bounded by the initiation of war in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks. The focus will predominantly be on representations of the recent wars 
in Iraq (2003-11) and Afghanistan (2001-present), though given my overarching 
emphasis on digital military technologies I will also include depictions of contemporary 
drone warfare despite the legal and ontological ambiguities concerning its status as 
‘war’. I will, however, exclude films made during this timeframe which depict previous 
conflicts. Although it would be interesting to study the evolution of the genre from 
Vietnam through to the present in order to comprehensively track the digital turn in both 
military technologies and war cinema, such a vast historical scope would, I think, 
stretch the bounds of the thesis and potentially entail some compromises in the depth 
and complexity of contextualising each period/conflict. Similarly, a more international 
scope might produce some illuminating contextual comparisons of the ways such 
technologies are employed and cinematically remediated, but my decision to focus on 
the US is constrained by the availability of studies on military-technological 
developments since my sources tend to focus predominantly if not exclusively on the 
US military. Ascribing a singular nationality to a film is, however, increasingly difficult 
in this globalised era of international co-productions, and I have erred on the side of 
inclusivity in ambiguous cases. For instance, Battle for Haditha is listed by most 
sources as a UK film given Broomfield’s nationality and the fact that its funding is 
derived largely from Film4, though the film’s focus on the US military and employment 
of former US troops as non-professional actors makes a strong case for its relevance 
here.  
The study will encompass both fictional and documentary depictions of war, and 
adopt a broad definition of war cinema that includes depictions of soldiers returning to 
civilian life in Stop-Loss (2008) and In the Valley of Elah (2007), as well as 
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representations of covert CIA-waged conflicts in Body of Lies (2008), Syriana (2005) 
and Zero Dark Thirty (2012). Although the former fit with many contemporary 
definitions of the war genre (including Westwell, Eberwein and Barker’s studies, which 
are surveyed below), the conformity of the latter group may appear somewhat 
contentious. I will discuss the reasons for their inclusion in greater detail in chapter 
three; broadly speaking, though, the administration of drone strikes by the CIA and 
JSOC (Joint Special Operations Command) represents a loosening of the definition of 
military action, a process which I intend to mirror in the corpus by considering the 
reconfigured relationship between the CIA spy thriller and the more traditional lineage 
of war cinema. Finally, I will also adopt what might be termed (following Gene 
Youngblood) an ‘expanded’ approach to defining cinema, incorporating some films 
exhibited in a gallery context – specifically, Omer Fast’s Five Thousand Feet is the Best 
(2011) and Harun Farocki’s Serious Games (2009-10) – which otherwise conform to the 
conditions of the corpus. Generally, I would consider this inclusive approach 
particularly beneficial by way of opening up the thesis to trends occurring across a 




A key work on the history of military imaging, Paul Virilio’s War and Cinema 
charts the technologically and historically inseparable development of cinematic and 
military modes of vision from World War I to the Cold War and Vietnam. In the 
introduction, Virilio observes that ‘alongside the army’s traditional “film department” 
responsible for directing propaganda to the civilian population, a military “images 
department” has sprung up to take charge of all tactical and strategic representations of 
warfare’, with the emergence of the post-WWII control centre uniting feeds of ‘spy-
satellites, drones and other video-missiles’ (2). Although the first category of traditional 
cinematic propaganda is dealt with to the extent that it is complicit in military spectacle, 
Virilio’s primary focus is on the second aspect: ‘the systematic use of cinema 
techniques in the conflicts of the twentieth century’ (1). 
This notion of military ‘cinematic techniques’ is predicated on a view of cinema 
as effecting a radical breakdown of spatio-temporal continuity through the development 
of ‘free montage’ and ‘narrative ellipsis’ (18). Pastrone, he argues, ‘showed that the 
camera’s function was less to produce images […] than to manipulate and falsify 
dimensions’, while the employment of montage in Eisenstein’s films contributed to 
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‘dynamically “finishing off” the dimensions of the world’ (21; 35). This process is 
mirrored in the increasing derealisation of warfare as face-to-face combat is gradually 
supplanted by spatial distanciation, with visual feeds of the enemy location relayed back 
to a central command at ever increasing speeds. As such, Virilio claims that ‘the history 
of battle is primarily the history of radically changing fields of perception [emphasis in 
original]’, with the objective now being to gain control of ‘perceptual fields’ rather than 
‘scoring territorial, economic or other material victories’ (10). 
Such derealisation is effected primarily through the history of aerial 
reconnaissance, as Virilio charts an inexorable line from observation balloons to the 
‘pilotless aircraft’ deployed in Vietnam, which progressively render the ‘target area’ a 
‘cinema location’ (15; 16). This effects an alteration in the perceptual experience of 
warfare for both the ground level troops, who no longer ‘see whom they were killing, 
since others had now taken responsibility for seeing in their stead’, and for the pilots 
whose visual experience of warfare is ultimately mediated through a ‘digital display’, 
‘radar screen’, and ‘onboard computer’, experiencing ‘a technological vertigo or purely 
cinematic derealisation’ as they are ‘imprisoned in the closed circuits of electronics’ 
(19; 105; 106). Weaponry too partakes in this cinematic spectacle, since ‘the advent of 
electronic war’ sees missiles equipped with cameras to relay real-time images back to 
military control centres (103). For Virilio, ‘nothing now distinguishes the function of 
the weapon and the eye: the projectile’s image and the image’s projectile form a single 
composite’ (104). 
Virilio further notes how military strategy, particularly during WWII, begins to 
demonstrate an awareness of its increasingly cinematic nature. He cites as an example 
the Allies’ strategy of ‘tak[ing] part in the mise en scène of Hitler’s newsreel and 
intelligence films [emphasis in original]’, employing Shepperton studio to produce 
‘phoney armoured vehicles or landing ships’ to be displayed as ‘visual disinformation’ 
to German aerial reconnaissance missions (80). As this example suggests, the 
transformation of war into a cinematic spectacle is paralleled by an increased awareness 
of the importance of simulated disinformation and the need for stealth, a process Virilio 
labels the ‘inverse of deterrence’ (4). Yet modes of military visualisation, at least by the 
time of Vietnam, would in turn develop counter-strategies to combat any attempts to 
elude aerial reconnaissance, as ‘physiological traces become accessible to a host of new 
devices’, such as infra-red and thermal imaging (24). Virilio concludes War and 
Cinema with a brief examination of late 1970s / early 1980s simulation technology, 
arguing that the ‘process of derealisation acquired fantastic proportions with the boom 
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in military flight and combat simulators’ (107). He also notes the emergence of ‘large-
scale electronic games’, as with the ‘electronic battlefield’ developed at the National 
Training Centre (NTC) in the Mojave Desert, employing MILES (Multiple Integrated 
Laser Engagement System) laser/infra-red ammunition (108; 110). 
Twenty-five years later, James Der Derian returns to this very site as part of his 
study of contemporary military modes of mediating warfare in Virtuous War: Mapping 
the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network. Although Der Derian’s style and 
objectives differ somewhat from Virilio’s (most notably in the more journalistic 
approach), it is nonetheless possible to read Virtuous War as, at least in part, an 
updating of War and Cinema’s examination of military imaging for the digital era. 
Here, the technologies and processes of imaging war are no longer strictly cinematic, 
but rather a digital composite of ‘computer simulation, media dissimulation, global 
surveillance and networked warfare’ (xx). Like Virilio, Der Derian emphasises how 
such modes of visualisation serve to ‘collapse distance’ and continue a process of 
derealisation whereby ‘the enemy disappeared as flesh and blood and reappeared 
pixelated and digitised on computer screens in killing zones, as icons of opportunity’ 
(xxxiv; 14). 
The focus of Virtuous War is primarily upon the simulated warfare 
environments used for military training and preparation, such as the NTC, the 
‘Synthetic Theatre of War (STOW), a prototype of immersive virtual environments that 
could use overhead reconnaissance, satellite communications, and massive parallel 
computing to integrate virtual, live, and constructive simulations of war in real time’, 
and the Institute for Creative Technology’s1 ‘totally immersive environments – where 
one can see, hear, perhaps even touch and emotionally interact with digitally created 
agents’ (14; 167). The underlying aim of Der Derian’s argument, however, is to 
question how these simulations are beginning to enact a collapse in the very distinctions 
between training simulations, war itself, and media representations.  
Der Derian substantiates his claim that wars are now ‘fought in the same manner 
as they are represented, by real-time surveillance and TV “live-feeds”’ with the 
observation that, during the Iraq invasion, ‘television studios introduced new sets that 
mimicked the command and control centres of the military […] [employing] computer 
                                                          
1 The Institute for Creative Technologies is based at the University of Southern California. 
According to their website, the ‘ICT brings film and game industry artists together with 
computer and social scientists to study and develop immersive media for military training, 
health therapies, science education and more’. See http://ict.usc.edu/. On the genesis, directives, 
and funding of ICT, see also Lenoir: 328-334. 
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generated graphics of the Iraq battlespace […] created by the same defense industries 
[…] and commercial satellite imaging firms […] that supply the U.S. military’ (xxxi; 
278). Furthermore, he questions the extent to which ‘simulations can precede and 
engender the reality of war that they were intended to model and prepare for’ (15). 
Citing the incident of the USS Vincennes shooting down an Iranian Airbus, Der Derian 
proposes that the crew’s simulation training may have engendered such a response to 
the unexpected appearance of a commercial aircraft, since they ‘didn’t believe their 
eyes’, but instead ‘believed their own computer simulations and training, and shot it 
down’ (138). In more general terms, Der Derian asserts that the visual equivalence 
between ‘simulated preparations and virtual executions’ of war may erode the ‘gap itself 
between the reality and virtuality of war’, perhaps effecting the full realisation of 
Virilio’s claim that ‘War is cinema and cinema is war [emphasis in original]’ – albeit in 
a slightly modified, digital form (xxxii; 10). 
This account of the virtualisation of war through the convergence of training 
simulators, actual weaponry interfaces, and media representations is informed not only 
by Virilio’s notion of the cinematisation of warfare, but equally by the work of Jean 
Baudrillard. Although some distinction must be drawn between Der Derian’s use of 
‘simulation’, referring primarily to specific military training applications, and 
Baudrillard’s employment of the term to designate a sign with no real referent or the 
‘map that precedes the territory’, there is nonetheless a clear sense that Baudrillard’s 
conceptualisation feeds into Der Derian’s reading of military simulations (Simulacra 




Tim Lenoir and Roger Stahl’s work broadly complements that of Virilio and Der 
Derian in addressing the intersections between military and media modes of imaging 
war, though Lenoir adopts a more specific focus on collaborations between the gaming 
industry and the military in developing training simulations, while Stahl principally 
addresses the media-technological forms by which contemporary warfare is mediated as 
an interactive mode of entertainment.  
Lenoir’s article “All But War Is Simulation: The Military-Entertainment 
Complex” traces the historically inextricable development of military simulations and 
video game technology, locating their genesis in Ivan Sutherland’s 1960s experiments 
with Head-Mounted Display systems. Although the notion of computer-generated, 
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virtual spaces was not yet technically feasible, Lenoir implies that their subsequent 
development stemmed from the possibility generated by these experiments. He then 
describes the thirty-five year history of work on such technologies, focussing in 
particular on the career trajectories of those involved in the Sutherland experiments 
across military and entertainment industry projects. From the collaboration between 
Sega and GE Aerospace (subsequently Martin Marietta / Lockheed Martin) in 
developing Real3D graphics for use in both military simulations and Sega arcade 
games, through to the implementation of the Institute for Creative Technologies, 
specifically charged with developing military simulations that can simultaneously 
crossover into gaming environments, Lenoir highlights the growing convergence 
between these two virtual modes of imaging war as definitive of the ‘military-
entertainment complex’. If his concluding remarks on the ‘fusion of the digital and the 
real […] and with it the disappearance of the boundary between fantasy and reality’ now 
appear somewhat simplistic, his work is valuable nonetheless as one of the earliest 
instances of highlighting the historical and technological complicity between military 
simulations and gaming (334). 
Roger Stahl’s Militainment, Inc., its title clearly positioning the work as 
continuous with that of Lenoir and Der Derian, examines the ‘intensification of the 
relationship between the Pentagon and the entertainment industries’ during the Gulf 
War and Iraq War (3). Against the background ‘process of uncoupling the military from 
public accountability’ via the abolition of the draft and increasing privatisation of the 
military, Stahl traces the modes through which war has become ‘a phenomenon 
available for consumption’ – specifically, in the forms of gaming, reality TV, television 
news, and merchandising (13; 15). Historically, Stahl posits ‘militainment’ as a reaction 
to Vietnam Syndrome, arguing that it ‘alerted policy planners that blind trust in 
government would not be enough to authorise war’ and thus engendered a ‘shift in the 
locus of authorisation, a shift from propaganda per se to the integration of war into 
existent practices of consumption’ (138). The Gulf War, Stahl argues, produced 
militainment according to the ‘logic of the spectacle’, through a simulative (in the 
Baudrillardian sense) ‘television war’ that ‘function[ed] to control public opinion by 
distancing, distracting and disengaging the citizen from the realities of war’ (22; 32; 3). 
By 2003, however, Stahl posits that ‘a new interactivity began to challenge the spectacle 
as the primary quality of the home front experience’ (20). 
This emergent ‘interactive war’ is fundamentally characterised by a shift in the 
terms by which media address the viewing subject, from an assumed passive 
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consumption to an invitation ‘to step though the screen and become a virtual player in 
the action’ (16). Stahl theorises this as the evolution of the ‘citizen-spectator’ into a 
‘virtual citizen-soldier’ within a discursive regime dominated by gaming as the ‘primary 
interface governing the civic experience of war’ (16-18). Thus, as television news 
coverage of Iraq began to incorporate ‘first person relationships with weapons’, video 
games ‘attempted to re-create the television war in playable real-time’ (42; 92). As 
such, this mode of immersive interactivity is fundamentally dependent upon the 
technological convergence highlighted by Lenoir. Stahl specifically notes that the 
weaponry interface of the AC130 Spectre gunship is technologically and perceptually 
indistinguishable in Pentagon-released war footage (replayed across news media outlets 
and archived on YouTube) and within the gameplay of the Call of Duty: Modern 
Warfare series (101-103). It is precisely this ontological levelling-effect of digital 
convergence (particularly the specific technological collaboration between the military 
and gaming industry) which enables the interactive mode to connect with, or ‘recreate’, 
the virtualised space of war as it is depicted in ostensibly non-fictional media sources. 
Stahl’s account of how reality television adapts to this immersive ‘first person 
regime of signs’ has perhaps the most direct relevance to studies of the contemporary 
war film, since he explicitly situates shows such as Military Diaries (2002) as part of 
the post-Vietnam war film lineage (42). Stahl argues that the defining trend of war-
themed reality TV has been to experientially approximate ‘the post 9/11 fever to 
virtually enter the body of the soldier through a first-person aesthetic’ (79). This, he 
posits, is the ‘culmination of wider cultural trends initiated during Vietnam and 
extending through the end of the century’ whereby discursive/political arguments have 
given way to a ‘gradual “zooming in” on the experience of the soldier’ (78-79). While 
Stahl acknowledges that films such as Apocalypse Now (1979) and Full Metal Jacket 
(1987) retained vestiges of anti-war critique, he asserts that they nonetheless ‘portrayed 
war as an internal crisis located neither in the field of politics nor between combatants 
but within the soldier himself’, and thereby laid the foundations for a reality TV mode 
which accelerates this trend of ‘stripping off layers of political context’ in favour of a 
‘personalised and experiential’ rendition of war (79; 81; 82). This experiential, first-
person mode is stylistically epitomised by Saving Private Ryan (1998), which ‘demotes 
the camera/eye from its objective status, implies a subjective body in its place, and 
invites the viewer into that body’, exploiting ‘identification as and sympathy for the 






 The above accounts usefully illustrate how digital imaging technologies have 
effected trends toward disembodiment and virtualisation within contemporary military 
modes of imaging war, as well as reconfiguring contemporary practices of representing 
war through the convergence of gaming and military simulations. Prior to a fuller 
explication of how such issues feed into this thesis’ research questions, however, I will 
juxtapose these military-technological histories with studies of the war film as a 
cinematic genre over a loosely contemporaneous historical period. This will enable a 
more precise contrast between these two overlapping but currently disjunctive 
discourses and indicate some of the more subtle, unacknowledged shifts in the 
contemporary war film which could be posited as a reaction to military-technological 
evolutions since the advent of digital imaging.  
 Encompassing two broader overviews of U.S. war films by Guy Westwell and 
Robert Eberwein, as well as Martin Barker’s study of Iraq War cinema, this section of 
the literature review aims primarily to delineate the approaches to military technologies 
and embodied subjectivities typically employed within the field, while simultaneously 
offering a broad overview of the main concerns of such studies. Following a brief 
summary of their arguments, I will explore the interrelationship between these histories 
of the war film and the above histories of military technologies, and begin to formulate 




Guy Westwell’s War Cinema: Hollywood on the Front Line provides a concise, 
chronological overview of the development of the war film from 1898 to 2006. By 
structuring the book’s chapters around specific wars and historical periods rather than 
iconic films, he implies the genre’s distinctive rootedness in response to historical 
circumstance. This is expanded upon in the introduction, through an indication of ‘the 
legacy of the propagandist role of the war movie’, particularly during WWI and WWII, 
and the ‘synergy’ or relationship of ‘mutual exploitation’ between the military and the 
Hollywood film industry (3). Westwell outlines two principle effects of this partnership: 
the ideological function of the war film in determining the ‘cultural imagination’ of war 
for propagandist purposes, such as ‘exaggerating an enemy’s threat and potency, as well 
as their cultural otherness’; and the ‘indexical relationship between the war movie and 
16 
 
war proper [emphasis in original]’, notably manifested in the use of ‘the actual 
apparatus of war: real airplanes, real warships, real uniforms, even real soldiers who 
frequently act as extras and advisors’ (3-7). Through a combination of textual analysis 
and informed engagement with socio-political context, Westwell aims to ‘question 
whether the cultural strategies for representing war currently at our disposal are savvy 
enough to allow society to make informed choices about war’s role in the world in the 
present and in the future’ (8). 
Prior to WWI, Westwell notes the significance of symbolic propaganda relating 
to the Spanish-American War in films such as Tearing Down the Spanish Flag (1898), 
and the ‘blend of patriotic propaganda and more objective factual reporting’ in the 
subgenre of ‘Yellow Journalism’, with its ‘aggressively realist register’ of stylistic 
immersion ‘spiked’ with the ‘high melodrama’ of heroic last-minute rescues (11-12). 
This tension between the real and the fictional is mirrored in later WWI propaganda, 
such as D.W. Griffith’s Hearts of the World (1918), for which he purchased 
documentary footage of WWI combat and edited it into the fictional diegesis (15).  
Following WWI, and the emergent anti-war sentiment in Europe, is the 
development of ‘what critics would quickly label the “anti-war movie”’ (18). Among 
these films, Westwell observes an intensification of the realist aesthetic, with both The 
Big Parade (1925) and All Quiet on the Western Front (1930) said to emulate newsreel 
footage (18-20). This realist register is, however, complicated in Westwell’s reading by 
the observation that the foregrounding of soldiers’ points-of-view can lead to ‘a limited 
and limiting perspective that reduces war to often uncomprehending lived experience’, 
eliding ‘identification of the social and economic causes of war’ (23-25). 
Westwell notes two dominant trends among the war films made during WWII. 
The first looks back to WWI, with ‘its aims clarified and renewed’, in order to provide a 
‘conversion narrative’ which justifies entry to the theatre of WWII through the 
dramatisation of a psychological/motivational shift from ‘selfish neutrality’ to ‘the need 
for selfless sacrifice’, as exemplified by The Fighting 69th (1940) and Sergeant York 
(1941) (28-29). The second group of films depict US defeats in the Pacific as incitement 
to revenge, and encourage the audience ‘to take the powerful emotions of shock, anger 
and the desire for revenge out of the cinema into a world that Americans were 
beginning to accept was defined by war’ (43). Westwell characterises these films 
through their distinctive leap from the historically specific to the mythic. Writing on 




We are taken from the violent attack on Wake Island to the mythic narrative of 
American manifest destiny without any sense of what might be called mid-level 
history […] This leap avoids the necessity of articulating how the wider historical 
forces of the economy, national self-interest and competing ideological systems 
have shaped the events under description […] war is shown to be difficult work 
requiring great sacrifice at the local level, and this sacrifice is made in order to 
ensure the progressive advancement of American liberal democracy (33) 
 
Westwell also observes the ‘continued symbiosis of fiction and nonfiction 
filmmaking’, with major Hollywood directors such as John Huston, Frank Capra, John 
Ford and William Wyler contributing documentary work, and the ‘increasingly 
common’ tendency ‘for dramatic action to be cut together with documentary footage’ 
(43-44). Further representative evolutions in the genre included ‘themes of democratic 
and social inclusiveness’  – particularly through the inclusion of a single, stereotyped 
black character within the ensemble – set against an ‘unashamedly racist description of 
the enemy’ (38). 
While the Korean War film cycle of the early 1950s is characterised by a 
‘profound cynicism’ and ‘questioning sense of war’, it is, ultimately, the advent of the 
‘uniquely traumatic’ Vietnam War which most radically disrupts the generic 
conventions established during WWII and necessitates ‘the modification of America’s 
most powerful mythologies’ (51; 54; 57; 62). Thus The Deer Hunter (1978) and 
Apocalypse Now are considered ‘in generic terms, strange, rambling and inchoate’, and 
disruptive of the ‘clear structure of World War II combat movie’ (62-63). Apocalypse 
Now also generates a mythic critique of a ‘quasi-fascistic American military’ through 
the invocation of ‘historical precedents of previous racist and genocidal military 
campaigns’ (68). However, Westwell complicates any simplistic reading of these films 
as ‘anti-war’ by examining the implications of the genre’s foregrounding of the 
Vietnam veteran experience. Through the veteran figure, Westwell argues, the war is 
‘psychologised and made open to the work of therapeutic narratives’, a tendency which 
renders a sense of closure to the war through the attainment of the ‘tangible goal’ of 
‘psychological order’ at the expense of a political focus upon the ‘historical experience 
of the war and American military defeat’ (64). 
Westwell also engages in an extended reading of Platoon (1986) in terms of its 
realist aesthetic, noting that the scene in which a character falls directly into the camera 
‘carefully emulates the look of news coverage and documentary films of the 1960s and 
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1970s […] [and] encourages the viewer to recognise the form of the movie as 
‘authentic’, that is, it conforms to and confirms a pre-held sense of the event gleaned 
from television news and documentaries about the war’ (78). Westwell is sceptical of 
‘the seductive nature of the film’s powerful reality-effect’, however, arguing that it 
conceals ‘considerable ideological work that is taking place under the cover of the 
film’s realist surface’ which ultimately conforms to the therapeutic template and renders 
the war a ‘personal ahistorical trauma that can be overcome’ (78-81).  
In the final chapter, Westwell examines representations of contemporary ‘small-
scale, contingent and intractable’ wars (84). Courage Under Fire (1996) is said to 
exemplify the ‘difficulty of representing the Gulf War, and perhaps war in general post-
Vietnam’ through its incorporation of a ‘legal investigation narrative’ and emphasis on 
the (initially) problematic attempts to reconstruct events through conflicting subjective 
recollections (86). Yet this is ultimately resolved in the final flashback, as ‘Hollywood’s 
realism finally asserts authority over the hyperreality of the news coverage and the 
subjective, unreliable memories of the participants’ (89). The period under discussion, 
though, is dominated by the return of the WWII film as part of the 50th anniversary 
commemoration, a subgenre that in turn is clearly dominated by perhaps the most 
discussed and influential war film of the era: Saving Private Ryan. Westwell notes how 
the film’s testimonial structure is used to ‘validate claims to historical accuracy’ and 
engender a response of ‘celebratory and self-consciously deferential reverence’ (91). In 
an extended analysis of the famous Omaha Beach landing scene, Westwell meticulously 
details the stylistic components – particularly the cinematographic emulation of Robert 
Capa’s photographs and the use of surround sound to render an ‘off-screen space […] 
perceived as deadly and dangerous’ – which serve to construct an ‘intensely subjective 
point of view’ (93-94). As in Platoon or All Quiet on the Western Front, however, 
Westwell argues that such an immersively rendered point-of-view is fundamentally 
incompatible with ‘any critical questioning of the war’ in historical or political terms 
(94). 
 Robert Eberwein’s The Hollywood War Film traces a similar trajectory in 
attempting to provide a historical overview of the war film, albeit with a slightly looser 
definition of the genre which incorporates films focussing ‘directly on war itself’, ‘the 
activities of the participants off the battlefield’ or ‘the effects of war on human 
relationships’ (45). In his introduction, Eberwein declares an affinity with a mythic, 
structuralist approach to genre drawn from the work of Thomas Schatz and Claude 
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Lévi-Strauss, yet the overriding theoretical concern of this work seems to be with the 
realist, indexical relationship between the war film and history.  
Eberwein asserts that ‘the history of war is to a great extent the history of its 
representation’, since for many viewers ‘the actual war is known only as something 
experienced on a screen, not as something from immediate experience’ (53). Although 
this may suggest a somewhat Baudrillardian approach to the genre as simulated 
experience, Eberwein simultaneously posits a Bazinian mimetic relationship between 
the image and the profilmic through such claims as: ‘the images of war we experience 
in film have a built-in inflected valence of reality because of the indexical quality of the 
historical recorded images’ (54). This apparent contradiction is in fact resolved 
distinctly in favour of the realist approach, as Eberwein concludes:  
 
War films seem real, in part because they actually use material taken from 
battlefields, but also because the reality of the actualities bleeds into the 
reenactments. The authenticity of the one generates an ontological authority for 
the other (55)  
 
Eberwein does not problematise or question in further detail this notion of ‘seeming 
real’, but instead proceeds on the assumption that, since the genre makes at least partial 
use of documentary material, such indexicality lends a widespread historical veracity to 
the war film as a whole. 
Central to Eberwein’s account of the war film is its genesis in a ‘specific, 
identifiable historical event’: the Spanish-American War (7). Eberwein outlines in 
extensive detail the range of early films depicting battle reconstructions and various 
aspects of soldiers’ lives, which he considers a unified though diverse group, or 
‘elements in a larger “film” that recorded and documented what this war was like’ (9). 
This group of films is posited as the site of the genre’s formation, and Eberwein claims 
that their thematic unity, despite the lack of explicit ‘genre distinctions’, is mirrored in 
the diversity of war films produced in relation to all subsequent wars (9). Somewhat 
more problematic, however, is his insistence on a similar ahistorical continuity among 
the audience for such films, whose ‘viewing position’ relative to any ‘series of films 
about war’ is considered statically linked by ‘joint enthusiasm and support for the war 
efforts’ (45-50). 
Eberwein peculiarly omits any extended consideration of films made during 
WWI, preferring to focus instead upon All Quiet on the Western Front and other post-
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WWI films. These are proposed as almost universally anti-war, ‘utterly bleak’ 
depictions of a ‘hopeless cause’ (69). His consideration of WWII, however, particularly 
the ‘retaliation films’, does provide a greater degree of nuance in exploring the complex 
temporal and ontological relationship between film and history. Films such as Bataan 
(1943), which depict US defeats in the Pacific, are said to: 
 
provide a fluid continuum in which the historical present and narrative time are 
capable of permutations, transcending the inevitability of chronology. A film 
celebrating what was not a tactical victory serves as a vehicle for its audiences 
who are watching from the vantage point of those who have seen victories in both 
factual and fictional accounts of the war (90) 
 
Such passages begin to look beyond the notion of these films as simple incitements to 
revenge, and invoke the complexity of the audience’s position relative to diegetic 
‘narrative time’ and the ‘historical present’. The notion that audiences would view such 
films as continuous with the later ‘legacy of victories that had occurred by the time of 
the film’s release’, conveyed through documentary and newsreel, is genuinely 
suggestive of complex continuity between fiction and non-fiction that Eberwein earlier 
claims (87). 
 Eberwein also suggests an analogy between this group of films and post-9/11 
war cinema. The success of the ‘retaliation films’ is said to be rooted in audience 
knowledge of historical ‘evidence that the war would eventually end’, whereas the ‘lack 
of interest in films about the Iraq war’ is determined by the relative lack of ‘closure’, 
since ‘the fictional films are not complemented by a historical reality that suggests 
victory’ (92). Such a proposition, however, rests upon an awkward claim of equivalence 
between Pearl Harbour and 9/11, between propaganda films and more generally critical 
(or at least ambivalent) contemporary war films, and between public sympathy for two 
vastly different wars.  
 Like Westwell, Eberwein believes that the ‘enormous effect’ of the Vietnam 
War is mirrored in a fundamental disruption of the war film, making it ‘increasingly 
impossible to draw on the earlier myths and genre conventions’ (93). He considers the 
films (with the exception of First Blood [1982]) almost ‘uniformly critical’, however, 
and posits the defining trend as depictions of soldiers murdering their sergeants (93). In 
Platoon, Apocalypse Now, and Full Metal Jacket, Eberwein notes a ‘corruption of the 
generic conventions’, with the usual trajectory of the ‘inexperienced recruit learning 
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how to be a good soldier under the stern but compassionate tutelage of a tough but 
really kind sergeant’ cynically transformed; in Kubrick’s film, the young recruit Pyle 
instead ‘join[s] the ranks of two men whose shooting skills are clearly respected and 
praised by Hartman: Lee Harvey Oswald […] and Charles Whitman’ (105). 
Eberwein’s overview of the two Iraq wars centres on readings of Courage Under 
Fire, Three Kings (1999) and Jarhead (2005), which he claims serve to ‘destabilise 
generic expectations in ways that constitute a critique of United States policy and 
conduct in the conflict’ (123). The multiple inconsistent flashbacks of Courage Under 
Fire are said to constitute a ‘narrative form, unlike that of any war film made before it, 
[which] is itself related to the uncertain conflict it presents […] [and] the dubious status 
of belief in regard to the validity of war itself and the United States involvement in it’ 
(126). Eberwein also observes the generic innovation of Three Kings, which adopts the 
conventions of the heist movie as a parallel to the US objective of ‘getting control of 
oil’, and use of ‘impotency’ in Jarhead as analogous to the restricted nature of combat 
(130-131). This chapter is, however, heavily skewed toward films depicting the first 
Gulf War, with only a brief sketch of the films made on the Iraq War. Of this second 
group, Eberwein notes the ‘distinctive mise-en-scene that immerses us in cramped 
doorways and narrow, almost impassable streets’, the trope of ‘soldiers [who] cannot 
tell whether they are seeing an enemy (the endless checkpoint confrontations) or are 
incapable of seeing them until it’s too late’, the proliferation of ‘atrocities’ captured by 
‘cell phone’ images, and the overall ‘despairing’ tone (134). 
A more thorough exploration of the contemporary subgenre of Iraq war films can 
be found in Martin Barker’s A ‘Toxic Genre’: The Iraq War Films. Barker begins by 
outlining the history of collaboration between Hollywood and the military, from the 
propagandist role of the Office of War Information (OWI) during WWII to the 
Pentagon Film Office’s conditions for providing funding and equipment. This brief 
history is intended to contextualise how ‘any understanding of the “genre” of 
Hollywood war movies has to begin by seeing the conditions of their production as an 
institutionalised compromise’ (11). In order to explore how such conditions operated 
during the Iraq War, Barker then examines the production context and discourse 
generated around the unreleased film No True Glory as an early indication of the 
demarcations of what specific topics and approaches are deemed commercially (and 




Nothing “policy-oriented”, nothing “political”, just “human experience” and 
“grand natural human drama” […] a widely-assumed and utterly disabling 
discursive argument: that to be patriotic is above and beyond politics. (21)   
 
He also infers that ‘it is as if the actual 2004 [sic] invasion is off bounds’, since in a 
post-Vietnam context ‘there can be no ambiguity attached to the idea of “America 
winning”’ (25). This context seems to pre-determine a continuation of the situation 
whereby ‘studio films have mainly become virtual advertisements for “America” and its 
military’ (11). Yet Barker in fact considers many of the Iraq War films to be ‘Statement 
Films’, which evince a ‘will to challenge viewers and promote rethinkings about the 
war and the US’s involvement in it’ (118). He argues that this is made possible 
primarily through subtle generic reconfigurations of the soldiering experience, a terrain 
which is not so conclusively micro-managed by studio interference.  
In Barker’s account, there are ‘three strands of “being an American soldier”’: the 
‘disciplined, restrained and courteous’ mode of ‘parade behaviour’, ‘barracks-
behaviour, which is crude, macho’, and ‘battle-behaviour, where American soldiers are 
constructed as confused, distressed and overwhelmed by experiencing hostility’ (32). 
He argues that in the ‘least political’ of the films, ‘the line dividing them is maintained’ 
(32). Thus, although the soldiers may appear offensive, casually racist and/or sexist 
when off-duty, ‘the moment they step out onto the streets of Iraq they become innocent, 
bewildered and desperate’ (33). In the ‘more political films’, on the other hand, ‘the line 
creaks if not breaks and […] elements of the bad behaviour cut loose in their treatment 
of civilians’ (33). This is pushed to the furthest extreme in Redacted, which effects a 
‘complete breakdown’ of these boundaries and ‘steps outside the realm of acceptable 
debate, because [de Palma] casts structured doubt on the innocence of American 
soldiers’ (40). 
Barker’s reading of Redacted is also interesting in the relationship it posits 
between the ostensible evidentiality of soldiers’ video diaries and the critical mode of 
the Iraq war Statement Film. He notes that the wave of soldiers’ videos uploaded to 
YouTube (prior to military restrictions) ‘created a recognisable look to the conflict’  
which has been cinematographically emulated in many of the fiction films, yet is 
sceptical about their ‘trustworthiness’ as evidential documents since ‘so much is clearly 
staged, posed, and edited’ (36). Redacted, he argues, ‘takes most seriously not just the 
look of soldiers’ videos, but also their implications for who is telling the stories, and 
what their accounts of war may reveal or hide [emphasis in original]’ (36). Barker 
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claims that the aesthetic of the film is not simply geared to convey some vague sense of 
authenticity, but rather to challenge the very perspective of such videos, emphasise that 
‘soldiers’ self-accounts should not be taken on trust [emphasis in original]’, and 
demonstrate how they may be turned into ‘evidence against the military’ (131; 37). 
Issues of indexicality and evidence are not addressed in much detail outside of the 
discussion of Redacted, with the focus of the work remaining largely upon fiction, to 
the exclusion of documentary. Yet Barker does specifically explore the employment of 
non-fictional tropes via the phenomenon of fictional war films which ‘put considerable 
effort into presenting themselves as “based in reality”’ (25). He considers this tendency 
as a deliberate agenda to simultaneously exploit ‘authenticating claims’ without the risk 
of being accused of historical inaccuracy, while employing fictional tropes to ‘maximise 
the emotional possibilities’ (120). This resembles the strategy of propaganda, in the 
sense of a fictional-historical hybrid which freely employs the generic tropes of fiction 
to allow the audience easy points of identification but also encourages ‘the application 
of these emotions to the lived world’ (120).  
Finally, I would like to consider Barker’s account of PTSD in the Iraq war films 
as an adjunct to Guy Westwell’s view of the therapeutic trend in Vietnam films. 
Examining the group of films which depict the homecoming of US soldiers (notably In 
the Valley of Elah, Grace is Gone [2007], Badland [2007], Home of the Brave [2006] 
and Stop-Loss), Barker identifies a range of generic features which typify the split 
between ‘over there’ and ‘over here’. Soldiers return from an ‘unknown, unpredictable’ 
and ‘inexplicably hostile’ environment to an America dominated by ‘deceitful 
officialdom’ and a ‘glib uncaring civilian population’, rendering home ‘emptied of 
opportunities, of relationships, of fields of meaningful action’ (164). Yet the critical 
potential of such a division, Barker argues, is largely glossed through the notion of 
PTSD which ‘packages soldiers’ responses to war as bundles of symptoms within the 
individual’ (85). This forestalls political exploration of ‘soldiers’ increasing discontent 
with the war’, and, in the case of In the Valley of Elah, even functions as ‘an acceptable 
excuse for the soldiers’ brutality’ (85; 98). By individualising and psychologising their 
responses, then, it achieves an effect of depoliticisation which clearly parallels the 
Vietnam veteran’s psychological quest for order as identified by Westwell. Barker 
concludes that:  
 
PTSD has come to function as a key metaphor for America inspecting itself 
within safe margins. What does it achieve? It offers soldiers a self-justifying 
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account of their situation. It “explains” abuses as unintentional outbursts. It 
generates positive-smelling narratives. It helps make suffering “American”. It 
provides a bridge across conservatives and liberals in America. And it buffers an 
entire Foucauldian industry […] What it does not do is actually heal the psychic 




 Collectively, the studies of the war film surveyed above largely subsume 
questions of technology within the framework of military authenticity and film’s 
capacity to indexically and mimetically represent the ‘the actual apparatus of war’ 
(Westwell 3). Digital modes of imaging war comprise a negligible element in each of 
these works. Eberwein’s brief analysis of Iraq War cinema notes the centrality of ‘cell 
phone images’ to their mise-en-scène, but does not extrapolate from this to discuss the 
wider relationship between film and new media (134). Westwell does implicitly relate 
the ‘difficulty of representing the Gulf War, and perhaps war in general post-Vietnam’ 
to Courage Under Fire’s diegetic conflict between ‘the hyperreality of the news 
coverage and the subjective, unreliable memories of the participants’, thus evoking a 
fundamental schism between digital mediation and military subjectivities, but ultimately 
folds these issues back into a more familiar framework of the propaganda function of 
television news and the possibility of ‘rescripting the disruptive cultural memory of the 
Vietnam War’ (86; 89). Martin Barker’s reading of Redacted perhaps comes closest to 
addressing the effects of digital media per se through the discussion of how soldiers’ 
video diaries assume a culturally-ascribed sense of authenticity which is interrogated by 
de Palma’s depiction of them, yet even here the theoretical framework applied remains 
distinctly anchored to the propagandist question of how war cinema combines non-
fictional elements with an emotive mode of address in order to inspire ‘the application 
of these emotions to the lived world’ (120). No explicit attention is devoted in any of 
these works to theorising how digital technologies within the military apparatus (such as 
drones, satellites or simulations) may have affected the representational practices of 
cinema. Instead, these historical narratives of the war film tend to posit stylistic 
evolutions in the genre as fundamentally dependent upon political discourses, with the 
diegetic tendency to privilege the embodied perspectives of soldiers typically figured as 
enacting a withdrawal from political contextualisation. In accordance with the primary 
research question of this thesis, however, I intend to examine this turn to subjectivity a 
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little more closely, and explore to what extent it may be technologically, rather than 
purely politically, motivated. 
Having juxtaposed these parallel histories of military imaging technologies and 
war cinema, it is, firstly, interesting to note that Vietnam emerges as a marked point of 
disruption in both accounts. Within film history, this crisis is posited in largely political 
terms, as a defeat which is irreconcilable with mythic notions of US military and moral 
supremacy developed (in part) through the propaganda campaigns of previous wars. It 
thereby instigates an inward turn for the war film, toward increasingly subjective and 
psychologised portrayals of the experience of war, with the restoration of the Vietnam 
veteran’s psychological order attempting to synecdochically fill in for an implied 
mythic-historical order. In the post-Vietnam context, this tendency to focus upon 
subjective experience is not only generically perpetuated but, to a certain degree, 
institutionalised by the military funding conditions outlined by Barker, which explicitly 
substitute ‘human experience’ for the ‘political’ (21). 
In Virilio’s account of military imaging, however, the crisis point of Vietnam is 
essentially figured in technological terms, as the climactic moment of the ‘derangement 
of perception in an environment where military technology is distorting not only the 
battlefield, but also, and especially, the space-time of vision’ (90-91). The supplanting 
of embodied perception by a post-human form of machinic vision is encapsulated by the 
description of the pilot as ‘imprisoned in the closed circuit of electronics’, while the 
advent of ‘pilotless aircraft’ and ‘large-scale electronic [war] games’ also appear as 
definitive elements of the Vietnam era process of virtualising distanciation that Virilio 
demarcates (106; 15; 108). Within the contours of Virilio’s argument this appears to 
constitute a continuation of the ‘cinematic’ derealisation of warfare, as experienced by 
military personnel, which he posits as a singular and continuous process dating from 
WWI. Yet by reading War and Cinema in conjunction with subsequent works by Der 
Derian, Lenoir and Stahl, it becomes more apparent that the cinematic techniques 
described by Virilio were, at the time of the Vietnam War, in the process of being 
supplanted by the digitisation of military technologies. Collaborations between the 
military and the gaming industry, as highlighted by Lenoir, feed into the production of 
the NTC and ICT’s virtual warfare environments, while the digital interfaces of 
remotely operated weaponry subsequently begin to evince a stronger aesthetic 
continuity with the CG realms of gaming than with cinema per se. For Stahl, this is 
reflected in a new regime of digitally mediated warfare in which the interactive appeal 
of gaming becomes the ‘primary interface governing the civic experience of war’ (18).  
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This digital turn in the wider military-technological context thus appears, 
contrary to Virilio’s framing of it, as somewhat disruptive of the historical alliance 
between the military and film. In aesthetic terms, the indexical bond between cinema 
and the military apparatus emphasised by both Westwell and Eberwein has been 
usurped by digital convergence, with new military modes of imaging war now more 
likely to be perceived as ontologically continuous with the realm of gaming. 
Furthermore, the digital enabling of remotely operated weaponry systems entails an 
increasing distanciation of the (military) body from the space of combat, in a process of 
virtualisation which presents a peculiar conundrum for embodied cinematic 
representations of war. As the experience of war becomes inseparable from this kind of 
digitally networked, screen-based mediation, one might therefore question whether the 
war film’s turn to embodied and/or psychological subjectivities might be posited not 
only as a retreat from the Vietnam War’s traumatic disruption of mythic national 
identity, but also a means to escape the virtualising and potentially alienating effect of 
incorporating layers of extra-cinematic mediation within the frame. To give a 
contemporary example in which this trend of technological distanciation is now greatly 
advanced, one could argue that the digital interfaces of satellite surveillance footage and 
remotely operated drone attacks are equally as disruptive to the aesthetic and moral 
codes of cinematically mediated war as was the historical experience of defeat in 
Vietnam. Does cinema’s turn to subjective experience, then, aim to re-ground a 
nostalgically cinematic sense of realism, enacted as a withdrawal from the 
‘technological vertigo’ of military personnel interfacing with digital screens (Virilio 
106)? Might cinema in this regard serve a validating or authenticising function toward 
the scenario of contemporary warfare which counterbalances the wider tendency toward 
virtualisation and simulation?   
This diegetic relationship between embodiment and military-technological 
mediation is under-theorised within film studies, yet is clearly a key issue for the 
continued relevance of cinematic representations of war in the digital era. Although the 
above accounts of the genre do not address remediations of military technologies as 
such, Westwell and Barker do however devote some attention to the authenticising 
evocation of other media technologies within the history of the war film. Indeed, in 
Westwell’s War Cinema, the embodied perspectives of Platoon and Saving Private 
Ryan are not only allied to the depoliticising effect of therapeutic internalisation, but 
also interestingly linked to the heightened reality-effect of an aesthetic mimicry of 
documentary, war photography and television news. This conjunction of intensified 
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subjectivity and an authenticising hyper-realist aesthetic is in itself suggestive of the 
notion that the war film’s subjective turn may be technologically motivated, since the 
desire to authenticise via the evocation of analogue media implies that the perceived 
authenticity of the war film’s embodied mode of address is in some way threatened. Of 
course, this is not to say that the war film’s references to other media emerge 
contemporaneously with the digital, since these genre histories emphasise that the 
practice may date back as far as the Spanish-American War. Nonetheless, there remains 
a distinct possibility that an increased dependence on asserting continuity with non-
fictional forms of war mediation such as documentary/newsreel and journalistic 
photography may be considered an attempt to bolster the genre’s realist grounding 
during a period in which military modes of imaging war were beginning to take on a 
digitised form that is somewhat less compatible with this cinematic aesthetic. 
This raises the question of whether a comparable form of remediation persists in 
contemporary manifestations of this subjective turn in the genre, and of whether it has 
shifted to embrace digital forms of war mediation or remains anchored to these 
preceding analogue forms. The above delineated military-technological context, coupled 
with the possibility that online video platforms such as YouTube have arguably 
supplanted the documentary/newsreel tradition as the contemporary aesthetic 
benchmark of non-fictional authenticity, might suggest that there is an inherent 
dissonance between war cinema’s embodied subjective grounding and remediations of 
the digital. Yet Barker’s reading of Redacted suggests that this may be an emergent 
tendency within the genre. For even if de Palma is attempting to subvert the 
evidentiality of military video diaries, it still implies that the ‘recognisable look’ they 
have lent to the conflict is at least capable of being harnessed in a comparable manner 
to, for example, Saving Private Ryan’s citation of Robert Capa’s photography (36). Of 
course, it is important in such discussions to avoid any essentialising claims regarding 
the inherent ‘realism’ of any particular media, speculative claims of which are 
impossible to measure and of dubious value. Yet it seems worthwhile nonetheless to 
trace the shifting values and aesthetics of realism as they correspond to differing media 
or platforms, since it has a significant bearing upon the war film’s relationship to the 
wider media context and questions of technology. It also seems pertinent to question 
whether films such as Redacted are indicative of the war film’s relinquishing of the 
subjective turn in favour of embracing the fragmentary and virtualising effects of digital 
convergence, or a sign that embodied and digital aesthetics might combine in 
contemporary war cinema in unanticipated ways. To clarify, though, my focus 
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throughout the thesis will principally be on specifically military forms of digital 
mediation rather than civilian/communicative modes of digitally mediating war, though 
the role of the latter in these studies of the genre should provide some indication of how 
the former may function. There is also inevitably some degree of overlap between them 
since drones, for instance, are increasingly being adapted for commercial purposes 
(such as Amazon’s delivery drones) and as a (civilian) filmmaking tool.  
In summary, then, there are three key interrelated issues raised by this 
disjunction between histories of military technology and of war cinema, each of which 
requires an expanded, inter-disciplinary framework to suitably address. The first, and 
broadest, concerns the relationship between the war film and digital technologies, which 
I will contextualise using Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin’s Remediation: 
Understanding New Media. Secondly, for the relationship between embodied and 
digital forms of mediation, I will turn to the works of Mark Hansen. Although a distinct 
theoretical framework for theorising embodiment within film studies does of course 
exist, I believe Hansen’s innovative work on new media art and virtual reality provides 
a more pertinent contextualisation of the digital and intermedial role of embodied 
perception which is readily adaptable to analysing this dynamic with reference to 
contemporary military technologies. Thirdly, given that the above works serve to 
elucidate military subjectivities as increasingly defined by remote, screen-based 
mediation, there is a curious convergence of military and spectatorial subject positions 
relative to the (virtual) scene of contemporary warfare. This is principally emphasised 
by Der Derian’s argument that wars are now ‘fought in the same manner as they are 
represented’, with the body relocated away from a combat space which is now militarily 
mediated in a manner similar to its representation for the civilian audience (xxxi). 
Stahl’s notion of the ‘virtual-citizen-soldier’ provides one method of interpreting this 
link, and his account of the spectatorial experience of depoliticised ‘death simulator[s]’ 
clearly designates a significant ethical dimension which I will explore in the thesis’ later 
discussions of spectatorial subject positions with reference to works by Michele Aaron, 
Lilie Chouliaraki and Libby Saxton (43). However, to theorise this relationship between 
diegetic/military and spectatorial subjectivities in more of an intermedial context, I will 
also draw upon three studies of immersion by Marie-Laure Ryan, Alison Griffiths and 
John Belton. Following summaries of each of the above mentioned works, I will briefly 
indicate how they will be deployed in the subsequent research chapters. I will then 
formulate my overarching research questions more specifically, and provide a concise 






 Although it is now seventeen years since the original publication of Bolter and 
Grusin’s Remediation, and certain sections may appear somewhat outdated (particularly 
the analyses of gaming, rooted in readings of Doom, Myst, etc.), its core concepts 
remain highly relevant to this study of the war film’s permeation by digital interfaces. It 
may be useful to begin by defining some key terms, since I will be using ‘remediation’, 
‘immediacy’ and ‘hypermediacy’ in the same sense as Bolter and Grusin, though 
applying them to new contexts. Remediation is, quite simply, defined as ‘the 
representation of one medium in another’ (45). The illustrative examples provided 
predominantly involve digital remediations of earlier media, such as viewing images of 
paintings through a web browser, yet it is simultaneously stressed that remediation 
precedes the digital, as in paintings which remediate maps or letters. As I have 
mentioned, my work will invert the more common focus on digital remediations of 
analogue forms to examine the incorporation of digital technologies within (war) 
cinema. The digitisation of cinema itself may initially appear to present something of a 
hindrance to the use of this framework, though it is worth highlighting that my use of 
the concept of ‘remediation’, following Bolter and Grusin, is not necessarily predicated 
upon the possibility of discretely distinguishing medial frames and ascribing distinct 
forms or effects to each. Contrary to the technological determinism that the authors 
ascribe to Marshall McLuhan, they repeatedly insist that they are not ascribing agency 
to technologies as such but rather examining material practices and contexts across a 
range of essentially hybrid media forms. The media hybridity of the digital era is most 
forcefully expressed in the claim that ‘all mediation is remediation […] at this extended 
historical moment’, since no medium ‘can now function independently and establish its 
own separate and purified space of cultural meaning’ (55).    
Among these hybrid forms, then, Bolter and Grusin argue that there exist ‘twin 
preoccupations of contemporary media: the transparent presentation of the real and the 
enjoyment of the opacity of media themselves’ (21). They emphasise that the notion of 
the ‘real’ in the above definition is not, however, intended in ‘any metaphysical sense’, 
but rather connotes ‘that which would evoke an immediate (and therefore authentic) 
emotional response’ in the viewer (53). The former tendency, typically referred to as 
transparent or immersive immediacy, is outlined primarily in relation to virtual reality 
as ‘the medium that best expresses the contemporary definition of the self as a roving 
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point of view’ through its ‘refashioning point-of-view editing, as it has developed in the 
Hollywood film tradition’ (161). The purest, albeit imaginary, instantiation of this logic 
is identified as the ‘wire’ in Kathryn Bigelow’s Strange Days (1995), a ‘fanciful 
extrapolation of virtual reality’ in which the medium effaces itself entirely and thus 
reveals the ‘goal of unmediated visual experience’ (4). The ‘enjoyment of the opacity of 
media’, on the other hand, is designated as hypermediacy. In contrast to the ‘unified 
visual space’ of immediacy, Bolter and Grusin propose that ‘contemporary 
hypermediacy offers a heterogeneous space, in which representation is conceived of not 
as a window onto the world, but rather as “windowed” itself – with windows that open 
on to other representations or other media’ (34). This notion of ‘windowed’ has obvious 
computing connotations, but is also implicitly linked to modes of remediation which 
make little or no attempt to conceal such reframing (i.e. lacking transparency) and also 
to postmodern forms of reflexivity.      
Though immediacy and hypermediacy thus appear to be opposed tendencies, it 
is consistently stressed that they are actually ‘complementary rather than contradictory’ 
(233). Hypermediacy is essentially considered by Bolter and Grusin as an alternative 
means of achieving the ‘same desire’ for authentic, ‘real’ experience that is provided by 
‘transparent media’ in a more immersive fashion (53). One example provided to 
illustrate this convergence of hypermediacy with immediacy is a webcam stream from 
Mars, which manifests a high-tech spectacle consistent with hypermediacy but 
simultaneously offers a static and transparent point-of-view which provides the viewer 
with an immediate ‘window onto the world’ (205-207).  
Bolter and Grusin further correlate immediacy and hypermediacy with the 
modes of spectatorial subjectivity that each entails under the rubric of “The Remediated 
Self”, arguing: 
 
Accordingly, there are two versions of the contemporary mediated self that 
correspond to the two logics of remediation. When we are faced with media that 
operate primarily under the logic of transparent immediacy (virtual reality and 
three-dimensional computer graphics), we see ourselves as a point of view 
immersed in an apparently seamless visual environment. In a virtual environment, 
we have the freedom to alter our selves by altering our point of view and to 
empathise with others by occupying their point of view – techniques pioneered in 
film and now extended and intensified in digital media. At the same time, the 
logic of hypermediacy, expressed in digital multimedia and networked 
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environments, suggests a definition of the self whose key quality is not so much 
“being immersed” as “being interrelated or connected” (232) 
 
The description of spectatorial experience under the ‘logic of transparent immediacy’ 
will likely appear as the more familiar model of the two to film scholars, as Bolter and 
Grusin explicitly acknowledge that this form of embodied identification derives from 
cinema. The alternate mode of ‘connected’, hypermediated spectatorship, while 
somewhat ambiguously outlined here, may be indicative of an emergent mode of 
digitally networked spectatorial experience that correlates more closely with new 
media-technological forms of representing conflict. This networked logic may also 
function as an apt delineation of the modes of military subjectivity engendered by the 
digital interfaces of remote combat mediation. As such, this dynamic between 
immersion and connectivity will structure my analyses of both military and spectatorial 
subject positions relative to the immediacy or hypermediacy with which military 




Mark Hansen’s phenomenological studies of embodiment in works such as New 
Philosophy for New Media and Bodies in Code are oriented primarily around 
contemporary artists’ work with new media, and thus fall outside the typical purview of 
film studies approaches to the topic. The turn to this somewhat less familiar theoretical 
framework here can be partially attributed to Hansen’s engagement with a range of 
emergent digital interfaces such as virtual reality environments which (as I will discuss 
in further detail below) are central to the changes being wrought in the mediation of 
warfare by digital technologies. My recourse to Hansen’s work is further motivated, 
however, by the prevalence of a particularly reductive approach to digital media which 
permeates the established lineage of film-phenomenological theorisations of 
embodiment. This is exemplified by Vivian Sobchack’s “The Scene of the Screen: 
Envisioning Photographic, Cinematic, and Electronic ‘Presence’”, a seminal work 
within the field which can arguably be framed as one of the key progenitors of a 
somewhat essentialist division between cinematic and digital forms of mediation. 
First published in 1994, “The Scene of the Screen” posits a tripartite division of 
the ways in which spectatorial encounters with photography, cinema and digital media 
generate distinct forms of embodied experience and ‘transform us as embodied subjects 
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[emphasis in original]’ (136). Each medium is ascribed a ‘cultural logic’ (drawn from 
the work of Frederic Jameson), to which Sobchack adds a further ‘phenomeno-logic’ 
(140). Thus, photography is aligned with market capitalism and realism, cinema with 
monopoly capitalism and modernism, and the electronic with multinational capitalism 
and postmodernism. The photographic, in Sobchack’s account, offers a sense of 
‘objectification’ and the ‘material possession’ of a moment in time, but at the cost of 
being able to ‘entertain […] the presence of a lived and living body’ (144). Analogising 
the leap from the photographic to the cinematic with reference to Chris Marker’s La 
Jetée (1962), Sobchack posits a ‘difference between the transcendental, posited moment 
of the photograph and the existential momentum of the cinema, between the scene to be 
contemplated and the scene as it is lived [emphasis in original]’ (145).  Cinematic 
spectatorship is thus essentially characterised by a sense of embodied presence, which is 
further construed as ‘subjective and intentional, as presenting representation’ (148). 
Cinema’s novel ability to make ‘visible for the very first time […] the very structure and 
process of subjective, embodied vision [emphasis in original]’, coupled with the insight 
into intersubjectivity generated by the iteration of this process, is what distinguishes the 
medium as producing ‘a meaningful aesthetically and ethically articulated experience’ 
(147). 
However, for Sobchack, the logic of the electronic enacts a fundamental rupture 
of cinema’s ‘mobile, embodied, and ethically invested subject [emphasis in original]’ 
(147). Embodied presence cedes to ‘an alternative and absolute electronic world of 
immaterialised – if materially consequential – experience […] [which] incorporates the 
spectator/user uniquely in a spatially decentred, weakly temporalized and quasi-
disembodied (or diffusely embodied) state’ (153). Since embodiment and ethical value 
are so closely aligned in Sobchack’s account of the cinematic, the disembodying effect 
of digital mediation further leads to a voiding of perceived ethical consequence via ‘its 
lack of specific and explicit interest and grounded investment in the human body and 
enworlded action, its free-floating levelling of value, and its saturation with the present’, 
which, Sobchack bluntly concludes, ‘could well cost us all a future’ (159). Although 
Sobchack attempts to circumvent charges of technological determinism through the 
Heideggerian refrain that ‘the essence of technology is nothing technological’ and an 
emphasis on the ways in which these ‘phenomeno-logics’ are contextually and socio-
culturally determined, “The Scene of the Screen” nonetheless exemplifies a pervasive 
tendency within film phenomenology to exclude digital media from the privileged 
cinematic realm of embodied meaning and ethical value (137).  
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Indeed, the same underlying a priori value judgements of media can be seen in 
Jennifer M. Barker’s work. “Touch and the Cinematic Experience” quite explicitly 
relies on the materiality of the filmic apparatus to link embodied spectatorship to the 
‘body’ of the film. This process is analogised through the Quay Brothers’ Street of 
Crocodiles (1986), with the film’s archaic mechanical puppeteering said to ‘literalise 
the palpable connection between film and spectator that exists in all cinematic 
experiences’ (149). Barker rhapsodises ‘the caress of shimmering nitrate and the scratch 
and dust and fibre on celluloid, […] the film’s rush through a projector’s gate and the 
“breathing” of lenses’, and characterises spectatorial sensation by ‘the press of our 
bodies against our seat, the chill in the theatre’, in the process revealing how this 
phenomenological framework is fundamentally embedded within a largely defunct 
conception of the (pre-digital) cinematic apparatus and a viewing scenario which is 
similarly being eroded by the ubiquity of digital viewing devices (151; 154). While 
Barker’s view of digital media remains implicit within “Touch and the Cinematic 
Experience”, The Tactile Eye engages with cinema’s incorporation of digital techniques 
more directly (if somewhat briefly). Discussing the use of digital tracking shots in films 
such as Run Lola Run (1998), Fight Club (1999) and The Matrix (1999), Barker 
contends that they ‘capitalise on computer imagery to mark an insurmountable 
difference between the film’s body and the viewer’s body’, simultaneously ‘thrilling’ 
and ‘unsettling’ the viewer since ‘these shots don’t correspond to our body’s experience 
at all’ (117-118).  
Clearly, adopting this kind of phenomenological framework to examine the 
remediation of military digital interfaces within war cinema would be somewhat 
problematic. My approach, as indicated by the use of Bolter and Grusin’s Remediation, 
is premised upon a more poststructuralist view of film and digital media, one which 
acknowledges their inseparable hybridity in the production and dissemination of the 
contemporary war cinema. Although it is possible that certain forms of digital mediation 
– particularly within a military context – may engender some degree of disembodiment, 
I am disinclined to begin this study with the assumption that only the ‘purely’ cinematic 
image invokes an embodied mode of spectatorship, since this would appear to foreclose 
the reading of emergent digital forms (such as drones and simulations) on a rather 
technologically-determinist basis.                   
This is not dismiss the entire realm of film phenomenology, of course, since 
works such as Laura U. Marks’ Touch: Sensuous Theory and Multisensory Media do 
evince a more nuanced approach to the relationship between film and digital media. For 
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instance, Marks parallels the materiality of ‘this video whose demagnetization speaks of 
memory loss [emphasis in original]’ with the ‘scratches and splices’ of film, as Touch 
explicitly sets out to ‘explore how a haptic approach might rematerialize our objects of 
perception, especially now that optical visuality is being refitted as a virtual 
epistemology for the digital age’ (xii; xiii). Significantly, this ‘optic visuality’ is not 
framed as an inherent quality of digital media, but rather as ‘the product of specific 
practices […] centrally, the military, medical, and other instrumental practices that 
construct the user of interactive tools and games as a disembodied and sovereign 
subject’ (xxi). She then proceeds to examine how ‘electronic media’ artworks may 
contest such disembodying practices in favour of more ‘implicated and embodied’ 
applications of digital media (xxi).  
Marks’ phenomenology of embodiment seems, therefore, better equipped than 
that of Sobchack and Barker to address the contemporary interrelationship between 
cinema and digital media. Indeed, Touch also employs a methodology that distinctly 
parallels that of Mark Hansen, particularly through the examination of ways in which 
new media art may catalyse new forms of embodied experience in contradistinction to 
military and other ‘instrumental’ applications of digital media. Yet my decision to draw 
more extensively on Hansen’s work is based largely on the more contemporaneous 
corpus of new media art encountered in New Philosophy for New Media and Bodies in 
Code, particularly the prevalence of virtual reality installations which overlap in 
intriguing ways with some of the military applications of digital technology which I will 
study in the following chapters. 
Prior to a more substantial outline of the two above mentioned works, it is perhaps 
worth briefly noting the embodied phenomenology of cinema set forth in Hansen’s first 
monograph, Embodying Technesis. Drawing upon Walter Benjamin’s ‘tactile model of 
filmic reception’, Hansen suggests that it provides a productive ‘shift of focus from 
image content to medium as the locus of the image’s mimetic impact’ (247; 260). In this 
account, film is fundamentally a ‘shock experience’, which ‘impact[s] us at the deepest 
level of our embodied experience, prior to the mediation of memory’ and thus ‘fails to 
leave any cognitive traces’ (239). This is justified through the somewhat speculative 
neurological claim of a ‘third experiential agency (perceptual consciousness) […] 
specifically intended to register the corporeal dimension of technology’s experiential 
impact [emphasis in original]’ as the site which receives the stimuli of film (245).  
Hansen claims that film is therefore unique is this respect as a ‘predominantly 
corporeal form of art’ (255). Despite the ocular connotations of ‘perceptual 
35 
 
consciousness’, Hansen forcefully emphasises that the experience of film is primarily 
tactile and affective, rather than visual and cognitive. This ‘autonomous and potentially 
empowering’ experience of the ‘singularity of filmic tactility’, Hansen claims, enables 
the restoration of a ‘sensuous […] contact with the cosmos’, which is simultaneously 
‘our best means of insuring against a repetition of world destruction on the order of our 
century’s great and horrible world wars’ and an increase in ‘our command over the very 
medium of capitalism’s extensive mimetic power’ (260-263). Finally, Hansen notes that 
‘Benjamin’s example can help us construct the analytical tools we need to resist the 
seductions of disembodiment projected by contemporary reproductive and virtual 
technologies’ (263). 
New Philosophy for New Media picks up this thread of embodiment’s relation to 
virtual technologies, and sees Hansen’s focus shift rather definitively away from film 
towards new media art appearing in the wake of digital convergence. The overarching 
argument of this work is that, contrary to claims of humanity’s redundancy in the face 
of formless digital information and machinic vision, the digital in fact necessitates a 
bodily ‘enframing’ of this information. From theoretical accounts of digital convergence 
such as Friedrich Kittler’s, Hansen accepts the notion that the digital has erased (or at 
least has the potential to erase) the differences between media. The digital thus 
‘explodes the frame [emphasis in original]’ of previously distinct media interfaces, 
resulting in a ‘pure flow of data unencumbered by any need to differentiate into 
concrete media types, or in other words, to adapt itself to the constraints of human 
perceptual ratios’ (35; 2). However, Hansen insists that this does not eliminate the 
human body from the loop of information, but rather provokes the realisation that ‘there 
occurs a displacement of the framing function of medial interfaces back onto the body 
from which they themselves originally sprang [emphasis in original]’ (22). 
This notion of the ‘framing function’ of the human body, which has been 
obscured ‘beneath any concrete “technical” image or frame’, is initially analogised 
through Henri Bergson’s view of the body as ‘a kind of filter that selects, from among 
the universe of images circulating around it and according to its own embodied 
capacities, precisely those that are relevant to it’ (8; 3). Yet Hansen attempts to rework 
Bergson’s theory of perception in adaptation to the digital era, such that it is no longer a 
flux of images from which the body selects or frames, but rather a flux of formless 
digitised information. Thus, he argues that ‘rather than selecting pre-existent images, 
the body now operates by filtering information directly and, through this process, 
creating images [emphasis in original]’ (11). For Hansen, this marks a creative 
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‘empowerment’ of the body since it ‘enframe[s] something (digital information) that is 
originally formless [emphasis in original]’ (11). 
This shift is effected simultaneously (and in complexly interrelated ways) through 
a technological evolution from image to information and the parallel corporeal 
trajectory from perception to affect. On the technological level, Hansen notes how the 
inhuman speed which characterises machinic vision (i.e. the computerised processing of 
images) does, in a sense, render human perceptual capacities redundant. In other words, 
‘because our bodies cannot keep pace with the speed of (technical) vision, we literally 
cannot see what the machine can sees, and we thus risk being left out of the perceptual 
loop altogether’ (103). Furthermore, machinic vision simply has no correlate to a single 
or grounded human perspective, functioning instead as a total ‘dataspace’ and 
demonstrating a ‘radical resistance […] to any possible human negotiation’ through the 
‘abandoning of any particular perspectival anchoring [emphasis in original]’ (96). This 
is exemplified through the ‘perspectival crisis’ of viewing Robert Lazzarini’s skulls, 
which ‘confront[s] the viewer with a projection of a warped space that refuses to map 
onto her habitual spatial schematising’, and thus puts human perspective into conflict 
with ‘the weird logic and topology of the computer’ (200-202).  
There is a disjunctive sense, then, that ‘the body is heterogeneous to the flux of 
information […] [and] can only be supplemental to this flux – something introduced 
into it or imposed on it from the outside, from elsewhere [emphasis in original]’ (123). 
Yet, as Hansen demonstrates in his reading of skulls, the impossibility of visual mastery 
of this fundamentally ‘heterogeneous’ realm summons instead an affective response, as 
‘our visual faculties are rendered useless and we experience a shift to an alternate mode 
of perception rooted in our bodily faculty of proprioception’ (203). This ‘affective 
proprioception’ is defined as ‘a form of bodily vision that has no intrinsic correlation 
with what is seen, that does not function in the service of perception, and that 
consequently defines a creative, autopoietic response on the part of the body itself 
[emphasis in original]’ (229). 
Although this replacement of the perceptual with the affective may be, at least in 
part, technologically motivated, Hansen is eager to stress that the affective is in no way 
inferior, or merely a ‘supplement to perception’, but rather ‘the privileged modality for 
confronting technologies that are fundamentally heterogeneous to our already 
constituted embodiment, our contracted habits and rhythms [emphasis in original]’ 
(133). Indeed, Hansen attempts to undercut any sense of the superiority of the visual 
over the affective through the claim that ‘optical vision derives from proprioceptive and 
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tactile “vision”’, that there is therefore an ‘affective basis for all so-called perceptual 
experience [emphasis in original]’ (110; 206).  
This notion of the affective underpinning of vision is explored primarily through 
the body’s capacity to generate space in Virtual Reality (VR) environments. Hansen 
notes how new media artworks such as Simon Penny’s Fugitive employ the VR 
interface in a manner which ‘coupl[es] the user with the image dynamically [emphasis 
in original]’, such that the virtual imagery is literally created by bodily movement (165). 
Similarly, Jeffrey Shaw’s Place: Ruhr provides the participant an experience of the 
‘exhilarating indifferentiation between your “subjective” embodied movement and the 
“objective” mechanical movement of the image’, and thus ‘collapse[s] perception back 
into (bodily) action, such that there occurs an indifferentiation between perception and 
the body’s kinaesthetic sense’ (47; 54). Such works, Hansen argues, serve to highlight 
the extent to which ‘perception in the VR interface […] can only take place in the body 
[emphasis in original]’ (163). This ‘production of space in the body’ or ‘bodily 
spacing’, marks VR as ‘the first properly “postimagistic” technology’, since the medium 
no longer serves as a ‘frame for perception’ but rather as the ‘technical supplementation 
of the human capacity for simulation [emphasis in original]’, i.e. the ‘body-brain’ 
achievement of creating space (167-170). 
Hansen’s view of VR, then, radically diverges from those who claim it to be a 
disembodied experience. This, in Hansen’s account, is primarily because it has thus far 
been conceived as a purely visual experience. He observes how systems structured 
around ‘VR goggles and helmet[s]’ serve to ‘deploy vision as the privileged sense 
endowed with the task of mapping the human sensory apparatus onto new dataspaces’, 
and locates the theoretical correlate to this practice in accounts of VR such as Lev 
Manovich’s, which demonstrate a ‘neglect of the tactile dimensions of the interface’ 
(162; 40). Against such views, Hansen proposes a focus upon ‘the physical dimension 
that is at issue in the body’s experience of space, regardless of whether the space 
concerned is an actual physical space or a simulated, virtual one [emphasis in original]’ 
(40). 
Ultimately, Hansen believes that an embodied, affective engagement with VR 
(and, by implication, the wider field of digital information) can also serve to confer a 
sense of reality or belief to such experience in a manner that is no longer possible for 




Faced with the all-too-frequent contemporary predicament of “not being able to 
believe your eyes”, are we not indeed impelled to find other ways to ground 
belief, ways that reactivate the bodily modalities – tactility, affectivity, 
proprioception – from which images acquire their force and their “reality” in the 
first place? (105) 
 
For Hansen, then, purely visual interfaces with the digital appear to instil a sense of 
disbelief in the viewer/participant, while ‘putting the body to work (even in quite 
minimal ways) has the effect of conferring reality on an experience, of catalysing the 
creation of a singular affective experience’ (39). New Philosophy for New Media, 
however, contains a notable lack of examples regarding the former type of experience, 
the sole specific reference being to Paul Virilio’s description of the ‘virtual cockpit’ in 
Open Sky, which ‘recode[s] complexly embodied capacities as instrumental visual 
activities, entirely purified of any bodily dimension’ and thus instantiates the ‘tradeoff 
of visual automation: embodiment for efficiency’ (104).       
Bodies in Code, Hansen’s most recent work, continues the exploration of bodily 
engagement with digital interfaces. Here, Hansen claims the inauguration of a new 
paradigm of the digital, a ‘reimagining of VR as a mixed reality’ (2). This ‘second 
generation virtual (or mixed) reality’ is characterised by a ‘fluid interpenetration of 
realms’ in the place of formerly distinct virtual and physical modes (26; 2). In this 
context, exemplified by ‘mixed reality situations’ such as ‘comparing a two dimensional 
architectural drawing with a real-time three-dimensional visualisation’, Hansen asserts 
that the fluidity of the user’s transitions are enabled by embodied interaction, and claims 
a more widespread cultural recognition that ‘motor activity – not representationalist 
verisimilitude – holds the key to fluid and functional crossings between virtual and 
physical realms’ (8; 2). Even the future of ‘contemporary consumer electronics’ now 
lies in ‘extended scope they afford human agency’, rather than investing in ‘ever more 
immersive illusory spaces’ (3). Hansen summarises this renewed understanding of the 
virtual as follows:  
 
rather than conceiving the virtual as a total technical simulacrum and as the 
opening of a fully immersive, self-contained fantasy world, the mixed reality 
paradigm treats it as simply one more realm among others that can be accessed 
through embodied perception […] emphasis falls less on the content of the virtual 
than on the means of access to it, less on what is perceived that on how it comes 




The titular ‘body in code’ is defined as ‘a body submitted to and constituted by an 
unavoidable and empowering technical deterritorialisation – a body whose embodiment 
is realised, and can only be realised, in conjunction with technics [emphasis in 
original]’ (20). In order to theorise this contemporary conjunction of embodiment and 
technics further, Hansen turns to Merleau-Ponty’s ‘phenomenology of embodiment’ as 
the framework for a ‘philosophy of embodied technics in which the excess constitutive 
of embodiment – the horizon of potentiality associated with the body schema – forms a 
ready conduit for incorporating the technical at the heart of human motility’ (39). 
Specifically, Hansen considers Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the ‘body schema’, 
exemplified by the blind person’s stick as prosthesis, as the beginning of a theorisation 
of technics which accounts for ‘an increase in power and scope of the body’s coupling 
to (and indifferentiation from) the environment’ (44). Hansen attempts to expand the 
notion of a body schema for the contemporary mixed reality context (in a similar 
manner to his use of Bergson in New Philosophy for New Media) to account for the 
‘total and seamless integration of the technical element into the perceptuomotor body 
schema’, since embodiment and technicity are now ‘complementary’, such that ‘neither 
one is the cause of the other […] neither one can be understood as a fall or 
contamination (or even a humanisation) of the other’ (44; 79). In conjunction with this 
use of Merleau-Ponty’s body schema, Hansen also attempts to reclaim ‘psychasthenia’ 
– defined as a ‘dissolution of boundaries between self and environment’ – from an 
‘image-based pathology’ into a creative account of the ‘tactile experience of the body’s 
interpenetration with the environment’ (126-130).  
Among the new media artworks analysed in Bodies in Code, there is one with a 
particular thematic relevance to contemporary warfare: Maurice Benayoun’s Worldskin. 
A 3D environment populated with 2D media images of warfare, Worldskin equips 
participants with cameras and thus invites them to document this virtual landscape of 
war. Yet each image captured by the participant’s camera is simultaneously removed 
from the virtual world (replaced by a blank space) and inscribed in a paper printout for 
the participant to retain. In Hansen’s reading, Worldskin aims ‘to catalyse a jump from 
the superficial level of the image as a neutralising “capture” of the world to a deeper 
level where it forms a trigger for the viewer’s active engagement with his or her agency 
in the world’ (90). Each ‘intervention’ by a participant therefore effects a 
‘transformation of the image from the superficial representation of the visible (the 
image of the body of the other) to the material traces or indices of the viewer’s 
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kinaesthetic movement (the blank spaces and the paper print-outs which uniquely 
inscribe the viewer’s position and orientation toward the images)’ (91). Hansen 
unequivocally privileges the bodily dimensions of interaction over any particular image 
content, and claims that the work ‘aligns the storage function of photography (and of 
tertiary memory more generally) with the insulated, distanced stance of the first-world 
image consumer’ (92). Ultimately, Hansen generalises this distinction between 
embodied interaction and ‘image consumption’, claiming a superior grounding and 
realising force for the former:  
 
This agonistic face-off with photography yields a fundamental reorientation of 
virtual technology that exposes virtual reality – at least as it exists in the world 
today – as mixed reality, as a dimension or property of the “real” world. Normally 
understood to be a form of passive immersion, a distancing fascination that 
insulates “first-world” spectator-citizens from the realm, as Žižek famously 
contended in his denunciation of Western reactions to 9/11, virtual reality here 
becomes a technical interface to the world that succeeds because it taps into the 





In this final section of the literature review, my aim is to develop a more 
concrete theoretical framework for studying the immersive mode of spectatorship as it 
relates to the war film. The works I survey cover a variety of media, but loosely follow 
a trajectory from VR to film, thus providing a historicisation and contextualisation of 
both digital and cinematic modes of immersion and the concomitant modes of 
subjectivity they structure. Currently, the concept of immersion as a mode of address or 
type of perceptual interface with media is encountered most often in discussions of VR 
technologies. In Mark Hansen’s work, the term appears initially in a discussion of 
Jeffrey Shaw’s Place: Ruhr, which exploits ‘the panoramic convention of immersive 
illusionism’ (New Philosophy for New Media 49). The nineteenth century panorama, 
which Hansen considers ‘the first system for immersing spectators within the space of a 
painting or two-dimensional representation [emphasis in original]’, is indeed invoked 
with some regularity by theorists/historians as the medial origin of the immersive ideal 
(85). Yet the Place works, in Hansen’s account, emphatically do not import the 
immersive mode into this new media context, but rather ‘layer’ media ‘in a way that 
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catalyses an experience quite different from the immersion normally invoked in 
reference to digital works’ (86).  
Hansen addresses this digital context of immersion more explicitly in Bodies in 
Code. Here, immersion is aligned with modes of conceiving VR as a purely visual 
simulation, as opposed to the fundamentally embodied interface that he proposes. 
Hansen refers to the way this tradition claims VR as a ‘total technical simulacrum […] 
the opening of a fully immersive, self-contained fantasy world’, and argues vehemently 
against such ocularcentric, disembodied modes of conceiving and employing VR 
technology (5). Reading Hansen’s work, there is nonetheless a distinct sense that this 
immersive mode of VR remains dominant as the ‘mainstream’ of ‘VR research’, and the 
form in which it is most often rendered through ‘popular culture’ (45; 113).  
Immersion can, however, be a rather slippery term to define, and is often applied 
inconsistently across differing critical approaches to media. While Hansen employs it to 
designate one specific mode of VR, Holly Willis, surveying many of the same new 
media artworks covered by Hansen, uses the term in almost exactly the opposite sense 
to designate ‘immersive installations’ which ‘creat[e] spaces within which the body as 
an entire entity experiences the artwork’ (85). Thus the term itself, in current 
employment, is somewhat lacking in exact significatory co-ordinates, particularly in 
relation to VR and the digital. 
A brief survey of two works which attempt to provide a more precise genealogy 
and phenomenological definition of immersion is perhaps useful then. The opening 
chapters of Marie-Laure Ryan’s Narrative as Virtual Reality: Immersion and 
Interactivity in Literature and Electronic Media chart the ‘rise and fall of immersive 
ideals’ in the ‘history of Western art’ particularly in structured opposition to a more 
formalist ‘aesthetic of play and self-reflexivity’ that characterises interactivity (2). Ryan 
fundamentally associates immersion with media that generate an ‘illusion of their 
presence’, particularly an ‘illusion of penetrable space’, and which thereby allow the 
viewer an experience of ‘the projection of a virtual body in a virtual space’ (2-3).   
Ryan locates the origin of immersion in the Renaissance development of 
perspective, which transforms painting from the realm of ‘symbolic representation’ into 
‘the projection of a three-dimensional space onto a two-dimensional surface’, a mode 
which clearly ‘assigns spatial coordinates […] to the body of the spectator’ (2). She then 
traces the evolution of visual media with a ‘sense of depth’ through ‘the stereoscopes of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Cinerama movies of the 1950s, which 
conveyed a sense of depth when they were viewed with special glasses, and the large-
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screen IMAX movies of the present’ to what is implicitly rendered as the ultimate 
realisation of immersive media: VR (53).   
In Ryan’s reading, the immersive quality of VR is primarily ‘facilitated by the 
illusionist quality of the display’, a distinctly visual sense of ‘the virtual world as 
autonomous reality’ (13). Through a rather literal interpretation of VR’s capacity to 
provide sensory engagement which equates the sense of touch with the use of ‘data 
gloves’, she claims that its ‘potential contribution to the expansion of the sensory 
dimensions of an image is really quite limited’ (55). Within the limited scope of visual 
experience, however, Ryan’s account does attempt a specific delineation of the 
conditions of immersion, which she denotes as ‘a sense of being surrounded, a sense of 
depth, and the possession of a roving point of view’ (53). Ryan notes the partial 
correspondence of these conditions to other media, observing that ‘movies allowed 
shifts in point of view […] but the spatial location of the virtual body of the spectator in 
the movie-world was rigidly determined by the location of the camera’, while the ‘first 
person video game […] offers a display that can be navigated’ in a manner akin to a 
more active roving point of view but only does so through a screen lacking in ‘three-
dimensional stereoscopic effects’ (54). VR, then, is ‘the only medium that combines the 
three properties of 360-degree panoramic picture, three-dimensional display, and a point 
of view controlled by the user’ (54). 
Ryan also speculates on the functional role of immersion within VR 
environments, arguing that in ‘practical applications’, ‘immersion is a means to 
guarantee the authenticity of the environment and the educational value of the actions 
taken by the user’ (66). Within a flight simulator, for example, ‘the usefulness of the 
system as a test of what a pilot will do with an actual airplane depends on its power to 
reproduce the complexity and stressful demands of real flight situations’ (66). This is 
perhaps a rather commonplace observation, but nonetheless serves to emphasise the 
vital link between immersion as verisimilitude and the efficiency of VR environments 
as simulative training (particularly in the context of military simulations). 
Alison Griffiths’ Shivers Down Your Spine: Cinema, Museums and the 
Immersive View also aims to define the conditions of immersive spectatorship, and 
explore the ways in which, across differing media, such ‘ways of seeing and 
significatory practices associated with one space become frames of reference for 
understanding subsequent architectural spaces and visual technologies’ (7). Griffiths 
focusses on ‘alternative modes of spectatorship’ – relative to the cinema – in cathedral 
architecture, the panorama, IMAX, the planetarium, and the museum (1). 
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Immersion is addressed at the level of ‘complex spatial relations and embodied 
modes of encountering visual spectacle’, and is defined quite extensively in an early 
passage (1): 
 
I use the term immersion in this book to explain the sensation of entering a space 
that immediately identifies itself as somehow separate from the world and that 
eschews conventional modes of spectatorship in favour of a more bodily 
participation in the experience […] The spatial relations in immersive viewing 
practices are often more complex, chaotic and improvised (with spectators being 
afforded a level of freedom to move and, in the case of the panorama, look where 
they want, for however long they want). One feels enveloped in immersive spaces 
and strangely affected by a strong sense of the otherness of the virtual world one 
has entered, neither fully lost in the experience nor completely in the here and 
now [emphasis in original] (2-3)  
 
What unites immersive spectatorship across media, then, is a sense of relatively 
unencumbered bodily engagement in connection with an ‘other’, self-enclosed space 
which affords a ‘visual spectacle that fills our field of vision, especially our peripheral 
vision’ (3). There is, therefore, a sense of ‘simulation and transportation’ involved in the 
experience of such alternate spaces, or a ‘heightened sensation of moving out of the 
immediate and into the hyper-real’ (6-7).  
Curiously, Griffiths omits any discussion of VR in this work, claiming that ‘what 
differentiates VR from the kind of immersive space I write about in Shivers is the 
intrinsically asocial nature of the VR experience’ since ‘the actual moment of donning 
headgear and gloves separates participant from spectator’ (8). Nonetheless, her case 
studies of the panorama and IMAX in particular do provide an insightful sense of the 
perceptual experience of immersive spectatorship and how these modes relate to other 
visual media. 
Griffiths’ account of the nineteenth century panorama is especially attentive to 
how modes of framing impact upon the level of viewers’ immersion. Noting how the 
positioning of the viewing platform often served to obscure the boundaries of the 
panoramic space, she argues that: 
 
With nothing within which to locate the canvas, the spectator was more likely to 
accept the realism of the visual field than if the painting had been conventionally 
framed and exhibited. Unlike the frame, which functions as a window onto an 
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illusionistically rendered space, the panorama attempted to create the sensation of 
the spectator’s physical relocation into the centre of such a space. (39) 
 
This suggests an intriguing link to Mark Hansen’s notion of the de-framing effect of 
digital media, with the concurrent emphasis on how bodily immersion may be 
conditional upon the invocation of a total, unframed medial space.  
More generally, Griffiths characterises panoramic immersion as being dependent 
on the ‘scale’ of ‘huge canvases that literally surrounded them’, an ‘invocation of 
presence’ or ‘sense of “being in a different time and space”’, and its function as a ‘mode 
of virtual transport’ (40). She also emphasises their predominantly nonfictional content 
and the particular popularity of battle panoramas which ‘interpellated [viewers] into the 
role of historical witnesses or war reporters via the subject matter and immersive mode 
of address’ (50). While ‘witnessing’ may appear to be an oddly passive role, given the 
emphasis on bodily implication in the diegetic space, it is perhaps countered somewhat 
by such works’ ‘jingoistic appeal’, which aims to ‘enhance support for empire by their 
transformation of war into visual spectacle’ (77; 51). This distinctive combination of 
witnessing and immersive presence may be the source for Griffiths’ speculative analogy 
that the panorama ‘might have had the same impact back then as today’s 24-hour cable 
news in its ability to virtually transport spectators to the battlefront through a heightened 
sense of immersion and realism’ (49). 
In Griffiths’ account, IMAX establishes a degree of continuity with the panorama 
through the way that its commercial promotion draws on the panorama ‘as a source of 
evocative metaphors of immersion’, establishing a ‘unifying discourse (and myth)’ of 
‘virtual travel to and immersion in a represented scene [emphasis in original]’ (81-82). 
She notes specifically the ‘enduring fascination with panoramic vision’, manifested in 
this case as ‘the ability to make use of our peripheral vision, giving us close to a 250-
degree (as opposed to the presumed 180-degrees) visual span of the world surrounding 
us’, and the frequent use of ‘perpendicular movement into the frame which evokes the 
sensation of penetrating space through heightened depth cues’ (82). The IMAX mode of 
immersion is not entirely synonymous with the panorama, however, and Griffiths 
equally emphasises its links to other visual media, specifically ‘a visuality of 
surveillance that comes from the aerial cinematography and sweeping crane shots’ (83). 
A further exploration of immersive spectatorship in cinema can be found in John 
Belton’s Widescreen Cinema, a study of 1950s widescreen technologies such as 
Cinerama, CinemaScope and Todd-AO. Cinerama is explicitly linked to ‘early 
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panoramas and dioramas’ through its ‘documentary-style spectacles’, while its 
advertising copy clearly evokes immersive ideals in the claim that ‘you won’t be gazing 
at a movie screen – you’ll find yourself swept right into the picture, surrounded with 
sight and sound [emphasis in original]’ (94-98). Belton also notes the perceptual 
justification for such claims: 
 
According to Fred Waller, the inventor of Cinerama, the medium owes its sense 
of audience participation to the phenomenon of peripheral vision. Waller’s own 
empirical experiments with depth perception led him to conclude that the 
successful illusion of three-dimensionality derived as much from peripheral as 
from binocular vision […] When projected on a deeply curved screen, this view 
tends to envelop the spectator sitting in the centre of the theatre. (99) 
 
Although Belton does not specifically use the term ‘immersion’, his (frequently 
invoked) notion of an audience ‘participation effect’ clearly evinces some semantic 
overlap, particularly through the claim that ‘widescreen cinema became identified with 
the notion of “audience participation”, the experience of heightened physiological 
stimulation provided by wraparound widescreen image and multitrack stereo sound’, in 
contrast to the ‘passive viewing’ of ‘traditional narrow-screen motion pictures’ (187). A 
sense of the dissolution of the frame recurs once again here, as Belton argues that 
cinemas specifically adapted for these widescreen technologies employed ‘panoramic 
screens […] [which] extended into the space of the audience and transformed the front 
of the theatre from an atmospheric frame within which a motion picture attraction was 
presented into an eye-filling, wall-to-wall display of image and sound, in which screens 
blended into the side walls of the theatre auditorium and the film was experienced 
directly, as it were, unmediated by theatre architecture’ (196). 
Finally, it is worth noting how such immersive views in film may be complicit 
with the spectacle of warfare, in a line of continuity that perhaps descends from the 
battle panorama as outlined by Griffiths. Belton’s work provides a particularly 
illuminating example of this, noting how, in 1940, Fred Waller ‘transform[ed] his 
Vitarama system into an aerial gunnery trainer, which the Army Air Corps, the Navy, 
and the Marines used during the war to instruct its machine gunners’:  
 
The Waller Flexible Gunnery Trainer consisted of five synchronised projectors 
which threw a continuous mosaic of attacking enemy fighters onto a large 
spherical screen […] [as] trainees fired electronic machine guns at diving enemy 
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planes. Elaborate calculations involving air speed and ballistics enabled Waller to 
predict which electronic bullets would hit their target; these hits were noted by 
beeps broadcast through individual earphones to the gunners and their instructor, 
who were thus able to tell immediately whether or not they had scored a hit and 




 The above surveyed works of Bolter and Grusin, Hansen, Ryan, Griffiths and 
Belton expand considerably the interdisciplinary and intermedial framework required 
for this thesis’ study of the interrelationship between the contemporary war film and 
digital military technologies. Remediation will, rather straightforwardly, serve to 
contextualise the war film’s remediation of digital technologies. Immediacy and 
hypermediacy strike me as particularly useful concepts for assessing the degree to 
which these digital interfaces are integrated within any particular film, since immediacy 
would posit a transparent and immersive alignment between the two, while the 
heterogeneity of hypermediacy suggests some degree of formal disharmony. More 
broadly, both medial logics may also be applied to delineate the relative types of 
perceptual and ontological experience afforded by a diverse range of technologies for 
mediating warfare. This will be further correlated with the forms of spectatorial 
subjectivity which Bolter and Grusin delineate as ‘immersive’ immediacy and 
‘connected’ or networked hypermediacy (232). I will, however, bear in mind Bolter and 
Grusin’s notion that both logics strive for the same evocation of ‘real’ experience, and 
thus explore the ways in which the connectivity of hypermediated subjectivities may 
evoke, by a different formal means, the same sense of presence afforded more 
immersively by the logic of immediacy.  
 Mark Hansen’s work will primarily be employed as a counterpoint to Der 
Derian and Virilio’s arguments regarding the virtualisation and disembodiment 
concomitant with contemporary military-technological mediation. Putting these 
ostensibly disparate works into even a dialectical relationship may initially appear 
somewhat puzzling, yet the difference between the military interfaces addressed by the 
latter and the digital artworks discussed by the former is actually not as clear as one 
might suppose. Indeed, in chapter four my analysis of simulations will include a 
substantial discussion the US military’s virtual reality treatment for post-traumatic 
stress disorder, which marks a striking convergence of these two apparently disparate 
fields. As such, I will complement the studies of this application’s military lineage with 
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Hansen’s notion of VR as a ‘postimagistic’ technology in order to further contextualise 
this form of mediation in relation to the representational regimes of cinema and digital 
media (167).    
 Although I am a little sceptical of the argument presented in Embodying 
Technesis that cinema constitutes an embodied and affective antidote to the virtualising 
disembodiment of digital imaging – since Hansen seems to have revoked this contention 
in his subsequent work to argue that embodiment and technics are ‘complementary’, 
such that ‘neither one can be understood as a fall or contamination (or even a 
humanisation) of the other’ – it does align intriguingly with the hypothesis that war 
cinema’s turn to subjective experience may be considered as a reaction to the digital 
virtualisation of warfare (Bodies in Code 79). However, I will primarily be drawing 
upon New Philosophy for New Media and Bodies in Code to explore whether military 
subjects’ interfacing with digital mediations of war may contain some elements of affect 
or embodied ‘framing’ that may not be identified by the works of Der Derian or Virilio. 
In structural terms, I should also note that, although Hansen’s work may be referred to 
only briefly during the close readings of my films, it will play a more substantial role in 
structuring each chapter’s concluding discussion as I zoom out from the specifics of 
formal analysis to a broader evaluation of the relationship between embodied perception 
and each digital form under consideration.  
 Finally, Belton’s account of the Waller Flexible Gunnery Trainer will function 
as a useful reference point for the historical imbrication between cinema and immersive 
military modes of imaging warfare, while Ryan and Griffiths’ work will serve to 
contextualise the intermedial spectatorial relationship to both cinematic and digital 
mediations of conflict. Immersion is generally figured here as broadly co-extensive with 
an embodied mode of navigation (if not necessarily identification per se), and thus will 
be explored principally in relation to the war film’s subjective turn in order to more 
precisely characterise the link between diegetic/military and spectatorial subjectivities. 
However, since it is also arguably aligned with digital interfaces, and VR in particular, I 
will further examine whether there might be unacknowledged or under-theorised links 
between the de-framing effect of cinema’s embodied and immersive mode of address 
and the ‘virtual transport’ of military interfaces such as drones. 
 This expanded, interdisciplinary framework will thus structure this thesis’ 
consideration of the relationship between contemporary war cinema and digital forms of 
military-technological mediation. As a distillation of the above discussions, my 
principal overarching research questions will be: 
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 Is the war film’s subjective turn identifiable as a reaction to the virtualising 
distanciation of contemporary digital forms of military-technological mediation? 
 In what specific ways (particularly in terms of immediacy/hypermediacy) does 
the contemporary war film remediate the digital interfaces of military 
technologies such as drones and simulations?  
 What kind of diegetic relationship is posited between the embodied perceptions 
of military subjects and military-technological forms of mediation?  
 How are the modes of spectatorial subjectivity evoked by contemporary war 
cinema linked to these military/diegetic subjectivities, and what are the political 
and ethical implications of this link?  
I will begin by addressing the first of these research questions, in the following chapter, 
through an analysis of what I have termed the ‘experiential mode’. Defined by a 
privileging of the quotidian aspects of soldiering via an embodied mode of address, I 
will argue that this trend can be framed as the most direct inheritor of the war film’s 
Vietnam era subjective turn. Through readings of Sebastian Junger and Tim 
Hetherington’s Restrepo (2010) and Kathryn Bigelow’s The Hurt Locker, I will 
examine the extent to which this contemporary instantiation of the subjective turn can 
be posited as a reaction to the perceived virtualising distanciation effected by military 
technologies. I will then present comprehensive studies of two of the contemporary 
forms of military-technological mediation that are frequently cited as central to this 
digital turn: drones (in chapter three), and simulations (in chapter four). My 
examination of war cinema’s remediation of these technologies will chiefly focus on the 
diegetic relationship posited between embodied and digital forms of mediation, thus 
addressing the second and third of my overarching research questions. Finally, chapter 
five will explore the spectatorial experience delimited by such hypermediated war films 
as Redacted and Battle for Haditha, and further examine how these forms of 
spectatorial subjectivity might be commensurate with the diegetic hypermediated 










2. The Experiential Mode 
 
 In the previous chapter’s literature review, I highlighted the general consensus 
held by the authors of numerous studies of the war film that, around the Vietnam era, 
the genre was marked by an increasing predilection for subjective, experiential portraits 
of war. This trend for aligning the viewer’s perspective with that of the soldiers depicted 
was often accompanied by a realist aesthetic rooted in imitation of television and 
documentary footage to heighten the sense of authenticity. While numerous films 
consistent with these trends (such as Platoon and Apocalypse Now) are broadly 
considered to espouse an anti-war sentiment, Guy Westwell and Roger Stahl are 
particularly sceptical of this mode of cinematically representing warfare, arguing that 
the myopic point-of-view tends towards a form of psychologising or internalising 
combat experience, often at the expense of analysing the wider political context.  
  This mode, which (for brevity) I will subsequently refer to as the ‘experiential’, 
has nonetheless proved immensely influential in determining the subsequent contours of 
the genre right through to contemporary representations of the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. A significant and oft-cited example from the intervening years is Steven 
Spielberg’s Saving Private Ryan – or, perhaps more specifically, the film’s famous 
Omaha Beach landing sequence. Westwell argues that the meticulous emulation of 
authenticising visual signifiers (such as Robert Capa’s photographs) and stylistic 
construction of an ‘intensely subjective point of view’ in this sequence preclude ‘any 
critical questioning of the war’; while Stahl considers the film the epitome of this 
subjectivising tendency which ‘demotes the camera/eye from its objective status, 
implies a subjective body in its place, and invites the viewer into that body’, rendering 
an experience akin to a cinematic ‘death simulator’ (93-94; 43).  
 Saving Private Ryan is also a key focal point for Jonna K. Eagle’s concept of 
‘strenuous spectatorship’, a mode of framing warfare drawn from early cinema’s charge 
films2 and battle re-enactments in which ‘the body of the spectator is imagined as 
                                                          
2 This may be an unfamiliar term to many readers since, as Eagle notes, the genre has as yet 
received little critical attention. Essentially, the charge films are defined as sharing an aesthetic 
of frontal assault with the rather more well-known ‘train films’ such as L’arrivée d’un train en 
gare de La Ciotat (1896), yet substituting the cavalry or infantry charge in place of the 
oncoming train. Examples discussed in the paper include Charge of the Boer Cavalry (1900), 
Charge of the Seventh French Cuirassiers (1896) and Advance of the Kansas Volunteers at 
Caloocan (1899). Regarding the latter example, Eagle demonstrates that ‘the spectator is invited 
first into a viscerally charged identification with the position of victim (situated as the locus of 
the rebels’ fire), and then aligned with the forward motion of the US soldiers’ efficacious 
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situated within the contemporary terrain of battle’ (18). Regarding Spielberg’s film, 
Eagle argues that:  
         
In addition to its function in the Western, the paradoxical provision of “authentic” 
embodied experience through the mediated thrills of screen culture centrally 
relates to the visual and visceral signifiers of “being there” that have come to 
define representations of war across a range of media. These representations refer 
with a particular insistence to an embodied spectator, both in the visceral intensity 
of their address and in the imagination of space and place that animates their 
visions. The screen violence in a film like Saving Private Ryan (Steven Spielberg, 
1998), for instance, operates through a fantasy of location founded upon 
innovations of editing, camera angle and soundtrack that work to situate the 
spectator amidst the carnage of battle. Like “embedded” war reporting or first-
person shooter games, recent war films invite identification with a specific 
somatic location within the visual, sensory and historical landscape of violence, 
drawing the spectator into an ever more intimate identification with an embodied 
imagination of the experience of combat. The spectator is sutured into the field of 
representation through a point of view that both refers back to and relies upon the 
relationship of the gaze to the body. (32) 
 
Eagle’s argument, with its emphasis on cinematically situating the body of the spectator 
‘amidst the carnage of battle’, overlaps significantly with Stahl’s account of 
contemporary war cinema’s ‘first person regime of signs’ (42). Both writers highlight 
the prevailing cinematic tendency to invite audience identification with an embodied 
construct of militarised subjectivity, and note its partial conjunction with the aesthetic of 
first-person-shooter games. They also share an understanding of the authenticising 
function of this perspective, which privileges the value of ‘being there’, or first-person 
witnessing, over distance and mediation. The technical rigour of Eagle’s paper, 
however, provides a more precise definition of the stylistic means by which this 
subjective position (and, as I will demonstrate, contemporary instantiations of the 
experiential mode in general) is figured as a specifically imperilled form of 
embodiment. This, she argues, has evolved from the frontal assault of the charge films 
to a more technically sophisticated rendition of three-dimensional space which 
                                                          
advance’, thus ‘conditioning an embodied sense of threat which is then redressed through an 
identification with violent action’ (31). 
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surrounds the point of spectatorial identification with the threat of violence, as 
exemplified by Saving Private Ryan.  
It is noteworthy, though perhaps unsurprising, that the most prominent example 
of the experiential mode in 1990s war cinema looks back to World War II rather than to 
more contemporaneous conflicts. Indeed, the Gulf War of 1990-1 appears somewhat 
resistant to a cinematic style grounded in an embodied first-person point-of-view. The 
high-tech spectacle and lack of embodied interaction characteristic of this conflict 
resulted in media imagery that Patricia Pisters describes as effecting a ‘farewell to both 
the subjective eye behind the camera as well as to the human subjects in front of the 
camera’ (236). Pisters draws a sharp distinction between the dominant representational 
modes of the Gulf War – termed the ‘end of the logistics of perception 1.0’ – and the 
subsequent Iraq War’s ‘logistics of perception 2.0’, marked by their degree of 
‘subjective and affective intensity’ (236; 241). As is implied by Pisters’ co-opting of the 
phrase ‘logistics of perception’ (the subtitle to Paul Virilio’s War and Cinema) her 
account of the relationship between military technologies and cinematic representation 
is deeply indebted to Virilio’s work, proposing the Gulf War as the culmination of an 
‘aesthetics of disappearance’ whereby the subjective anchoring of perspective gives way 
to a disembodied military-cinematic spectacle (236). Jean Baudrillard’s The Gulf War 
Did Not Take Place is an equally significant influence here, with Pisters echoing his 
critique of the manner in which this technological spectacle was harnessed primarily as 
a ‘media simulation of the war’ (235).  
While this conceptual framework is certainly useful in distinguishing the 
differing aesthetics of these two conflicts, it does however serve to obscure some of the 
continuities between contemporary forms of the experiential mode and its historical 
legacy, particularly the cinematic approaches to Vietnam delineated above. Pisters does 
briefly note that the Gulf War demonstrated a ‘completely different strategy towards 
perceptual aesthetics than the Vietnam War’, though the paper (understandably, given 
its brevity) does not fully address the more complex overarching continuities that may 
complicate the oppositions established – such as, for instance, the possible similarities 
between Vietnam era and contemporary modes of positing cinematic subjectivity in this 
context (235).         
Constructing a more thorough account of how the experiential mode of 
cinematic representation works in films depicting the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars is the 
principal objective of this chapter, as a key step towards the thesis’ overarching aim of 
examining the relationship between embodiment and digital military-technological 
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mediation throughout this corpus. This study will address both stylistic continuities and 
discontinuities with the lineage of the experiential mode outlined above, as well as 
political, sociological and technological factors which have altered the wider context of 
the war film. The following section will focus primarily upon the contemporary 
phenomenon of journalistic embedding, assessing its relation to the experiential war 
film by analysing a typical example of embedded literature – Sebastian Junger’s War – 
and the accompanying documentary Restrepo. Subsequently, I will present an extended 
close reading of Kathryn Bigelow’s The Hurt Locker, exploring the key stylistic 
components of the film’s experiential aesthetic, as well as addressing its relationship to 
technological mediation and critiques of the film’s perceived lack of political 




 Among various contextual factors that have influenced the form of the Iraq and 
Afghanistan war films, the embedding of journalists with US military troops is 
evidently a significant determinant. The procedure is generally considered to have been 
initiated as a reaction to both the Vietnam War’s relative press freedom and its effect of 
eroding public confidence in the conflict, and the surreal television news reports from 
the first Gulf War in which, as Baudrillard famously argued, there was ‘nothing to see’ 
(The Gulf War Did Not Take Place, 47). Though the program afforded journalists an 
opportunity for intimate access to frontline troops and, in many cases, actual combat 
experience, it has subsequently received widespread criticism for the ethical 
compromises involved. From the bias implicit in the initial procedure of selecting which 
journalists are granted embed assignments – as highlighted by Chelsea Manning’s 
recent article for The New York Times – to strict limitations on movement and the 
reliance on military officers’ information for a broader overview of the conflict, critics 
have argued that the level of military control over such reporting essentially renders it 
propaganda3. 
 The influence of embedded reportage on Iraq and Afghanistan war films is clear 
from even a cursory overview of the films’ sources. Mark Boal’s experiences of 
                                                          
3 For more extensive critiques of embedding, see (among others) Patrick Cockburn’s 
“Embedded Journalism: A Distorted View of War” for The Independent, Kylie Tuosto’s “The 
‘Grunt Truth’ of Embedded Journalism: The New Media/Military Relationship” in the Stanford 
Journal of International Relations, and Chelsea Manning’s “The Fog Machine of War” for The 
New York Times.   
53 
 
embedding in Iraq in 2004 led directly to the screenplays for The Hurt Locker and In the 
Valley of Elah, while the subsequent Zero Dark Thirty somewhat more contentiously 
draws upon his research into the CIA’s manhunt for Osama bin Laden. Generation Kill 
by Evan Wright details his experience of embedding with US Marines during the 
invasion of Iraq and was adapted into the 2008 HBO series of the same name. Likewise, 
Rajiv Chandrasekaran’s Imperial Life in the Emerald City, based upon his embedded 
assignment in Baghdad, formed the basis for the Paul Greengrass film Green Zone 
(2010); while Sebastian Junger’s War and the accompanying film Restrepo report from 
Afghanistan’s Korengal Valley over the course of a year embedded with the army. This 
list is not exhaustive, and does not even take into account looser dramatizations of 
actual events such as Redacted and Battle for Haditha, or ‘first-hand’ documentaries 
such as The War Tapes (2006) and Gunner Palace (2004) whose point-of-view is 
literally that of US troops equipped with handheld cameras.  
 By way of illustrating the complicities between embedding and the experiential 
mode, I will analyse, in further detail, War and its subsequent screen adaptation as 
Restrepo. There are of course variations in both style and content among these assorted 
literary sources, though Sebastian Junger’s work is a reasonably representative example. 
In an early passage from the book, Junger explicitly outlines his approach to the 
assignment: 
 
This time, however, I’m not interested in the Afghans and their endless, terrible 
wars; I’m interested in the Americans. I’m interested in what it’s like to serve in a 
platoon of combat infantry in the U.S. Army. The moral basis of the war doesn’t 
seem to interest soldiers much, and its long-term success or failure has a 
relevance of almost zero. Soldiers worry about those things about as much as 
farmhands worry about the global economy, which is to say, they recognise 
stupidity when it’s right in front of them but they generally leave the big picture 
to others. (25)  
 
The terms of this definition overlap significantly with the tropes that I have begun to 
identify as constitutive of the experiential war film. Junger’s precise focus on the 
infantry experience, to the exclusion of any ‘big picture’, clearly evinces a striving to 
understand and capture the subjective point-of-view of its subjects. It also displays a 
form of authenticising rhetoric to justify this potentially myopic perspective – whereby 
the experiential ‘grunt’s truth’ is unquestioningly adopted as the author’s own 
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framework – that is somewhat analogous to the experiential war films’ privileging of 
‘authentically’ subjective experience.  
Yet it is perhaps rather problematic to present this elision of the wider political 
context as a self-evident consequence of adopting the subjective perspective of its 
subjects, as Junger appears to do in the above construct, and particularly so in the 
assumption that the grunt point-of-view is incompatible with a political stance. The 
proclivity among both embedded journalism and experiential war films to focus almost 
exclusively on the subjective experience of lower-ranking troops in their portraits of the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan represents a noticeable shift in relation to the Vietnam era 
turn to subjectivity. While these Vietnam War films assumed the point-of-view of 
officers and infantry alike, their contemporary equivalents tend to largely exclude the 
officer class. This tendency could be conditioned by the types of embed assignments 
made available by the US military, or may be motivated by a journalistic distrust of 
officers’ information as perpetuating misleading propaganda, with the grunt’s 
experiences seen as a relatively truthful alternative. Regardless of the instigating factors, 
there seem to be two interrelated underlying assumptions at work here: one of which 
presupposes the grunt as inherently lacking in political engagement – via the rather 
demeaning class implications of Junger’s comparison with the figurative ‘farmhand’ – 
while the second seems to posit this lack as enabling access to a more authentic realm of 
experience by virtue of its disconnection from the political.   
Junger’s emphasis on subjective experience does not, however, extend to the 
point of literally shifting into first-person narration from the point-of-view of any of the 
soldiers. Nonetheless, distinctions between the roles of external observer and participant 
in the war are blurred throughout the book, particularly as Junger encounters dangerous 
combat situations, realises his reliance on the unit for safety and begins to assist them in 
tasks such as supplying ammunition. In doing so, the continuities between War and the 
tradition of ‘strenuous spectatorship’, as outlined by Eagle, begin to emerge. Indeed, 
Eagle’s article identifies the nineteenth century war correspondent (specifically, Stephen 
Crane in Cuba) as the archetypal, original figure of this convention: 
 
Like Crane on the hilltop – at once impervious and vulnerable, removed from the 
scene of violence in which he is at the same time intimately engaged – the 
strenuous spectator occupies a privileged vantage point on action alongside a 
fantasy of assault. Rather than being cordoned off from an embodied sense of 
threat, then, as some early cinema theorists have argued, here the spectatorial 
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body, and the white masculine body in particular, is imagined as very much on 
the line. (19) 
 
By embedding with the infantry, and attempting to capture the experience of the 
Afghanistan War from as close to their perspective as possible, then, Junger’s work 
essentially activates this framework of strenuous spectatorship in which he is 
simultaneously ‘removed’ from the action (by virtue of his non-combatant role) yet 
‘engaged’, with his body ‘very much on the line’. Furthermore, this blurring of the 
boundaries between journalist and combatant is rather evocative of Roger Stahl’s 
critique of embedding, whereby the ‘war correspondent’ develops into a ‘soldiered 
journalist’ due to the ‘overwhelming bias’ toward an authenticising mode of ‘being 
there’ at the expense of ‘perspective, analysis, context, and history’ (86). This definition 
of the ‘soldiered journalist’ overlaps significantly with that of the cinematic spectator as 
a ‘virtual-citizen-soldier’, thus suggesting that the (embedded) literary mode of 
mediating combat evinces a strong degree of complicity with the cinematic regime of 
experiential mediation. It further appears to corroborate Eagle’s more explicit genealogy 
of strenuous spectatorship as a mode of representation – or, indeed remediation – that 
traverses its literary origins to subsequently fuse a range of contemporary media 
including ‘recent war films’ and ‘first-person shooter games’ (32). This mode of 
reporting allows Junger to explore various aspects of the soldiers’ psychological 
response to war, and he develops a particular interest in the question of enjoyment: 
 
War is a lot of things and it’s useless to pretend that exciting isn’t one of them. 
It’s insanely exciting. The machinery of war and the sound it makes and the 
urgency of its use and the consequences of almost everything about it are the most 
exciting things anyone engaged in war will ever know […] but the public will 
never hear about it. It’s just not something that many people want acknowledged. 
(144) 
 
This question of whether military subjects derive enjoyment from war, and 
particularly from the act of killing, remains rather contested. John Protevi (whose work 
I will return to in greater detail in chapter four) argues that the novel technological 
means of conditioning soldiers’ affective responses to war studied in “Affect, agency 
and responsibility: the act of killing in the age of cyborgs” are fundamentally oriented 
toward overcoming an inherent ‘inhibition on killing’ based on ‘proto-empathic 
identification’, and ascribes this moral/psychological inhibition to around ‘98% of 
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soldiers’ (406). On the other hand, Joanna Bourke’s An Intimate History of Killing 
surveys combat veterans from WWI, WWII and Vietnam to find ‘ordinary men and 
women […] rejoicing as they committed grotesque acts of cruelty’, leading her to argue 
for a fundamental ‘association of pleasure with killing’ (369). Bourke also extends this 
claim to encompass the spectatorial pleasure derived from witnessing acts of killing in 
the war film. Examining what attracted William Broyles, a US Marine who served in 
Vietnam, to the ‘pleasures’ of the military, she observes:   
 
Despite the filthy, anti-heroic battle scenes in the films he mentioned, he was 
entranced by them. Realistic representations of combat are not necessarily pacifist 
or even pacificistic. It was precisely the horror which thrilled audiences and 
readers: gore and abjection was the pleasure, subverting any anti-war moral 
[emphasis in original]. (18) 
 
This parallel between military subjects’ enjoyment of killing and spectatorial 
pleasure in witnessing it might, in the context of my study of the experiential mode, be 
read as a prescient warning against the contemporary tendency (particularly manifest in 
journalistic embedding and the lineage of ‘strenuous spectatorship’) to collapse any 
mediating, contextualising perspective in order to strengthen the alignment of diegetic 
(military) and spectatorial (civilian) subject positions. For if Junger’s model of soldiers 
revelling in the visceral pleasures of combat is conjoined to a mode of representation 
that decontextualises and depoliticises embodied experience while inviting 
identification with military subjects, this may open up a potentially problematic and 
complicit form of spectatorial pleasure.      
However, since Bourke’s ‘audience’ here is constituted exclusively by military 
personnel (or at least those who would subsequently go on to military service), it may 
be somewhat presumptive to generalise such particular case studies and thus assume 
that the broader spectatorship of war cinema operates upon the same principle. Indeed, 
the issue is rarely broached within film studies approaches to the genre, and thus 
remains an open question. Since my own study of the experiential mode of combat 
representation here is not based on any empirical research into spectatorship, it is 
somewhat beyond the scope of the thesis to posit any definitive answers to whether 
viewers actually pleasure from witnessing mediated acts of killing.  
Nonetheless, (textual) readings of these films may still pertinently acknowledge 
the types of subject position and potential forms of enjoyment offered to the viewer by 
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particular modes of representation. In particular, the depoliticising trends I have 
discussed above appear to presume a form of spectatorial engagement that is derived 
principally from the immediate and subjective experience of embodied identification 
rather than any moral or political framework in which the violence is contained. This 
coincides pertinently with Stahl’s contention, in Militainment, Inc., that an interactive 
and embodied form of audience pleasure has come to supersede propaganda as the 
principal contemporary means of providing ‘approval and authorisation of war’ (4). 
Even if this embodied form of spectatorial identification does not quite shade into an 
explicit pleasure in killing, then, this collapsed distance between diegetic and 
spectatorial subject positions remains a key point of contention. As such, I intend to 
closely examine the embodied points of view proffered by Restrepo and The Hurt 
Locker in relation to these wider tendencies toward immersive and decontextualised 
mediations of combat, thus evaluating whether the experiential mode fosters a sense of 
complicity in military violence by appealing to spectatorial identification with the 




 Given the ‘soldiered journalist’ content of Sebastian Junger’s War, one might 
expect Restrepo, the documentary adjunct to / adaptation of the book, to be largely 
commensurate with the subjective, experiential mode of war filmmaking – and this 
expectation is likely to be reinforced by the initial evidence of the film’s aesthetic 
choices. Restrepo opens with video diary footage shot by the soldiers themselves prior 
to deployment in Afghanistan, depicting a drunken revelry of (in their terms) ‘loving 
life, getting ready to go to war’. This use of the amateur video diary is a familiar trope 
among Iraq and Afghanistan war films, originating primarily through soldiers’ footage 
shared online through YouTube and subsequently imitated in both documentary and 
fiction films. Indeed, in Pisters’ account of the genre, the video diary is said to be 
‘paradigmatic for a new logistics of perception’, conveying ‘affective and traumatic 
intensities’ in stark contrast to the aesthetic of the previous Gulf War (241-242). 
Obviously, the pre-combat context precludes any sense of trauma here, and the affective 
power is perhaps only legible to repeat viewers of the film or those who have previously 
read Junger’s book and thus realise its elegiac connotations, since the self-proclaimed 
narrator of this sequence, Juan ‘Doc’ Restrepo, died during the subsequent deployment. 
Nonetheless, such videos do typically link performativity to an affective sense of 
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transience and fear of death, as Pisters points out (regarding Redacted): ‘Through 
statements by the soldiers such as “you are making a video of me making a video of 
you” and promises to take care of each others’ videos should they die in combat, these 
war diaries confirm the soldiers’ existence’ (239). Aside from these affective 
associations, the video diary also serves in a more basic manner to authenticise and 
indexically validate the film’s aesthetic, fulfilling a similar role to that of newsreel or 
television news coverage during earlier phases of the war genre. Viewed historically, it 
is worth noting the greater value now ascribed to the element of subjectivity in this role 
since the video diary, as a mode of narrating the war, is rather more individualised in 
both the scope of its content, and its implicit audience (i.e. family and friends). This 
semantic overlap with the epistolary tradition, as well as its customary emphasis on 
affective and embodied subjective experience, serves to differentiate the video diary 
quite substantially from its formal predecessors in this authenticising role.   
 Following this diary extract, Junger and Hetherington use two brief title cards to 
contextualise the film. The first concisely identifies the protagonists (Second Platoon, 
Battle Company), timeframe (15 month deployment beginning in May 2007), and 
location (Korengal Valley, East Afghanistan), while the second warns ‘It was 
considered one of the most dangerous postings in the US military’. The latter is 
particularly evocative of the ‘strenuous spectatorship’ tradition in its manner of glossing 
the preceding contextual information as, seemingly, significant only to the extent that it 
promises an abundance of combat footage and a viscerally imperilled perspective. This 
expectation is immediately confirmed as the film cuts to footage of an IED attack, 
captured on what appears to be a video diary. The chaotic sequence is shot with a 
markedly handheld, first-person aesthetic, which is heightened by the manner in which 
the sound abruptly cuts out following the explosion. It is not entirely clear whether this 
is due to actual technical difficulties, whether it is intended to mimic a temporary loss of 
hearing as in the battle sequences of Saving Private Ryan (among other war films), or 
whether it simply a confluence of both. Furthermore, the author of this footage remains 
unidentified, creating a degree of ambiguity as to whether the first-person point-of-view 
here is that of Junger, Hetherington, or one of their military subjects. This indistinct 
perspective seems particularly significant in undermining any sense that Hetherington’s 
point-of-view – as a celebrated professional photographer – will legibly diverge from 
the amateur reportage shot by the soldiers.     
 It quickly becomes apparent that, in contrast to the mediating journalistic 
perspective of War, the film contains no visible or audible traces of Junger and 
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Hetherington’s presence whatsoever. This is presumably intended to intensify its 
subjective sense of ‘what it’s like to serve in a platoon of combat infantry in the U.S. 
Army’, to cite Junger’s objective in War; in other words, to render the subjectivity of 
the film’s perspective as being that of the soldiers rather than an embedded journalist 
(25). This trope is common to the vast majority of films adapted from embedded 
reportage, and tends to accentuate the focus on the immediate and experiential over the 
contextual. Indeed, among the above list of adaptations derived from embedded 
journalism, the only one which retains this mediating journalistic perspective is 
Generation Kill (2008), and it is notable that Evan Wright’s focalising perspective in 
the series enables a more complex debate over the boundaries of civilian and military 
points-of-view. This is manifested quite literally during a nocturnal battle sequence, 
which cuts between the technologically and strategically enhanced points-of-view of 
Marines equipped with night vision goggles, and that of Wright’s relatively unmediated 
observation. It also enables the series’ ultimate critique of framing war exclusively from 
a militarised first-person perspective – a point conveyed rather didactically during the 
finale in which the audience for the soldiers’ video diary react to the film with regretful 
disdain and gradually file out of the screening.   
 In Restrepo, however, the absence of this mediating framework precludes any 
critique of or distancing from the soldiers’ perspective. In contrast to Junger’s book, 
which still retained some degree of contextual analysis – as in, for instance, his 
discussion of the Afghan government’s ban on lumber exports and its effect of turning 
local workers into potential al-Qaeda recruits – such political or economic factors 
affecting the war are simply not discussed or integrated into the film (47-52). Instead, 
the simplification of narrative perspective seems to restrict the film’s focus to the day-
to-day experiences of the soldiers which in this account are largely procedural rather 
than politically or idealistically oriented. Patricia Aufderheide, in her assessment of the 
Iraq War documentaries, is particularly critical of this tendency among the group of 
films which she terms ‘grunt docs’: 
 
In fact, the directors of the grunt films usually do not directly address most 
American publics as voters. The grunt films function well, in fact, as a certain 
kind of entertainment. These films largely address us as viewers, usually as 
television viewers, who might happen to be war buffs or medical buffs. There is 
no public policy issue about the legitimacy or purpose of the war on the table in 
these films, because the soldiers can’t tell you whether we should be there. As 
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soldiers, they have to fight under orders. So if a public is a group of people who 
come together around a common problem, these films do not directly address a 
national public. Rather, they address viewers as consumers, people making a 
selection among a broad number of channels. They may even quell debate, insofar 
as viewers echo the protagonists’ stolid following of orders. (61) 
 
The terms of Aufderheide’s argument here echo Stahl’s critique of ‘militainment’, in 
that the cinematic adoption of soldiers’ subjective perspectives lends itself more to a 
form of experiential entertainment than contextual or political debate. The notion that, 
in acting ‘under orders’, the soldiers ‘can’t tell you whether we should be there’ does 
echo Junger’s assumption of the grunt’s lack of political engagement to some degree. 
Yet Aufderheide’s analysis also highlights the extent to which this is a result of 
filmmakers’ typical approach to the material, manifested particularly in a ‘liberal’ 
concern ‘not to demonise the soldiers’ by any distancing from or critique of their 
performative self-presentation, and a procedural focus on ‘the challenge of getting the 
job done’ (59-60).     
Restrepo largely conforms to this template. The fundamental compassion 
evinced for the film’s subjects, as is essentially dictated by its status as an elegy for the 
medic Restrepo, is affecting yet does serve to preclude critique. Compounding the 
stripping away of context effected by the removal of journalistic mediation, its subjects 
are further portrayed as uninterested in wider debates over the war as a whole, and as 
such the film itself seems to plead a wilful ignorance on the question of ‘whether we 
should be there’. This is of course not strictly an apolitical stance since the very notion 
of inviting subjective identification with military subjects is itself a mode of validation 
which, as Aufderheide notes, ‘may even quell debate’ (61).  
 While the film renders the experience of the war in procedural rather than 
political terms, Junger and Hetherington do thematise this procedural aspect to a greater 
degree than many similar documentaries by investigating the soldiers’ attitudes to their 
work and its effects upon them in psychological and affective terms. Mirroring the 
many discussions of the pleasures of combat in War, the film’s soldiers display a 
marked eagerness for ‘contact’. Alongside numerous scenes of the troops idling around 
their outposts, itching for action, several combat sequences are followed by explicit 
expressions of delight, such as: ‘Big firefight… that was fun. You can’t get a better 
high. It’s like crack, you know… Once you’ve been shot at, you really can’t come 
down. There’s nothing… you can’t top that’. This sentiment is echoed, and enhanced, 
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by the film’s sketchy contextualisation of their missions and the rendering of combat 
through a first-person aesthetic comprised primarily of handheld digital video (as in the 
opening IED attack sequence outlined above) with a marked predilection for intimate 
close-ups, occasionally augmented by soldiers’ helmet-cam footage. It is also, in more 
general terms, fundamentally enabled by Junger and Hetherington’s choice of the 
Korengal valley as the location for embedding, since there are relatively few combat 
zones which retain such a high degree of embodied ‘contact’ in the contemporary era of 
digital mediation. Nonetheless, the effects of technological distanciation are still present 
here to a degree and do appear to have some impact on the soldiers’ enjoyment. For 
instance, the film’s final combat sequence features a long-range firefight, with the (off-
screen) target visible only through the heavy-duty optics wielded by the platoon’s 
sergeant, leading to one of the soldiers somewhat frustrated declaration that ‘I just wish 
they were closer so I could’ve actually seen them when I killed them’. This notion that 
the pleasures of combat are reliant upon embodied intimacy, and potentially diminished 
by technological distanciation coincides with the findings of Bourke’s study, which 
notes that: 
 
Combatants used their imagination to “see” the impact of their weapons on other 
men, to construct elaborate, precise and self-conscious fantasies about the effects 
of their destructive weapons, especially when the impact of their actions was 
beyond their immediate vision […] What is striking is the extent to which 
combatants insisted upon emotional relationships and responsibility, despite the 
distancing effect of much technology [emphasis in original] (6-7) 
 
 While such aspects of the film may suggest that it is little more than a glib 
instantiation of Stahl’s ‘death simulator’ militainment, this combat eagerness is 
ultimately balanced against at least one diegetic combat sequence imbued with a starkly 
contrasting sense of trauma, and the affective post-combat reflections captured through 
subsequently recorded interviews. The combat sequence in question is presented in far 
greater detail than any other and occupies almost thirty minutes of screen time. It is 
introduced through the interviews as the commonly agreed upon ‘low point’ of the 
platoon’s deployment and, atypically, contextualised with both a mission name 
(‘Operation Rock Avalanche’) and a sequence depicting its tactical planning. The film 
also briefly diverges here from the dominant representational mode (i.e. the first-person 
perspective of handheld digital video), depicting the missile system interface of an H64 
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attack helicopter as it bombards what is subsequently revealed to be a civilian residence. 
The aftermath of this attack, as the platoon walk through the settlement and witness the 
devastation of the strike in the form of civilian corpses and wounded children, further 
diverges from the strictly military point-of-view which has primarily been engaged thus 
far. The contrast drawn between the clinical distanciation of the missile interface and 
the affective, embodied rendition of its effects hints at a critique of US military 
operations otherwise largely absent from the film. Furthermore, the glimpse of civilian 
alienation afforded here is in itself a significant counterpoint to the militarised point-of-
view, and a rare instance of such among the ‘grunt doc’ genre. The remainder of this 
mission fits more comfortably into the typically experiential first-person view of 
combat, and depicts an assault by Taliban forces resulting in a (US) casualty. It is shot 
in the same intimate handheld manner as the rest of the film, though it is notable that the 
sequence employs far longer takes, allowing the reactions to Sergeant Rugle’s death to 
play out in closer to real time. The traumatic impact of this incident is thus rendered 
primarily through the physical display of affect, with one soldier in a particularly 
panicked, tearful state.  
 The film’s other, more formal, counterpoint to experiential combat enjoyment is 
the use of individual interviews. Despite the occasional recourse to using extracts from 
these interviews as voiceover narration, for the most part they seem to exist in a 
somewhat differentiated diegetic space. It is evident from the tense employed by the 
interviewees that these were recorded after the platoon’s return from Afghanistan, and 
this distanciation from the film’s otherwise relentlessly experiential combat 
representations allows for a more reflective consideration of its long-term effects. These 
are presented as almost exclusively psychological, ranging from mild disturbances to 
PTSD-induced sleeplessness. While many of the soldiers are uninhibited about 
discussing this, the filmmakers’ consistent use of close-ups, which fill the frame with 
the subjects’ facial outlines against a stark black background, clearly serve to heighten 
the visibility of their affective eliciting of their experiences in the Korengal. For 
instance, in discussing Rugle’s death, it is the silent spaces in between the soldiers’ 
monologues that are particularly evocative, with one interviewee trailing off mid-
sentence. His eyes, which had thus far been piercingly focussed directly into the lens, 
take on a faraway glaze, while his mouth purses and hesitates around the sound of the 
words to come. He ultimately asks for a ‘timeout’, apologising for losing his ‘train of 
thought’. Junger and Hetherington hold this shot for an almost uncomfortable duration, 
then subtly ease into footage of the actual incident via an evocative sound bridge. In 
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moments such as these, then, the nuanced detection of visual, embodied affect forms a 
stark counterpoint to the enjoyment of combat on display elsewhere. They further serve 
to effect something of a transition in the spectatorial relationship to military 
subjectivity, moving from the invocation of embodied identification, as suggested 
above, into a more detached, reflective mode whereby the viewer is placed in a position 
of scrutinising these somewhat more objectified witnesses.   
 Yet while these elements of Restrepo may enact some degree of aesthetic 
differentiation from the kind of thorough combat-immersion featured in, for instance, 
the similarly experiential year-in-Afghanistan documentary Armadillo (2010), it is 
worth noting that the interviews’ strict adherence to evoking and internalising combat 
experiences is open to the same critique as the Vietnam war films discussed in the 
previous chapter. While Junger’s book opens out occasionally to encompass discussions 
of the subjects’ post-Army lives in terms of finding work, relationships with family, 
etc., Restrepo’s post-combat interviews focus almost entirely on their time in the 
Korengal and clearly serve to internalise and psychologise the experience. In doing so, 
they appear to perpetuate the tradition of using the combat veteran’s psychological order 
as a synecdoche for the war as whole. Westwell argues that this ‘recuperative 
ideological strategy’ enables the restoration of psychological order to fill in for the 
implied mythic-historical order (64). However, the degree of therapeutic closure 
achieved in Restrepo appears to be negligible, with Staff Sergeant Joshua McDonough 
noting during his interview that ‘there’s no intel on how to treat us right now because 
they haven’t had to deal with people like us since World War II and Vietnam… guys 
that are coming back from 15 month deployment with as much fighting as we went 
through’.     
While this open-ended reworking of the Vietnam veteran trope may suggest a 
more subversive reinterpretation of it by refusing the reinstatement of psychological 
order, Aufderheide remains sceptical over the merits of such structures. She argues that 
within the typical ‘course of a deployment’ timeframe of most Iraq War ‘grunt docs’, 
character development tends to uniformly follow the ‘trajectory […] from young and 
naïve to young with post-traumatic stress disorder’, and that ‘what keeps us watching’ 
in spite of this familiar pattern is ‘a voyeuristic quest, the thrill of wondering if we will 
see someone get hurt or killed’ (60). Ultimately, Aufderheide dismisses such content as 
amounting to little more than ‘emotional pornography’ (60). This may be a somewhat 
harsh verdict to apply to Restrepo, since the film’s attempts to elicit sympathy for the 
troops’ traumatic experiences and subsequent psychological effects are generally more 
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sensitive than sensationalist. However, the film’s relentless emphasis on subjective 
experience and predominant conformity to the experiential mode does arguably solicit 
identification more than understanding. It is certainly significant that this identification 
takes place with a soldierly body both physically and psychologically scarred by the 
experience, yet the understanding achieved by this process is inward-looking and thus 
open to charges of voyeurism, rather than a stimulus to socio-political critique of the 




 Having garnered multiple Academy Awards and inspired polarising critical 
debate, Kathryn Bigelow’s The Hurt Locker is arguably the most prominent post-9/11 
US war film. Its visceral, highly subjective depiction of bomb disposal in occupied 
Baghdad broadly aligns the film with the contemporary experiential mode, and has 
directly inspired both praise and criticism. Slavoj Žižek, in a now famous post for the 
London Review of Books’ blog, attacked the film’s ‘pseudo-documentary style’ and 
incitement to identification with ‘our boys’ […] fear and anguish’ as masking a 
pernicious and ‘invisible’ ideological complicity which precludes ‘questioning what 
they are doing there’. Conversely, Amy Taubin’s review for Film Comment revels in 
Bigelow’s construction of a ‘fully three-dimensional theatre of war […] [which] 
make[s] you feel as if you, like the characters, are under threat from all sides.’ Refuting 
Žižek’s equation of subjective identification with an endorsement of the war, Taubin 
argues that:  
 
Bigelow harnesses her action-movie chops in the service of allowing us not only 
to understand the addiction but to feel the adrenaline surge in ourselves. The 
opening sequence produces an immediate contact high that lasts through to the 
final frame. Bigelow’s dedication to cinema as an experiential medium finally has 
a worthy subject. Which is not to say that the movie functions either as a 
recruiting tool, or as a panacea for the viewer, who, safe in her or his seat, might 
prefer to keep knowledge of Iraq or Afghanistan compartmentalized, neatly 
packaged as a two-hour movie. Like the great modern war films—Apocalypse 
Now, Full Metal Jacket, The Thin Red Line—The Hurt Locker depicts the war 
zone as a dystopia, where notwithstanding the horror, those who fight draw 
pleasure from how the possibility of imminent death concentrates the mind and 




Žižek and Taubin’s readings of the film, then, seem to stem from a common 
understanding of The Hurt Locker’s form as broadly aligned with the experiential mode 
as I have defined it above, but differ radically in the political and aesthetic merits 
ascribed to this invocation to subjective identification. Žižek’s claim that the film’s 
rendering of the war as a ‘personal account’ in ‘pseudo-documentary style’ uses 
subjective experience to obscure political context echoes the critiques of Westwell and 
Stahl, whereas Taubin’s argument frames the ‘experiential’ as a distinctly embodied and 
visceral ‘pleasure’ whose political implications are much more ambiguous given the 
apparent tension between a personalised ‘contact high’ and the overarching sense of ‘the 
war zone as a dystopia’. Both, however, crucially hinge on the specific interpretation of 
the way Bigelow harnesses this experiential subjectivity. Addressing the implicit 
politics of The Hurt Locker’s experiential aesthetic will thus constitute one aspect of my 
focus in this final section of the chapter. However, alongside (yet intertwined with) this 
focus on the politics of the experiential mode, I will also approach the film from a 
somewhat different angle, attending to the relationship posited between the embodied 
grounding of the experiential and contemporary modes of military-technological 
mediation. This is thematised through the contrast established between the Explosive 
Ordnance Disposal (EOD) squad’s initial Sergeant, Matthew Thompson (Guy Pearce), 
and the subsequent introduction of his replacement, William James (Jeremy Renner). 
 The first point-of-view rendered in the film’s opening sequence is that of the 
robotic device employed by the unit to investigate a potential roadside IED. The image 
is marked by digital static, a narrow focus and a shallow depth of field. The robotic 
device’s progress toward the IED is intercut with a depiction of escalating panic in the 
area as Iraqis flee the scene and US military vehicles arrive. This is immersively 
rendered with quick cutting between multiple, undefined points-of-view which break 
the classical 180-degree rule of editing, creating a paranoia-inducing instantiation of 
what Taubin refers to as a ‘fully three-dimensional theatre of war’. This kinetic style is 
fundamental to the film’s sense of experiential excitement, yet here it is contrasted with 
the coolly distanced observation of protagonists Thompson, Sanborn and Eldridge as 
they assess the explosive device through the remote interface of the robotic camera and 
casually make phallic jokes about the investigative robotic prosthesis. The technological 
mediation of the robotic device is implicitly linked to a detached sense of mastery, as 
Thompson, preparing to remotely detonate the IED, precisely forecasts the intended 
blast radius.      
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Once the ‘bot’ breaks down, however, and Thompson is required to put on the 
protective suit and approach the IED himself, there is a fundamental shift from the 
detachment of technological mediation to a distinctly embodied sense of danger. 
Aesthetically, this is conveyed by a noticeable intensification in Bigelow’s use of 
embodied first-person perspectives. These include, on the periphery of the scene, rifle 
sightings of observers from Sanborn’s point-of-view, but are primarily organised around 
Thompson’s perspective from the interior of the bomb suit. Its physical restrictiveness 
lends his movement something of the ethereal quality of a slow-motion dolly, while the 
soundtrack amplifies the experiential sense of subjectivity through the prominence of 
his breathing patterns echoing in the helmet. The gradual emergence of a suspenseful 
electronic drone on the soundtrack heightens the sense of threat while Thompson, now 
in the ‘kill zone’, lays the charge, and Eldridge sees a man with a mobile phone appear 
from a nearby butchers. Furious cross-cutting between these perspectives culminates in 
the highly aestheticized explosion of the IED, with extreme slow-motion and high 
resolution imagery employed to highlight the details of the scattering debris. 
Following Thompson’s death, James’ first mission as the new team leader 
clearly establishes his alternative approach to ordnance disposal, recklessly premised on 
individual and embodied pleasure. The sequence is introduced through a dynamic 
construction of three-dimensional space, similar to that of the film’s opening, with 
Bigelow cutting between interior shots from the EOD unit’s vehicle and various 
undefined points from which they are apparently observed. The absence of any 
specifically identifiable grounding to these diverse views on the action again generates 
an edgy, paranoid sensation of being under panoptic surveillance. As the unit emerge 
into this scene, the film also utilises first-person points-of-view as a mode of embodied 
grounding, with the camera movements mimicking their scanning of the empty, littered 
street for signs of the IED as well as tracking across the overhead balconies to assess the 
gathering observers.  
Having identified the location of the IED, James immediately dismisses 
Sanborn’s assumption that they will use the ‘bot’ to investigate, putting on the bomb 
suit instead and grinning with pleasure in defiance of warnings that it is ‘kind of tight 
down here’. Approaching the IED, James deploys a smoke bomb to visually isolate 
himself from the support of Sanborn and Eldridge and largely ignores their 
communications, as though his evident pleasure in the job is heightened by 
disconnecting himself from the wider military network and individualising the 
experience. It is at this point that the first-person point-of-view becomes more intensely 
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engaged, with the rhythms of James’ breath inside the helmet serving as a particularly 
embodied evocation of his subjective, experiential sensation.   
The mission is then brusquely interrupted by a peculiar scene in which an Iraqi 
taxi driver breaks through the military barricade set up around James. A tense 
confrontation ensues as the driver implacably and motionlessly stares back at James 
despite the plethora of guns aimed at him. James’ warning shots eventually convince 
him to begin reversing away from the scene, at which point he is detained. The total 
ambiguity of the driver’s motives is matched by the sheer redundancy of this scene in 
terms of narrative causality. As a somewhat enigmatic interlude, then, it serves only to 
amplify the scene’s tension and perhaps to provide some degree of face-to-face contact 
(if not quite combat per se) in contrast to the technological anonymity of IEDs. I will 
return to this point, and more generally to the film’s characterisation of Iraqis, in the 
discussion below.  
As James returns to the procedure of disarming the IED, Bigelow reinstates the 
primacy of the first-person point-of-view. In visual terms, this is not strictly a sustained 
first-person view; although some shots heighten the sense of subjectivity by 
incorporating the edges of his visor as a frame within the frame, the scene also 
incorporates frequent cuts to perspectives that are just slightly askew from James’ 
embodied position. Nonetheless, a sustained quality of embodied subjectivity is 
maintained throughout the entire sequence through the persistent use of the interiorised 
sound of his breathing. It is also worth noting the manner in which James seems to 
anthropomorphise the explosive by gently, almost sensuously brushing away the rubble 
which concealed it and intoning ‘hello, baby’. After swiftly, almost anti-climactically 
disarming the IED, James discovers a larger ‘secondary’ explosive, the emergence of 
which is accompanied by a brief drone on the soundtrack, echoing that of the film’s 
opening sequence. James’ work on this second device is intercut with the point-of-view 
of an Iraqi on one of the balconies above. The significance of this observational 
perspective is subtly suggested by an initial match cut from inside James’ helmet to a 
shot which frames him from above and uses the ovoid ornamental railing of the balcony 
to frame him in a graphically similar form. Although the technical details of the 
disarmament remain somewhat opaque, the viewer can nonetheless read this 
confrontation as a duel in which James is attempting to remove the detonator before the 
antagonist can trigger the IED, due to the cinematic grammar employed – specifically, 




The analysis of these two sequences enables an initial postulation of Bigelow’s 
use of the experiential mode. As in Restrepo, there is certainly an overarching attempt 
here to convey a deeply subjective sense of the experience of war, particularly as 
filtered through the perspectives of Thompson and James from within the bomb suit. 
While Restrepo was grounded almost exclusively in first-person points-of-view, as 
mediated by handheld digital video, The Hurt Locker’s aesthetic is somewhat more 
diverse. For instance, in the both of the above scenes, Bigelow establishes the action 
with a rapid series of cuts between multiple, undefined perspectives which appear to be 
surveilling the protagonists. Breaking the 180-degree rule in this way may typically 
connote disorientation, yet here it actually serves to orchestrate a coherent and 
comprehensive sense of three-dimensional space. As Robert Burgoyne’s article on the 
film notes, this spatialisation of the combat zone depicts ‘an experience of war no 
longer defined by fronts or sectors, a war in which improvised bombs and irregular 
combatants are concealed in the folds and textures of urban life’ (13). Furthermore, the 
speed of editing deployed here intensifies the affective sense of threat felt via the 
subjective points-of-view which are embedded within this space. Though similar to 
Restrepo in some regards, particularly the fluidity of fronts and omnidirectional nature 
of potential threats, The Hurt Locker’s spatial constructions do nonetheless reflect a 
more technically sophisticated means of heightening the tension implicit within the 
landscape of war in comparison with Restrepo’s elegantly composed yet more 
straightforward establishing shots, which primarily accentuate the landscape’s natural 
beauty and occasionally suggest the significance of strategic vantage points.  
The subjective perspectives contained within this three-dimensional space are 
principally conveyed through the use of first-person points-of-view. While these are not 
typically sustained throughout the duration of a scene, they are however crucially 
augmented by various sensuous details such as the distinctive quality of movement 
within the bomb suit and the prominent sounds of breathing within the helmet, which 
forcefully emphasise the embodied nature of the film’s subjective perspectives. These 
two key aspects of the film’s experiential aesthetic coincide, perhaps to an even greater 
degree than Restrepo, with Eagle’s definition of ‘strenuous spectatorship’. Indeed, it is 
striking that Eagle’s analysis of Saving Private Ryan could just as easily be applied to 
The Hurt Locker. Bigelow’s ‘imagination of space and place’ similarly ‘operates 
through a fantasy of location founded upon innovations of editing, camera angle and 
soundtrack that work to situate the spectator amidst the carnage of battle’, and grounds 
the point-of-view in an embodied form of subjectivity that ‘draw[s] the spectator into an 
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ever more intimate identification with an embodied imagination of the experience of 
combat’ (32). There are of course notable differences between the films beyond this 
‘strenuous’ representation of the space of combat – most obviously, Spielberg’s film 
embeds its combat within a present-day framing device which directly appeals to 
patriotic devotion and heroic self-sacrifice, while The Hurt Locker’s experiential 
portrait of combat is not contained within any comparable political rhetoric or context.  
Indeed, Burgoyne’s reading of the film posits the rupture between individual 
embodied experience and any conventional overarching political narrative as distinctly 
innovative, arguing: 
 
Framing combat as an addictive pleasure, an ongoing, private and collective need, 
the film departs radically from genre convention, disdaining the formulas of older 
war films – the pathos formulas of sacrifice and loss – for a mode of address that 
emphasizes the adrenalized experience of risk […] The Hurt Locker foregrounds 
the idea of private experience and pleasure in war, rendering war as a somatic 
engagement that takes place outside any larger meta-narrative of nation or history. 
(13) 
 
This view of the film is apparently shared by Steven Shaviro, whose account of 
Bigelow’s proceduralism (in the blog posts “Kathryn Bigelow” and “A Brief Remark on 
Zero Dark Thirty” for The Pinocchio Theory) posits that the intensive focus on 
‘operational techniques’ in both The Hurt Locker and Zero Dark Thirty drain these 
works of any ideals or overarching rationale. Yet, as I have suggested in relation to 
Restrepo’s proceduralism (particularly with reference to Aufderheide’s critique of the 
‘grunt doc’), one should be wary of the presentation of individual embodied experience 
as inherently apolitical.       
 While Burgoyne justifiably asserts that ‘the palpable experience of […] the body 
at risk’ is radically disconnected from ‘any kind of larger national narrative [emphasis 
added]’, this is not to say that it is a site entirely purified of political implications or 
other discursive relationships (13). The citation above intriguingly suggests that it is 
framed as ‘an addictive pleasure, an ongoing, private and collective need’, and 
Burgoyne further suggests that the film in fact constructs something of a dialectical 
opposition between embodiment and technological mediation: 
 
By underscoring the body at risk, The Hurt Locker also presents an implicit 
critique of the distance – moral and physical – of remote targeting and weaponry. 
70 
 
The reality of war as embodied activity and embodied violence asserts itself here 
in a visceral way. (12) 
 
As I have emphasised through the earlier reading of the film’s opening sequence, there 
is undoubtedly a significant body/technology dynamic at stake in the film. This is 
initially conveyed through the contrast established between Thompson and James, as 
the procedure for dealing with IEDs shifts from the detached precision of robotic 
mediation to the viscerally embodied risk of James’ approach. James’ association of 
embodied pleasure with a lack of technological mediation and isolation from the wider 
military network becomes even more pronounced after the initial mission outlined 
above, as he subsequently begins to work without the bomb suit and jettisons his radio. 
It may be possible, developing Burgoyne’s line of argument, to read this shift from 
Thompson’s technologically-aided insularity to James’ riskier engagement as a 
metaphor for the degeneration of asymmetrical warfare with minimal casualties into a 
drawn-out counter-insurgency program throughout which the death toll escalated 
alarmingly.  
 However, while I concur with the suggestion that The Hurt Locker frames 
embodied experience and technological mediation as a key binary opposition – with 
James manifesting a similar proclivity for unmediated ‘contact’ as that expressed by 
some of Restrepo’s subjects – the claim that embodiment ‘presents a critique’ of 
technological distanciation does not quite, I believe, satisfactorily address the 
significance of James’ reckless endangerment as a willingly self-imposed form of 
pleasure. Furthermore, the film does not seem to posit either embodied or 
technologically mediated modes of warfare as the ontologically privileged ‘reality of 
war’; indeed both are depicted as potentially lethal, and if the film ultimately focusses 
on the embodied form to a greater degree, it is primarily in order to explore this aspect 
of James’ combat addiction.  
This body/technology dialectic may appear somewhat disjunctive for a war film 
in which ‘combat’ is primarily constituted by the body-versus-anonymous-technology 
scenario of a man attempting to disarm IEDs, though Bigelow does just about manage 
to sustain this notion by consistently incorporating human antagonists, such as the taxi 
driver or, more frequently, a combatant who lingers on the margins of the scene waiting 
for an opportune moment to trigger the explosion. As this implies, the film’s 
characterisation of Iraqis is particularly reductive. In the majority of cases, including 
those just mentioned, they simply represent an undefined threat. No attempt is made to 
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contextualise the reasons for insurrection against the US occupation of Baghdad, and 
the closest the film comes to ascribing an equivalent sense of subjective motivation is 
the vague implication that the taxi driver in the above described sequence may be 
mirroring James’ enjoyment of embodied danger. Even the most prominent Iraqi 
character in the film – a young boy nicknamed ‘Beckham’ for whom James develops 
some paternal sympathy – appears to be defined solely through his relation to James. 
Beckham, however superficially, holds a flattering mirror to James’ recklessness by 
praising EOD work as ‘fun, it’s cool, it’s gangster, yeah?’, which contrasts markedly 
with the suspicions and fears emanating from Eldridge and Sanborn. 
The implied infantilism of James’ self-image that emerges here is but one 
element of critique which suggests that James’ position as the film’s purveyor of 
embodied, experiential pleasure in war is perhaps not to be taken at face value. While 
his actions throughout (approximately) the first half of the film may be read as eccentric 
yet heroic, a degree of distanciation is introduced during a sequence in which Sanborn 
and Eldridge consider fragging him4, with the audience seriously invited to consider 
whether this action is justifiable as a means of self-protection for the unit. In the latter 
half of the film, James’ escalating paranoia becomes increasingly difficult to identify 
with, and supplants his heroic self-image with delusions of persecution.   
The first substantial evidence of this occurs during the sequence in which the 
unit find a ‘body bomb’, with James mistakenly identifying the victim as Beckham.5 In 
stark contrast to the pleasure derived from earlier sequences of ordnance disposal, 
James is in this instance visibly disturbed and subsequently embarks upon a bizarre and 
clearly misguided nocturnal attempt to find the perpetrators. When he later discovers 
Beckham selling DVDs inside the military compound, James simply ignores him as 
though refusing to acknowledge the fantastical grounding of this escapade. The 
motivating factor behind this shift in James’ character seems to be rooted in the very 
                                                          
4 Specifically, Sanborn and Eldridge ponder detonating the ordnance which the unit are assigned 
to dispose of before James can retreat to a safe distance. The term ‘fragging’ derives more 
generally from the Vietnam era practice of soldiers killing their own officers with hand 
grenades.  
5 This sequence has been the source of some confusion among viewers and critics. Robert 
Burgoyne’s ‘Embodiment in the War Film: Paradise Now and The Hurt Locker’, for instance, 
assumes that the body-bomb is Beckham’s corpse, and neglects to discuss his re-appearance 
(16). However, given the evident paranoia displayed by James from this point onward in the 
film, and the comparative clarity of identifying Beckham as such in his subsequent re-
appearance in contrast to the distorted, bloodied corpse, I believe this reading has a greater 
justification. The commentary by Kathryn Bigelow and Mark Boal on the US Summit 
Entertainment DVD release confirms that this was the authorial intention.  
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notion of a body-bomb, which perhaps enacts a radically disconcerting literalisation of 
his anthropomorphising of IEDs; although it is also worth noting that the circumstances, 
in contrast to earlier ordnance disposal procedures, do not provide any identifiable 
human antagonist nor anyone to rescue, thus thwarting any opportunity to fulfil his 
perceived heroic role.   
Structurally, this sequence plays a significant role in beginning to erode the 
degree of audience identification with James. The combination of his charisma and 
unconventional success with the use of a first-person, experiential aesthetic designed to 
induce audience identification may have precluded any critical reading of his character 
up to this point, yet Bigelow here begins to establish a degree of distance whereby one 
cannot simply identify with the delusional grounds of his decision-making. This is 
further developed during the following mission in which the unit are called in to assess 
an oil tanker explosion. Surveying the chaos of the aftermath, James refuses the 
straightforward terms of the mission. Invoking a paranoid vision of ‘guys watching us 
right now and laughing at this’ to justify chasing his ‘adrenaline fix’ (as identified by 
Eldridge), James leads the unit into a reckless pursuit of unseen perpetrators through 
unknown back alleys, which results in Eldridge’s brief capture and injury. Once again, 
then, the conjunction of arriving too late for any heroics and the absence of an 
identifiable antagonist seems to induce this paranoid delusion.  
This notion of James as a victim of military circumstance is ultimately 
compounded by the film’s conclusion. During his brief sojourn at home, prior to re-
enlisting, he explains his singular motivation to his infant son: 
 
You love everything, don’t you? But you know what, buddy? As you get older, 
some of the things you love might not seem so special. Like your jack-in-the-box. 
Maybe you realise it’s just a piece of tin and a stuffed animal. And the older you 
get, the fewer things you really love. By the time you get to my age maybe it’s 
only one or two things. With me, I think it’s one.   
 
Read in conjunction with the film’s opening citation from Chris Hedges’ War Is A 
Force Which Gives Us Meaning – ‘The rush of battle is a potent and lethal addiction, 
for war is a drug’ – this clearly posits James’ unrelenting compulsion to put his body 
‘on the line’ as an addiction. Žižek’s critique of the film is equally sceptical of this 




The Hurt Locker brought back to Hollywood the trend which also accounts for the 
success of two recent Israeli films about the 1982 Lebanon war, Ari Folman’s 
animated documentary Waltz With Bashir and Samuel Maoz’s Lebanon […] 
Maoz has said his film is not a condemnation of Israel’s policies, but a personal 
account of what he went through: “The mistake I made is to call the film Lebanon 
because the Lebanon war is no different in its essence from any other war and for 
me any attempt to be political would have flattened the film.” This is ideology at 
its purest: the focus on the perpetrator’s traumatic experience enables us to 
obliterate the entire ethico-political background of the conflict. 
 
Certainly, the general notion of victimisation in this context does appear to 
coincide with genre tendencies to circumvent politics by internalising and 
psychologising the soldiers’ experience, as discussed above in relation to the Vietnam 
veteran figure and trauma in Restrepo. Additionally, The Hurt Locker’s diegetic 
restriction to James’ experiences does preclude any engagement with the ‘ethico-
political background of the conflict’. Žižek’s contention that ‘we are there, with our 
boys, identifying with their fear and anguish instead of questioning what they are doing 
there’ is justified, then, in the sense that the experiential rendition of disarming IEDs 
does not directly open up to questioning the political basis for the war, nor, to reiterate 
Aufderheide’s critique of the ‘grunt docs’, does the film address its audience as a voting 
public. Furthermore, the flattening of distinctions between wars seems to have a 
particular validity with reference to The Hurt Locker, since political context presumably 
has no bearing on James’ addiction to bodily risk.  
Despite these pertinent criticisms of the film, I would nonetheless maintain that 
Bigelow’s use of the experiential mode is rather more sophisticated than that of many 
similar films since the positing of combat addiction does suggest, albeit on an 
individual-subjective level, some sense of ‘questioning what they are doing there’. By 
manifesting James’ enjoyment of combat through a highly subjective aesthetic which 
invites audience identification, subsequently establishing a greater degree of 
distanciation through his escalating paranoia, and finally reframing the opening 
construction as an addiction, the film ultimately seems to imply a kind of auto-critique 
of the experiential mode. 
Earlier in this chapter, I noted that the experiential mode of representing war 
may effect a collapse of the soldier/audience distinction through directly and 
immersively translating the soldierly pleasures of combat into a form of spectatorial 
pleasure fundamentally oriented around the experience of the body at risk. The Hurt 
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Locker, through the above structure, may suggest that the terms of this construction are 
reversible – in other words, that this particular type of ‘militainment’ may, at its most 
extreme, go some way towards producing soldiers like James, disillusioned with civilian 
pleasures and only able to derive enjoyment from the visceral, embodied danger of 
combat. Since Stahl notes that ‘militainment’ works to craft the ‘imperialist subject’ as 
one who ‘provid[es] approval and authorisation’ of war by interactively engaging with 
this experiential pleasure, and many of the products which accommodate this 
interactivity (such as the game America’s Army) ultimately function as recruiting tools 
for the military, the path from the cinematic experiential mode to combat addiction does 
not seem too far-fetched (4).         
This reading of the film may be somewhat against the grain given Bigelow’s 
apparent predilection for this particular style of visceral action. Yet this almost 
paradoxical structure, whereby the subjective enjoyment of combat is both lavishly 
manifested and critiqued, does leave the film open to diverse and potentially 
contradictory readings which may account for both its wide audience appeal at a time 
when war films were proving largely unpopular and for the ensuing polarising critical 




 This chapter has explored the post-Vietnam legacy of the war film’s turn to 
subjective and embodied experience in contemporary instantiations of what I have 
termed the experiential mode, as the initial stage in a wider exploration of the shifting 
relationship between embodiment and technological mediation in the genre. This 
tendency is defined initially in relation to Vietnam War films, drawing on critical work 
which highlights the privileging of subjective and embodied experience to the exclusion 
of wider socio-political analysis. For Westwell, this is fundamentally effected by the 
mediating figure of the Vietnam veteran, whose often traumatic embodied experience 
serves to psychologise and internalise the war and thus negate the potential political 
charge of disaffection. Stahl contends that a similarly subjectivised and embodied form 
of ‘militainment’, posited as a reaction to ‘Vietnam Syndrome’, continues to 
characterise cinematic and televisual representations of the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, which appeal to ‘the post 9/11 fever to virtually enter the body of the 
soldier through a first-person aesthetic’ (79). Like Westwell, Stahl explicitly frames this 
trend as incompatible with a critique of the war, with the ‘gradual “zooming in” on the 
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experience of the soldier’ theorised as correlating inversely to socio-political analysis 
(78-79).    
Positing this tendency as continuous across almost forty years does, of course, 
have its complications, despite seminal examples of the experiential tendency 
manifesting in the intervening years (such as Saving Private Ryan). The Gulf War, in 
particular, seems somewhat resistant to this characterisation given that it is commonly 
depicted as a postmodern media spectacle cut adrift from embodied experience. While it 
is somewhat beyond the scope of this chapter to comprehensively explore the mutations 
that embodiment in the war film undergoes during the Gulf War era, it is nonetheless 
worth noting how the foregrounding of the keenly-debated relationship between 
embodiment and technological mediation during this conflict perhaps comes to supplant 
the body-politics dialectic that dominates critical approaches to Vietnam era 
embodiment. Given this contextual issue, as well as my overarching hypothesis that the 
war film’s embodied turn may now be posited as a reaction to the virtualising 
distanciation of digital mediation rather than simply as a retreat from politics, I have 
addressed contemporary examples of the ‘experiential’ in terms of the body’s 
relationship to both politics and technology, and further explored some of the novel 
ways in which these terms may be intertwined (considering, for example, the political 
and ethical implications of rendering combat as an embodied pleasure that is only 
impeded by technological mediation). 
Initially, I highlighted how the phenomenon of journalistic embedding is central 
to the contemporary strengthening of the experiential tendency, with embedded 
reportage forming the basis for many cinematic representations of the Iraq and 
Afghanistan Wars including Sebastian Junger and Tim Hetherington’s Restrepo. The 
discussion of Junger’s War demonstrated how closely embedded accounts tend to 
reproduce the Vietnam era subjectivisation of war, particularly through the rhetorical 
justification of the ‘grunt’s’ experience as inherently ‘authentic’ because of his/her 
presumed indifference to the ‘big picture’ of political context or ideology. Although the 
near-exclusive focus on the ‘grunt’ in such work differs slightly from the wider 
spectrum of rank encountered in Vietnam War instantiations of the experiential, this 
rhetoric nonetheless serves to filter the mediating frame of reference for comprehending 
the war down to a similarly myopic focus on the procedural and day-to-day experiences 
of soldiering. However, in place of the previously dominant 
internalising/psychologising mechanism, the emphasis here is primarily on the visceral 
enjoyment derived from embodied combat.  
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As is the case with virtually all embed adaptations, Restrepo jettisons the 
mediating figure of the journalist, largely attempting to align the spectatorial point-of-
view with that of the diegetic combatants. This is formally implemented by the 
employment of a first-person aesthetic which seemingly deliberately obscures the 
formal differences between Hetherington’s cinematography and video diaries recorded 
by the film’s soldiers. While the ‘grunt’s truth’ rhetoric (in both literary and cinematic 
forms) would posit this first-person perspective as an authentic and apolitical mode of 
witnessing, I have problematised the supposed neutrality of the experiential here by 
suggesting that this immersive identification with military subjectivities – particularly 
when coupled with a clearly embodied pleasure in combat – should instead be 
considered as a form of political and ethical complicity. Some distanciation from this 
complicit perspective is opened up by the film’s post-combat interview strand via its 
reflective tone and affective scrutiny of trauma. Yet this aspect of the film does 
ultimately serve to reinstate the psychologisation/internalisation of war to some degree, 
even if this particular instance does not quite offer the same sense of therapeutic closure 
as many of the Vietnam War films.  
The relationship between embodied experience and technological mediation is 
touched upon briefly in Restrepo, as the film’s subjects explicitly associate the pleasures 
of combat with an embodied witnessing that is apparently diminished by the 
distanciation of long-range artillery. This theme is, however, more substantially 
developed in The Hurt Locker. Bigelow’s film establishes an oppositional relationship 
between these modes of mediating war from the outset, contrasting Thompson’s use of 
robotics with James’ predilection for embodied risk. The latter emerges as the film’s 
privileged perspective, aligned with an embodied and predominantly first-person 
aesthetic that serves to evoke James’ enjoyment of the sensory experience of combat 
and invite identification with this imperilled point-of-view embedded within a 
technically sophisticated rendition of three-dimensional space. As such, The Hurt 
Locker’s embodied form has been critiqued for what is often perceived to be a typically 
experiential focus on these sensory aspects of combat to the exclusion of any 
engagement with politics or ideology. Although this may appear to be a less 
problematic pleasure than that offered by Restrepo, given that it is fiction rather than 
documentary and deals with IED-disposal rather than the killing of Afghans, in formal 
terms it does nonetheless seem to perpetuate a similar complicity. 
However, I have argued that the relationship between embodiment and 
technological mediation in The Hurt Locker is somewhat more complex than the 
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critiques of, say, Slavoj Žižek may suggest. As the film increasingly aligns spectatorial 
pleasure with James’ embodied risk, it seems to reframe the use of robotics in the 
opening sequence, such that it begins to appear less like a prosthetic extension of human 
capabilities and more like a signifier of a kind of post-human remote warfare that 
negates James’ skills and enjoyment. Reading this at face value though – as Bigelow’s 
attempt to critique the unreality of technologically mediated warfare through embodied 
imagery – fundamentally neglects the significance of this elision of technology as a self-
imposed form of pleasure and also fails to acknowledge the increasingly reflexive 
framing of the experiential as the film begins to distance itself from James’ perspective, 
revealing this enjoyment to be a debilitating form of addiction. Indeed, these latter 
elements also open the film up to an alternative reading as a kind of auto-critique 
whereby the experiential mode given its most lavish incarnation yet ultimately 
somewhat problematised through the implicit suggestion that James’ addiction may in a 
sense be mirrored by The Hurt Locker’s spectator: disillusioned with all aspects of 
warfare barring the visceral thrill of combat.    
It is also worth noting how these two contemporary manifestations of the 
experiential conform in many ways to the critical delineation of immersive spectatorial 
subjectivities as outlined in the literature review. Of course, considered strictly in terms 
of medial frames, both Restrepo and The Hurt Locker are quite simply and 
conventionally cinematic, and their limited remediations of military-technological 
interfaces do not offer much opportunity for contrasting heterogeneous perceptual 
frames. Nonetheless, the aesthetic construction of embodied experience in these films 
corresponds quite closely to Ryan and Griffiths’ definitions of immersion. Both 
fundamentally characterise immersion as an illusion or invocation of presence, which 
broadly corresponds with the transparent aim of the experiential mode in offering the 
viewer some simulated sense of what it is like to be in a combat zone via an 
approximation of military subjectivity. The Hurt Locker’s embedding of this presence 
within a distinctly three-dimensional space further coincides with Ryan’s spatial 
conceptualisation of immersion as ‘a sense of being surrounded, a sense of depth, and 
the possession of a roving point of view’, as well as Griffiths’ account of how battle 
panoramas envelop the viewer’s perspective within ‘huge canvases that literally 
surrounded them’ (53; 40).  
Interpreting frames in a more metaphorical manner, one could also claim that the 
de-framing effect of decontextualised embodied presence offered by these films – 
considered above primarily in relation to ‘frames’ of political context – may further 
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strengthen the alignment of the experiential with the immersive. In other words, the 
rendering of military experience as individualised and embodied, with little or no 
indication of what is at stake in national, political or ideological terms, serves to create a 
fundamentally immersive form of subjectivised enjoyment. In this sense, immersive 
spectatorship also acquires connotations of complicity, linking the spectatorial agency 
invoked by Restrepo and The Hurt Locker to viewers of battle panoramas who, in 
Griffiths’ reading, are ‘interpellated into the role of historical witnesses or war reporters 
via the subject matter and immersive mode of address’ and thus implicitly grant 
‘support for empire’ through the consumption of war as ‘visual spectacle’ (50-51). 
I will return to Hansen’s work in subsequent chapters, since his framework will be 
more useful for conceptualising spectatorial subjectivity in relation to digital interfaces, 
though it is perhaps relevant to note here that the oppositional relationship between 
embodiment and technological mediation does intersect with the conceptualisation of 
cinema in Hansen’s Embodying Technesis as an essentially tactile, embodied and 
affective medium which can help ‘resist the seductions of disembodiment projected by 
contemporary […] virtual technologies […] reclaiming a distinctly human perspective 
in the face of material and technological forces that for so many today portend the 
inevitable dawn of a new, radically posthuman epoch’ (263). However, as I have 
suggested in my analyses of Restrepo and The Hurt Locker, embodied perception does 
not quite function as a straightforward humanist grounding in this context, but rather 
tends toward a more troubling form of complicity with military subjects’ pleasure in the 
visceral thrill of the body at risk.     
While Ryan and Griffiths thus seem to corroborate the findings of this chapter – 
with the use of their critical frameworks here leading to an outline of diegetic and 
spectatorial subjectivities that largely conform to earlier suggestions with reference to 
the ‘virtual-citizen-soldier’ and ‘strenuous spectatorship’ – Bolter and Grusin’s concepts 
of immediacy and hypermediacy can be used to frame spectatorial immersion from a 
slightly different angle, one which perhaps enables a more pertinent contrast between 
the experiential mode and the digital forms of mediating war addressed in the 
subsequent chapters. Although Remediation pre-dates the films covered in this chapter 
by almost a decade, Bolter and Grusin do coincidentally draw attention to Kathryn 
Bigelow’s earlier work Strange Days – or, more specifically the imaginary technology 
of the ‘wire’ within this film – as epitomising immersive immediacy. This ‘fanciful 
extrapolation of virtual reality’ is said to lay bare immediacy’s ‘goal of unmediated 
visual experience’ (4). Of course (as Bolter and Grusin acknowledge), the very notion 
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of any medium offering ‘unmediated’ experience is a paradox, or non-actualisable 
myth, yet I believe that this concept quite accurately expresses The Hurt Locker’s 
distinctive sense of embodied presence articulated in opposition to technological 
mediation. This can be further clarified via Bolter and Grusin’s account of the ‘version 
of the contemporary mediated self’ (i.e. spectatorial position) expressed by the ‘logic’ of 
immediacy:   
 
Accordingly, there are two versions of the contemporary mediated self that 
correspond to the two logics of remediation. When we are faced with media that 
operate primarily under the logic of transparent immediacy (virtual reality and 
three-dimensional computer graphics), we see ourselves as a point of view 
immersed in an apparently seamless visual environment. In a virtual environment, 
we have the freedom to alter our selves by altering our point of view and to 
empathise with others by occupying their point of view – techniques pioneered in 
film and now extended and intensified in digital media. At the same time, the 
logic of hypermediacy, expressed in digital multimedia and networked 
environments, suggests a definition of the self whose key quality is not so much 
“being immersed” as “being interrelated or connected” (232) 
 
As noted by my analyses of Restrepo and The Hurt Locker, the restriction of 
narrative perspective to an embodied point-of-view is a key tendency of the experiential 
mode of the contemporary war film, and tends to delimit the spectatorial experience to a 
complicit form of ‘empathy’ with diegetic military subjectivities. The two films can be 
somewhat differentiated, however, by the spatial form in which this embodied 
perspective is embedded. I have argued that The Hurt Locker, unlike Restrepo (and 
indeed the majority of experiential war cinema), surrounds this point-of-view with a 
distinctly three-dimensional rendition of ‘seamless’ space. This cinematic spacing is 
highly technically sophisticated and relies on rapid, almost paranoid cutting between 
multiple, undefined points-of-view; yet this high-tech accomplishment is ultimately 
geared toward a sense of unencumbered presence. As such, the film replicates the 
curious technological paradox of immediacy since its evocation of ‘unmediated’ 
presence is effected by an effaced but nonetheless fundamental technicity. The spatial 
dimensions of The Hurt Locker could thus be said to bridge the experiential mode with 
immediacy by taking the characteristically embodied presence of this group of films and 
situating it within a more specifically immersive space.         
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The aesthetic correspondence between The Hurt Locker and a definition of 
medial immediacy which primarily refers to ‘virtual reality and three-dimensional 
computer graphics’ also seems to be a noteworthy outcome of this chapter. Bolter and 
Grusin do stress throughout this work that virtual reality should be considered a 
remediation of cinematic point-of-view rather than a transcendence of prior media, so to 
find some degree of continuity between them is perhaps not too surprising in itself. 
However, the way that this immediacy is founded upon a paradoxical sense of 
‘unmediated’ technicity may suggest that the dividing line between experiential 
embodiment and the mediation of drones or CG simulations is not quite as rigid as some 
critics of military-technological virtualisation would suggest. The two subsequent 
chapters will address precisely this relationship between embodiment and technological 
mediation in relation to drones (chapter three) and simulations (chapter four) – 
exploring the extent to which the subjective experience of warfare is altered by the 
mediation of these technologies. Drones in particular are often posited as complicit with 
an emptying out of subjective and embodied experience, creating a distinctly virtual 
form of contemporary warfare to which the experiential mode is sometimes (as in 
Hansen’s Embodying Technesis) considered a kind of antidote. The following chapter 
will reconsider this notion in relation to drone mediation, as well interrogating whether 
the specific modes of subjective experience afforded by this novel form of remote 
warfare are continuous with the type of embodiment that characterises the experiential 
war film, or whether new technologies may demand a new theoretical formulation of 





















The escalating military use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) – or drones, 
as they are more commonly termed – has attracted an increasing degree of controversy 
over the past few years. Two principle reasons are commonly cited for this: the first 
regarding the ethics of remote warfare, and the second concerning the shift in military 
doctrine from geographically circumscribed conflict between nation-states to the global 
and amorphous series of ‘kill-list’ assassinations carried out by drones.  
US drone missions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen are typically 
run from control centres in the US, such as Creech Air Force Base in Nevada, with the 
drone remotely operated in real time via satellite link. Although many aspects of the 
drone program remain rather secretive, a part of the US military’s propaganda campaign 
against negative portrayals of drones in the media has involved allowing some degree of 
access to sites such as Creech, which can be seen in a segment produced for the CBS 
series 60 Minutes6 and in countless stills available online. These depict a control panel 
comprised of multiple screens streaming the drone video feed alongside maps, and a 
joystick-style controller similar to that which one might use for a flight simulator game. 
The apparent convergence of this apparatus with gaming, as well as the evident 
insularity of the drone operator who is able to kill at a distance without placing one’s 
body at risk, have been the target of numerous journalistic critiques which suggest that 
drones have reduced war to the level of gaming. For instance, Akbar Ahmed and 
Lawrence Wilkerson’s 2013 Guardian article, entitled “Dealing remote-control death, 
the US has lost its moral compass”, explicitly denounces these ‘armchair warriors’ as 
perpetuating a ‘dishonourable’ mode of combat by ‘making warfare more like a video 
game and giving technicians the dissociated power of life and death for the figures on 
the screen before them’. In such accounts, then, the analogies drawn with gaming tend 
to bolster an argument focussed primarily on the geographical and ethical distanciation 
apparently inaugurated (or at least pushed to a new extreme) by drones’ particular form 
of screen mediated, remote combat.       
While drones are, in part, used to supplement more conventional modes of 
combat – such as providing ‘overwatch’ support to ground troops in Afghanistan – they 
are also an integral component in a particularly divisive shift in US military doctrine. As 
part of the so-called War on Terror, drone strikes have been executed to target 
                                                          
6 “America’s New Air Force”; see http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/americas-new-air-force/ 
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individual militants in numerous countries with which the US is not formally at war – 
which, as Medea Benjamin highlights in Drone Warfare, is in clear violation of 
international law (127-148). These strikes have attracted controversy for the 
discrepancy between the official rhetoric of ‘precision’ weaponry and the numerous 
civilians known to have been killed either as collateral damage or through instances of 
mistaken identity. Critics have highlighted several new policies, introduced as part of 
the US drone program, which may directly contribute to this apparent incongruity. 
Alongside ‘personality strikes’, which target known individuals, the policy of ‘signature 
strikes’ allows for the targeting of what Benjamin terms ‘groups of men who bear 
certain signatures, or defining characteristics associated with terrorist activities, but 
whose identities are not known’; while ‘double tap’ strikes, in which a first missile is 
shortly followed by a second aimed at the same location, are also widely considered to 
have escalated the number of civilian deaths (131). Furthermore, many drone missions 
bypass official military channels, being run instead by the CIA and JSOC (Joint Special 
Operations Command), an anti-terror unit that Benjamin describes as ‘even more 
cloaked in secrecy and less subject to accountability than the intelligence agency’ (62). 
As a result of the extremely loose definitions of ‘combatant’ instantiated by such 
practices as signature strikes, and the lack of transparency concomitant with running the 
drone program through the CIA and JSOC, the most reliable public statistics on drone 
strikes are available via the Bureau of Investigative Journalism7.    
In short, drones are central to some of the most contentious and substantial 
changes being effected in contemporary warfare by digital technologies. Given that a 
central objective of this thesis is to re-establish a discursive connection between studies 
of the war film and the wider military-technological context, then, the representation of 
drones in contemporary war cinema is a key topic. Certainly, many of the above 
outlined socio-political issues relating to the use of drones are reflected in this corpus. 
The first instances of drones in film – in the CIA thriller cycle of 2005-8 typified by 
Syriana and Body of Lies – as well as the more recent Zero Dark Thirty, could be said to 
reflect the proliferation of drone warfare outside conventional military channels in a 
skewing of the war genre toward globe-spanning CIA, rather than strictly military, 
operations. Tonje Hessen Schei’s documentary Drone (2014) is a useful primer on these 
issues for a broad audience, outlining drones’ production and deployment, the 
experiences of drone operators from recruitment at gaming events to disillusion and 
                                                          
7 See https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/ 
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PTSD, and a useful counterpoint to Western perspectives on drones through its focus on 
their impact on residents of Waziristan and the efforts of Clive Stafford-Smith’s charity 
Reprieve to bring legal justice for civilian victims in the area. Similarly, albeit in the 
realm of fiction, Good Kill (2014) crams its diegesis with topical concerns, addressing 
the ethics of signature and double tap strikes via the focalising perspective of a former 
Air Force pilot now reluctantly employed as a drone operator, as well as exploring the 
difficulties of the ‘compartmentalisation’ demanded by remote warfare on military 
personnel who ‘blow up six Taliban and go home to barbecue’. 
 Yet cinema, of course, does far more than simply hold up a mirror to these 
socio-political issues. Integrating drone perspectives into cinema for the first time 
involves a series of aesthetic and ontological choices which have a particular resonance 
for the wider relationship between the war film, the military employment of digital 
technologies, and gaming. While an identification with the drone camera’s roving point-
of-view may appear somewhat commensurate with the cinematic apparatus itself – 
leading to an alignment of the viewer’s perspective with that of the drone operator – 
critics’ claims that drones turn warfare into something like a video game also suggest 
that in this realm of remote yet interactive digital weaponry, the interactivity afforded 
by gaming may facilitate a more exact reproduction of the drone operator’s experience. 
The general scarcity of cinematic representations of drones, especially in relation to the 
veritable glut of films focussing on the Iraq War, may be partially due to the ongoing 
opacity of drone warfare compared to the visibility afforded by media embedding in 
Iraq, yet it may also owe something to this incongruity between the genre’s dominant 
embodied/experiential mode (as outlined in the previous chapter) and the potentially 
rather static mise-en-scène of ‘armchair warriors’ physically confined to a small cabin.  
 As such, this chapter will interrogate not only these socio-political issues raised 
by the use of drones, but also the extent to which cinematic representations of drones 
may inaugurate a new visual regime of warfare. Does the framing of war through the 
drone interface, for instance, reshape cinematic notions of the subjective experience of 
war as developed through the embodied/experiential mode? How do we characterise the 
experience of drone operators, and how does this correspond to the viewer’s 
perspective? How does the drone interface differ from prior aerial modes of imaging 
warfare, and how does this affect the genre’s conventions?  
 In order to more rigorously address these questions, the chapter will begin with 
an overview of the ways in which drones have been studied and theorised within the 
lineage of aerial warfare, encompassing works by Medea Benjamin, Paul Virilio and 
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Derek Gregory, as well as studies of military satellite imaging. Drawing a contextual 
and conceptual framework from this discussion, I will then examine the panoptic model 
of drone imagery instantiated by Syriana and Body of Lies, before moving on to a 
discussion of the relationship between embodied human intelligence and drone 
reconnaissance in Kathryn Bigelow’s Zero Dark Thirty. Finally, I will present extended 
readings of Andrew Niccol’s Good Kill and Omer Fast’s Five Thousand Feet is the 
Best, focussing in particular on these films’ accounts of the subjective experience of the 
drone operator and the radically different model of drone imaging suggested by the 




 Medea Benjamin’s Drone Warfare provides a useful, albeit brief, sketch of the 
history of UAVs, noting their origins in 1930s experiments by US, UK and German 
military forces with drones implemented as the mobile, unmanned targets of ‘anti-
aircraft exercises’ (13). By the time of the Vietnam War, drones were incorporated into 
US military reconnaissance practices, though Benjamin emphasises that armed drones 
did not appear until 1999, as part of the NATO Kosovo campaign (13-15). This spare 
contextualisation establishes the background for the journalistic discussion of 
contemporary applications and controversies around current drone wars to be found 
throughout the rest of Drone Warfare, though the lack of discursive discussion of the 
relationship between drones and other military technologies necessitates a turn here to 
more theory-oriented studies of contemporary military technologies in order to position 
drones within a more distinct military-technological lineage and explore more 
specifically the ways in which they conform to or depart from associated military 
imaging systems such as satellites.  
Paul Virilio’s seminal 1984 work War and Cinema is perhaps one of the first 
works to attempt this, positing a direct line of evolution from ‘the first battlefield 
observation balloon’ of 1794 through WWI aerial reconnaissance photography to the 
‘pilotless aircraft’ deployed over Laos in 1967 (15). The early use of drones, then, is 
broadly claimed as the culminating achievement of a military-cinematic panopticism 
through which ‘Direct vision was now a thing of the past: in the space of a hundred and 
fifty years, the target area had become a cinema ‘location’ [emphasis in original]’ (15-
16). A significant intermediary step between manned aerial observation and the current 
use of drones can also been read in his description of the experience of piloting during 
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the Vietnam War, with his account of the pilot’s ‘technological vertigo’ once 
‘imprisoned in the closed circuits of electronics’ coalescing again around the 
substitution of ‘digital display’ for direct perception (104-106). 
 Furthermore, Virilio’s foregrounding of ‘a new type of headquarters […] [the] 
central electronic-warfare administration’ as a military ‘images department’ used to 
analyse the feeds of ‘spy satellites, drones and other video-missiles’ seems to anticipate 
the CIA’s use of drone surveillance and thus their positioning at something of a tangent 
to what are conventionally considered military operations (2). Although Virilio does not 
explicitly isolate drones as an object of extensive study beyond these passages, his 
overarching thesis regarding the mutual imbrication of cinematic and military 
technologies can also be productively extended to the contemporary proliferation of 
drones outside of a strictly military context, as they are now appearing in various 
amateur and commercial guises ranging from the DJI Phantom model marketed for 
recreational aerial imaging to Amazon’s delivery drones or their employment for 
environmental/ecological monitoring. As some of these examples suggest, Virilio’s 
military-cinematic binary schema does perhaps risk appearing somewhat outdated in 
this contemporary context, since it is now not only cinematic techniques that 
reciprocally influence military practice, but also some degree of the interactivity and 
connectivity of digital media8. Nonetheless, the sense of drones as effecting a blurring 
of military-civilian boundaries is a significant theme in several of the films discussed 
below, although it is primarily instantiated in a psycho-geographic expression of the 
drone operator’s experience rather than via direct reference to non-military drones per 
se.   
While Virilio’s work goes some way toward conceptualising broad trends in 
military technologies that have culminated in armed drones, a more specific predecessor 
can arguably be located in military satellites. Introduced in the early 1960s as part of the 
US military’s covert reconnaissance of Soviet territory, satellite imaging offered a 
disembodied and remote means of surveillance that is comparable to the reconnaissance 
function of drones in the present (and, indeed, indispensable to the current drone 
apparatus in the live transmission of drone video feeds to operator bases across the 
globe). Paul B. Stares implicitly highlights this facet of satellites in his account of their 
genesis in an effort to reduce ‘visibility’ and avoid provocation following the Soviet 
capture of the U2 piloted by Gary Powers (62-65). Yet it is primarily their later 
                                                          




development, particularly during UN peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, the first Gulf 
War and the 2003 Iraq War, which demonstrates a much closer imbrication with 
contemporary drone imaging. Lisa Parks’ Cultures in Orbit and Roger Stahl’s article 
“Becoming Bombs” are useful sources for detailing the specific modes and functions of 
satellite imaging during these conflicts.  
In her analysis of satellite imagery during the Bosnian War, Parks notes the 
sociocultural assumptions of military/scientific objectivity associated with the 
technology and argues that it is fundamentally tied to a visual regime which ‘treated the 
surface of the Earth as a domain of unobstructed Western vision, knowledge and 
control’ (79). This panoptic claim, however, is somewhat undermined by the ‘excessive 
abstraction and emptiness of the satellite perspective’ which creates a dependence upon 
annotation (often drawn from supplementary intelligence gathering or other 
circumstantial assumptions) in order to ground signification (89). Thus, in Parks’ 
account, there was ‘nothing evident’ about the satellite-derived photographic ‘evidence’ 
of mass burials at Srebrenica, since the satellite imagery of this period constituted ‘an 
abstract visual field that must be anchored and infused with meaning in order to signify 
anything other than its own orbital position’ (89-91). Parks emphasises that a clear 
‘hierarchy of discourses’ regulates this anchoring, with the ‘dispassionate gaze of the 
intelligence analyst and anthropologist’ systematically privileged above the ‘embodied 
experience of victims and bystanders’, both within actual military practice and the 
televisual realm of news programs’ interactive annotations, zooms and various other 
animated transitions (96). Contrary to the real-time interactivity of contemporary drone 
operation, then, all of this post-event analysis and supplementation significantly 
suppresses the technology’s ‘capacity for liveness’ (97).   
In “Becoming Bombs”, Roger Stahl argues that satellite imagery has been an 
‘integral part of the US civilian experience of war’ since the first broadcast of a Libyan 
chemical weapons facility in 1989 (70). He notes that the 1991 Gulf War was the first 
‘to be waged using real-time, integrated, computer and satellite-based Geographic 
Information Systems’, from which emerged a range of ‘static satellite imagery’ 
enhanced by ‘flashy graphics’ on CNN (70). The article primarily focusses, however, on 
the use of satellite imaging during the Iraq War, particularly through its reproduction on 
television news, and on the modes of spectatorial engagement effected by this aerial 
visual regime. Like Parks, he considers the technology complicit in an effacement of 
embodied experience, claiming that satellites ‘reinforced the logics of the “clean war”’, 
compounding the post-Vietnam trend of the disappearance of bodies and effecting a 
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‘shift in focus away from the axis of the body and toward the axis of technology’ (79). 
In its adaptation for television news, this aesthetic is supplemented by 3D animation 
such as the ‘earth zoom’ which ‘beheld the entire world before plunging down to claim 
possession of any one of its details’, thus ‘promot[ing] a more interactive aesthetic, 
immersing the civic eye in a theatre of virtual action’ while simultaneously 
‘weaponising the civic gaze’ (80-83). Stahl’s study of the overlapping 
commercial/military origins of satellite imaging also significantly highlights how 
Keyhole’s ‘Earthviewer’ interface (subsequently used in television news coverage of 
Iraq) was explicitly modelled on flight simulators, thereby establishing a quite explicit 
convergence with gaming (71-72). 
In addition to the basic similarity between satellites and drones as unmanned 
modes of aerial reconnaissance, then, the works of Parks and Stahl enable further 
comparisons to be drawn. Satellites are posited as concomitant with a panoptic regime 
of military knowledge and control, which coincides with Virilio’s account of drones in 
War and Cinema as well as several more contemporary accounts, such as Pasi Väliaho’s 
“The light of God: Notes on the visual economy of drones” in which he argues that: 
 
drone assisted wars are driven by an imperative to establish unbounded, synoptic 
control of visibility from the heavens. The drone operator’s duties are focused on 
the administration of a visual economy (of people’s perceptions and actions) by 
controlling the vertical axis from a God’s-eye viewpoint. To this we should also 
add the ability to act – that is to say, to kill – at a distance by sending off, along 
with the laser beam, a Hellfire missile. Thus, we are called forth to imagine an 
omniscient eye and an omnipotent hand that rule Earth from the sky.  
 
In Parks’ and Stahl’s accounts, this panopticism is also associated with a shift away 
from embodied experience, which is further compounded by the virtualising spatio-
temporal effect of animated interactivity to which satellite imagery is subjected by 
television news productions. As such, one might consider whether many of the initial 
media assumptions about drone imaging – as virtualising and comparable to gaming – 
may be rooted in these discourses around satellites. 
However, recent studies of drones by Derek Gregory, Caroline Holmqvist and 
Alison Williams have begun to dispute this oft-drawn analogy with the distanciation of 
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gaming. Examining the perceptual experience9 of the drone operator in greater detail, 
these works reframe drone mediation as comprising a distinctive rupture from the 
military lineage of aerial abstraction or distanciation, arguing instead that drones effect 
a highly sensory and intimate engagement with combat spaces and bodies.   
 Gregory’s 2011 article “From a View to a Kill: Drones and Late Modern War” 
explicitly refutes ‘critics who claim that these operations reduce war to a video game in 
which the killing space appears remote and distant’, suggesting instead that the ‘new 
visibilities’ enabled by drone mediation produce a highly distinctive mode of ‘intimacy’ 
(193). Gregory expands upon this distinction between distance and intimacy in a later 
work, entitled “Lines of Descent”, for the edited volume From Above: War, Violence 
and Verticality. Outlining the way in which ‘distance threads through the genealogy of 
bombing’, he argues that aerial warfare has since WWII ‘typically work[ed] to render 
bombing an abstract, purely technical exercise for those who execute it’ (42). Trends 
such as carpet bombing ‘erased people from the field of view’ and, via the ‘language of 
patterns’, created an abstracted yet ‘deadly form of applied geometry’ (48). During the 
Vietnam War, similar ‘abstract geometries’ were applied, although Gregory notes that 
the three key elements of ‘the technical infrastructure for today’s drone wars’ – namely, 
‘remotely piloted aircraft, real-time visual surveillance and a networked sensor-shooter 
system’ – simultaneously began to emerge (53-54). Once assembled and unified, a 
fundamental transformation from distanciation to immersive intimacy appears to take 
place, for two primary reasons: the high resolution imagery of ground level events now 
enabled and instantaneously transmitted back to the pilot by drone video feeds, and the 
networked reconfiguration of subjectivity that takes place with the instantiation of the 
digitally connected kill-chain: 
 
But the flight crews repeatedly insist that real-time video feeds bring them right 
into the combat zone: that they are not 7,000 miles away but just 18 inches, the 
distance from eye to screen. Insofar as this is a “videogame war” then it shares in 
the extraordinary immersive capacity of the most advanced videogames. This is 
significantly different from the detachment – the “distance and blindness” – 
experienced by bomber crews over Germany and Vietnam. And yet the reality-
                                                          
9 More specifically, Gregory’s focus is on the ‘scopic regime’ of drone imaging, defined as ‘a 
mode of visual apprehension that is culturally constructed and prescriptive, socially structured 
and shared’ (“From a View to a Kill” 190). An echo of this can be found in Holmqvist’s 
attention to the ‘ontology’ of drone imaging; while Williams primarily (and complementarily) 
explores the relationship between drone imaging and embodiment. 
89 
 
effect this produces may be sufficiently powerful where remotely piloted aircraft 
are providing armed overwatch or close air support to convert proximity not 
distance, visibility not blindness, into a serious problem […] [operators] interact 
regularly with troops on the ground through live video feeds and online 
communications, and the intimacy created by these new forms of military-social 
networking can predispose them to interpret the actions of others in the vicinity as 
a threat to their comrades and precipitate lethal action (62) 
 
It is interesting to note here that, rather than refuting the analogies with gaming 
absolutely, Gregory instead proposes an alternate conceptualisation of gaming that is 
rooted in immersion rather than virtualisation. There is, of course, a substantial overlap 
between gaming and drone operation in terms of the individual skillset required (e.g. 
hand-eye co-ordination, multitasking), as highlighted by Medea Benjamin’s account of 
the military’s overt ‘appeal to youth gaming culture’ (86). Yet this does not serve to 
‘distance soldiers from the consequences of their actions’ as Benjamin proposes (87). 
Instead, for Gregory, it leads to a novel perceptual experience of ‘proximity’ or 
presence generated by the immersive qualities of the drone video feed.   
Caroline Holmqvist’s “Undoing War: War Ontologies and the Materiality of 
Drone Warfare” echoes Gregory’s claim that analogies between drones and gaming 
only begin to acquire substance when considered in relation to immersion. Dismissing 
the equation of drones, gaming and virtualisation as ‘often simplistic’, she argues that: 
 
It is the immersive quality of video games, their power to draw players into their 
virtual worlds, that makes them potent – this is precisely why they are used in 
pre-deployment training. The video streams from the UAV are shown to have the 
same immersive quality on the drone operator – they produce the same “reality-
effect” [emphasis in original] (541-542) 
 
Furthermore, Holmqvist’s study expands upon Gregory’s account of how the drone 
video feed induces a sense of intimacy by exploring how the combination of the drone 
video feed’s immersive and high-resolution imagery with a networked sense of 
‘proximity to ground troops [emphasis in original]’ may be responsible for the perhaps 
startlingly high number of incidences of PTSD among drone pilots (542). This is 
principally ascribed to the ‘exposure to high-resolution images of killing, including the 
details of casualties and body parts that would never be possible to capture with the 
human eye’ inaugurated by the drone assemblage in stark contrast to the distanciation 
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ascribed by Gregory to aerial bombing and also, more implicitly, to satellite imagery in 
the readings of Parks and Stahl (542). Indeed, Williams further characterises the 
experience as a distinctly ‘sensory engagement with the combat spaces’, suggesting a 
highly distinctive conjunction of affective embodiment and technological mediation 
(385).   
The arguments of Gregory, Holmqvist and Williams thus suggest that the key 
differences between drones and earlier modes of aerial imaging relate primarily to the 
operators’ networked subjectivity and to a substantially higher resolution of imaging 
which is directly linked to affective, potentially traumatic, bodily experience and 
PTSD10. Contrary to assumptions regarding the disembodied, virtualising equivalence 
of drone operation and gaming, then, these articles suggest that drone warfare may in 
fact bear a greater resemblance to the embodied cinematic aesthetic of experiential, 
sensory and deeply subjective portraits of war as highlighted in the previous chapter. In 
the following section, I will therefore explore the extent to which cinematic 
representations of drones have conformed to this description, grounding the analysis 
through the key concepts of virtualisation, embodiment and subjectivity and exploring 
what is at stake in these alternate modes of conceptualising drone warfare as it is 




As noted above, drones first began to appear in the subgenre or cycle of CIA 
thrillers around 2005-8, exemplified by Syriana and Body of Lies11. Stephan Gaghan’s 
Syriana, from 2005, is loosely based on See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground 
Soldier in the CIA’s War Against Terrorism, a memoir by former CIA agent Robert 
Baer. The film’s multiple, intersecting and globe-spanning narrative threads deal 
                                                          
10 I am aware that this discussion of PTSD among drone pilots could be misconstrued as 
advocating a misguided empathy for the drone operator at the expense of his/her victims, and it 
not my intention at all to minimise the suffering of civilians (or even combatants) in the 
countries (primarily Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia and Syria) forced to endure this 
illegal and unethical bombardment. Yet, in the context of cinematic representations, I maintain 
that a questioning of our spectatorial and ethical subject positions (relative to the diegetically-
constructed subjectivity of the drone operator) is valid and perhaps even necessary if we are to 
take seriously cinema’s role in shaping public understanding of the ways in which warfare is 
transformed by the advent of such technologies.  
11 One could also include, within this subgenre, films such as The Kingdom (2007), Rendition 
(2007) and Lions for Lambs (2007). The decision to focus on Syriana and Body of Lies is 
largely based on their more prominent use of drone imaging. 
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predominantly with the struggle for control of oil reserves in an unspecified Middle-
Eastern emirate, focalising this geopolitical conflict through the perspectives of Prince 
Nasir (the unnamed country’s foreign minister), a CIA agent assigned to assassinate 
Nasir, an energy analyst from Switzerland, two Pakistani migrant workers, and 
numerous US lawyers and lobbyists. Ridley Scott’s 2008 film Body of Lies employs a 
similarly globe-spanning narrative structure, cutting fluidly between Iraq, Jordan, Syria, 
UAE as well as the US, UK, Turkey and the Netherlands to track the pursuit of terrorist 
Al-Saleem by CIA agent Roger Ferris. Video feeds from all these locations are relayed, 
via satellites and drones, to the CIA control room run by Russell Crowe’s character Ed 
Hoffman.      
With their aesthetics and narrative modes recalling 1990s surveillance / spy 
films such as Enemy of the State (1998) as much as what is more conventionally 
considered war cinema, Syriana and Body of Lies certainly pose an interesting 
ontological dilemma for definitions of the ‘war film’ itself in the digital era. Garrett 
Stewart, in Closed Circuits: Screening Narrative Surveillance, refers to them as ‘the 
new Hollywood plots of surveillance paranoia, in overseas and homeland settings alike’ 
in contrast to the ‘traditional war (or anti-war) film’, but does acknowledge that there is 
increasingly a ‘dubious overlap’ between these two ‘intersecting spheres’ of Iraq War 
era conflict films (173). The veneer of fiction cast over Syriana and Body of Lies also 
serves to detach them any specific conflict – via the coy refusal to specify the key oil-
rich location in Syriana, and the pursuit of an individual terrorist without reference to 
any particular war between nation-states in Body of Lies – in a manner that is perhaps 
curiously out of synch with the framing of more conventional war cinema. Yet, while 
these aspects create a degree of ambiguity in defining my corpus here, they are 
simultaneously richly evocative of a shift in US military doctrine inextricably related to 
the advent of drone warfare. Specifically, the films’ global, panoptic reach, fluid border-
crossings, and focus on individual assassinations carried out by the CIA mirror the 
actual context of drones’ use as part of the War on Terror more closely than the 
embodied/experiential conventions of the ‘traditional’ war film might allow. Thus, I 
think the representations of drones in these films should be taken seriously as a 
burgeoning branch of contemporary war cinema reflecting a shift in military doctrine 
from full-scale combat to counter-insurgency operations, rather than treated as distinct 
from the war genre per se and aligned with spy- or action-films.  
 Before moving on to analysing specific instances of drone imaging in these two 
films, I believe it is also worth observing how their very narrative structures are also 
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complicit with the digitisation of military technologies. Stewart suggests a sense of this 
through his claim that:  
     
Screen narratives such as Syriana […] are not political first of all in regard to the 
inferred content of their ideological stance and its typifying dialogue. They are 
political in the very form of their narrative mapping. In this way, they can almost 
unconsciously mirror what they might intermittently resist or critique. (Closed 
Circuits 34) 
 
While the employment of multiple interconnected storylines pre-dates the digital as both 
a literary and cinematic technique, the particular engagement of parallel editing in 
Syriana and Body of Lies does suggest a distinctly panoptic instantiation of this device 
through the suggestion (occasionally explicit, but largely inferred) that the films’ global 
scope is activated by and fundamentally reliant upon the CIA’s surveillance network. It 
may even be said to evoke the ‘time-space compression […] [which] has brought all 
those in the network much closer to the killing space’ that Gregory posits as a crucial 
characteristic of the digitally connected drone kill-chain (“From a View to a Kill” 196). 
However, as I will argue, since the films do not overtly distinguish a ‘drone aesthetic’ 
from the wider range of surveillance technologies (particularly satellites), this narrative 
structure seems to connote a more generalised panoptic model of digital connectivity.    
 This indistinction between drone and satellite footage is particularly apparent in 
Body of Lies. While the ground level agent (Roger Ferris) does intermittently make 
reference to his ability to spot the distinctive gleam of a drone in the skies above, they 
are otherwise figured as a mere extension of CIA chief Ed Hoffman’s panoptic vision, 
with a complete absence of any sequences depicting drone piloting per se or an 
employment of their armed capacities. Instead, drones are represented as an 
interchangeable element in a uniform digital surveillance aesthetic. This is demonstrated 
most clearly in the montage sequences that bookend the film. The closing sequence, for 
instance, begins with a drone mediated shot of Ferris, overlaid with annotations of co-
ordinates as well as a tag specifically marking the feed as ‘UAV’ followed by a string of 
numbers. The drone camera then begins to zoom out, and, without any legible cuts, 
seamlessly transitions into an extreme long-shot satellite image of the city (annotated 
once again, in this case as ‘SAT KH11-12’). This satellite feed then begins to fragment, 
ultimately splitting the screen into four juxtaposed panels. The upper-left segment here 
appears to be the same satellite image as in the previous shot, while the lower-left 
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retains the drone annotations seen in the initial shot of Ferris; the specific source of the 
two segments on the right, however, remain unclear. Ultimately, this split-screen 
surveillance image begins to flicker and degrade, marking the close of the film with a 
haze of digital static12.      
 Garrett Stewart’s reading of this sequence posits ‘cancelled voyeurism’ as ‘the 
closest thing to narrative resolution’, elaborating on the perceived equivalence between 
the film’s diegesis and the panoptic model of surveillance evoked by the above 
montage: 
 
There’s nothing left to see if the technopticon has lost interest […] To compensate 
for any lack of satisfying climax, at least we’ve supposedly been privy to some 
top-secret CIA feeds, allowing us for once to see the world the way the secret 
service does. And not, of course, just visually. For at a certain level of 
geopolitical oversight – to whose plotting our hero (any hero) is no longer 
instrumental – all monitored enemy activity, whether or not we foment or even 
fabricate it13, can be made to serve our militarist purposes. A film doesn’t have to 
be even half good to be fleetingly brilliant, which is not to say popular, when it 
lets American imperialist logic declare itself so nakedly. (Closed Circuits 177) 
 
The way that this ‘technopticon’ is distinctly invoked at the opening and closing of the 
film, with the digital noise serving as a kind of transition, does seem to imply that the 
film’s diegesis is accessed by hacking into ‘some top-secret CIA feeds’ as Stewart 
suggests. However, this notion also sits somewhat awkwardly with the film’s 
relentlessly technophobic moralising, which is perhaps the clearest instantiation of the 
tendency for a kind of ‘high-tech technophobia’ that Stewart elsewhere identifies as 
characteristic of this group of films (Closed Circuits 173). As such, I think that there is 
another, perhaps paradoxical reading to be made of this closing sequence.     
                                                          
12 Interestingly, this effect is mirrored by a sequence in Robert Greenwald’s documentary 
UnManned: America’s Drone Wars (2013). In the absence of any actual drone footage, 
Greenwald’s dramatic recreation begins with an aerial shot of the Waziristan landscape, then 
begins the transition to a ‘drone’ aesthetic by bleaching all colour from the shot, overlaying the 
landscape with operational gridlines, and eventually destabilising the image itself with the 
embellishment of digital static. In a similar manner to Body of Lies, this fetishistic exaggeration 
of the drone interface seems to ascribe a deeply sinister, almost otherworldly ontology to it, and 
one that is equally alienated and detached from the main body of the film’s diegesis.   
13 Stewart’s account of ‘fabrication’ here refers to a narrative thread in which the CIA create a 
fake terrorist cell (replete with digital traces), who claims responsibility for a staged bombing of 
a Turkish air base in order to draw out the real terrorist, the egoistic and competitive Al-Saleem. 
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The reductive collapsing of drone and satellite imaging, coupled with the 
destabilising eruption of this exaggeratedly digitised static, may also be viewed as a 
kind of ‘othering’ of digital surveillance, as aesthetically and ontologically distinct from 
the realm of the cinematic – which is almost exclusively aligned, in this case, with the 
mediating point-of-view of the ground level agent, and his dangerous and embodied 
heroics. Body of Lies contrasts the methods of Hoffman and Ferris throughout, with a 
repeated privileging of Ferris’ embodied presence and capacity for adapting to the 
complexity of localised situations against the cruel, Machiavellian scheming of 
Hoffman, which is implicitly aligned with his panoptic power. This overt and somewhat 
facile character-centric critique seems to enforce a rather rigid distinction between the 
cinematic heroism of ground-level agency and the moral vacuum of the digitally 
enhanced aerial view. I hesitate to label the film’s rendition of drone imaging as 
disembodied since it is quite neatly aligned with Hoffman’s perspective, yet this binary 
opposition that the film establishes does seem to imply that drone mediated space 
differs ontologically from the properly cinematic diegesis, and in doing so perhaps 
ascribes to drones (via their indistinction from satellites) the values of virtualising 
distanciation and the effacement of embodied experience that are highlighted by Parks 
and Stahl’s analyses of satellite imagery. 
In summary, then, the use of drones in Body of Lies seems to offer little more 
than the opportunity of zooming from an extreme long shot satellite image to the 
medium long shot of the drone, thus ultimately comprising little more than a slight 
tweak of cinematic grammar and a slight increase in the detail of panoptic imagery. By 
neglecting to engage with the contemporary assemblage of armed drones – in other 
words, the material context of their application including the subjective experience of 
piloting and the inter-subjective network of the so-called kill-chain – this representation 
fails to demonstrate any real difference between contemporary uses of armed drones and 
their use for unmanned aerial observation throughout the late twentieth century.  
Syriana, on the other hand, does feature at least one key sequence which 
forcefully emphasises the armed capacity underlying the drone interface, although it 
simultaneously enacts a similarly problematic split between ground-level and aerial 
perspectives. The sequence occurs towards the end of the film, with the CIA attempting 
to assassinate Prince Nasir and his convoy while, at ground-level, a CIA agent (Barnes) 
opposed to the mission races to intercept the convoy and warn them of the impending 
strike. Gaghan composes this sequence from these two distinct points-of-view: the 
screen of the CIA control room, on which the drone video feed is blown up to gigantic 
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proportions for the assembled observers, and the ground-level perspective of Barnes. In 
the process, Syriana demonstrates a similar kind of aesthetic and ontological split 
between drone mediated space and embodied perspectives to that seen in Body of Lies. 
Although the drone image is in colour, and unburdened by the clutter of 
annotations or overlays, it remains an extreme long shot with a distinct lack of 
resolution which, significantly, does not enable the identification of the individuals on 
the ground. The film therefore relies exclusively on the ground-level element of its 
parallel editing schema to depict the ensuing action with any narrative clarity. This 
aesthetic strategy purports to privilege ground-level complexity against aerial 
abstraction or virtualisation in the same manner as Body of Lies; and indeed, the film’s 
sympathies are quite explicitly aligned with rogue agent Barnes, whose ethics remain 
untainted by the military-industrial machinations in which his superiors are enmeshed. 
The fact that Barnes remains unidentified, and thus that the film’s most recognisable 
star (George Clooney) is killed as collateral damage in the strike is seemingly intended 
to emotively flag the wanton destruction unleashed by this mode of aerial warfare. 
Nonetheless, it is rather problematic to perpetuate the notion that drone 
operators cannot necessarily verify the identity of their targets. Numerous studies of 
drones have emphasised the unparalleled detail that their high-resolution video feeds 
afford, which renders the verisimilitude of Syriana’s drone imagery somewhat 
questionable. Yet this becomes more significantly problematic when considered in 
relation to the infamously loose rules of engagement for actual US drone strikes, 
whereby any adult male of military age within a pre-authorised target area may be 
deemed a legitimate target. In this wider political context, Syriana’s drone strike 
sequence risks corroborating this procedure (in contradiction to the film’s ostensible 




With the fading out of this cycle around 2008, drone imaging was largely absent 
from cinema screens until the emergence of Kathryn Bigelow’s Zero Dark Thirty in 
2013. It may be worth noting here that this absence of cinematic representations of 
drones coincides with the peak of actual US drone strikes, as reported by the Bureau of 
Investigate Journalism, with the highest casualty rates in Pakistan occurring between 
2008 and 2012. Whether this constitutes an active suppression of drone representations 
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during this period, a delay in the transition from public awareness to the emergence of 
further drone-related films, or simple coincidence, is up for debate.  
In many ways, Zero Dark Thirty can be posited as a return to the form and 
concerns of the above sub-genre or cycle, since there are numerous generic parallels 
with Syriana and Body of Lies, with the film again demonstrating CIA, rather than 
strictly military, use of drones. For the majority of the film drones remain largely off-
screen, as Bigelow focusses predominantly upon intelligence gleaned from 
interrogation/torture (euphemistically referred to as the ‘detainee program’). A brief 
reference to ‘actual intelligence, preferably something that leads to a strike’ does, 
however, imply their diegetic presence, but in doing so seems to establish a dynamic 
whereby intelligence is associated with embodied human agency, with drones fulfilling 
a simple role of precision weaponry rather than surveillance, and thus being merely the 
final link in the networked kill-chain. This seemingly straightforward, unchallenged 
linearity leading to drone assassinations is termed by Michael Atkinson, in his Sight & 
Sound article on the film, a ‘procedural soullessness’ (33). Comparing this streamlining 
of narrative whereby the ‘only objective is to find and exterminate’ to the Call of Duty 
games, Atkinson ultimately considers it to be ‘a hallmark of the Asymmetrical War 
Film’ (33). This underlying sense of drones as the end point of procedural narrative 
linearity is reinforced by the brief scene in which Maya watches the feed of a drone 
strike in the build-up to the Camp Chapman attack. The strike itself is not 
contextualised in any meaningful way, with no diegetic indication of where it may be 
taking place or who the target may be. Rather, it seems simply to serve as a narratively 
redundant visual background to Maya’s simultaneous telephone conversation with her 
colleague Jessica. 
The binary opposition of embodied human intelligence and drone imaging is 
further reinforced during the sequence portraying the reconnaissance of the ‘fortress’ in 
which Osama bin Laden is suspected to be hidden. The embedding of satellite and drone 
imaging within the CIA ‘Predator Bay’ control room, combined with its surveillance 
function, does link it once again to a panoptic regime. There is also a hint of 
interactivity conveyed through the agents’ manipulation of reconnaissance imagery: 
rewinding, annotating, etc. Yet Bigelow rapidly establishes the limitations of this 
approach to intelligence gathering. The feed is monitored and studied for months 
without result, compressed by the film into a montage sequence in which Maya 
inscribes the days of inactivity upon the glass-walled office of her supervisor. 
Ultimately, bin Laden’s ‘tradecraft’ (i.e. evasion of observation) is portrayed as 
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fundamentally impenetrable through remote surveillance. It is only the interpretation of 
behavioural patterns, noting that the inhabitants consist of three women and two men 
and thus inferring the implied presence of a third male occupant, which gleans the 
faintest hint of evidence. The goal of panoptic vision is thus thwarted, with human 
intelligence and sociocultural reasoning posited as the motive force behind the 
necessarily tentative indication of bin Laden’s presence.  
In this sequence, drones and satellites are once again conflated as 
indistinguishable modes of aerial imaging. Yet there is a contrast to be drawn between 
Zero Dark Thirty and the earlier CIA films in the manner of editing together aerial and 
ground level perspectives. Here, in the absence of any operatives on the ground (barring 
the thwarted attempt to gain access under the guise of a doctor administering polio 
inoculations), the film’s perspective is limited almost absolutely to the CIA control 
room. This does effect a certain virtualisation of the target space, as it is represented 
through rather abstract, low-resolution imagery that is only able to characterise 
individuals through general outlines (height, movement, etc.) and heat signatures, and 
subsequently reconstructed in the form of a scale model of the compound. This 
restriction of perspective suggests a potential exploration, in a more rigorous way than 
Syriana or Body of Lies, of how drone imaging has reconfigured the subjective 
experience of warfare for their operators along the lines of Gregory, Holmqvist and 
Williams’ work. However, the lack of (image) resolution seems to preclude any form of 
sensuous, immersive engagement, and Bigelow simply does not linger over this imagery 
for long, preferring instead to compress the surveillance via montage and summarise 
key operational data in the context of strategy meetings.  
The film’s final section portraying the raid on the compound does however go 
some way toward demonstrating the use of drone imaging as part of a networked 
operation. Maya co-ordinates the stealth force of ‘canaries’ from a forward operating 
base (FOB) in Afghanistan, and is surrounded by screens: monitoring radar, the 
communications of the Pakistani military, and a drone feed tracking the helicopters 
(portrayed, presumably via infra-red imaging, as a sharp white silhouette). The landing 
sequence in particular attempts to unify the diverse mediations of the scene, rapidly 
cutting between the helicopter interior, a handheld ground view, the FOB control room, 
and the drone image itself. Yet the raid itself is subsequently portrayed from the 
distinctly embodied perspective of helmet-mounted cameras, reflecting a sense of 
subjective intimacy that appears to be the generally privileged mode of imaging warfare 
within Zero Dark Thirty. 
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Ultimately, the film’s division between drone surveillance and embodied human 
perspectives mirrors the binary opposition of bodies and technology established in 
Bigelow’s earlier war film The Hurt Locker, in which the initial use of a robot for IED 
disposal is displaced in favour of the haptic rush of a dangerous embodied proximity. 
This division, as it is played out in Zero Dark Thirty, essentially reinforces the notion of 
drones as a disembodied and objective means of surveillance. In comparison with Body 
of Lies and Syriana, there is a slightly more fluent sense of an integration of the drone 
aesthetic with ground level perspectives conveyed through the networked subjectivity of 
the raid finale. Yet even in this sequence there remains a sense that Maya’s drone 
mediated perspective is more operationally significant than convincingly cinematic, as 
the embodied subjectivity (albeit somewhat technologically enhanced) of helmet-
mounted cameras is ultimately asserted as the privileged mode for the film’s 
culminating action set-piece. Thus, the general formal opposition established between 
drones and embodied perception seems to preserve the notion of drones as a mode of 
virtualising distanciation, somewhat distinct from the cinematic diegesis and still far 
from Gregory, Holmvist and Williams’ characterisations of the drone experience.  
 
* 
   
Andrew Nichols’ Good Kill and Omer Fast’s Five Thousand Feet is the Best 
(henceforth 5,000ft) – the two films which will occupy the remainder of this chapter’s 
analysis – are significantly differentiated from Syriana, Body of Lies, and Zero Dark 
Thirty by the simple fact that both are set in Las Vegas. Neither film, therefore, contains 
any ground-level perspective on combat to complement the drone’s aerial imagery, and 
thus the ontological split between the aerial and the ground-level perpetuated by the 
above films is not replicated here. This serves to embed Good Kill and 5,000ft more 
firmly within the notion of remote warfare, and engenders a more substantial degree of 
reflection upon how warfare is altered when mediated exclusively via the drone 
interface.     
Although released in 2014, Nichols’ film is set in 2010, offering a slight 
historical distance on this period characterised by the peak of US drone strikes in 
Pakistan and an absence of cinematic representations of drones. This context is 
acknowledged by the film’s opening titles, which declare 2010 as the year of ‘the 
greatest escalation of targeted killings’. It is also narratively significant in situating the 
film amidst a boom in the recruitment of gamers as drone personnel – an issue 
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addressed most explicitly via an admonitory speech to the recruits which simultaneously 
acknowledges that war has become a ‘first-person-shooter’ while warning them that the 
consequences are real ‘flesh’ and ‘blood’ – and amidst a burgeoning of CIA-run drone 
missions, which are operated by the film’s Air Force drone crew.  
The opening sequence of Good Kill immediately establishes an intimate, 
immersive conceptualisation of drone imagery that is closer to the accounts of Gregory 
and Holmqvist than to the disembodied, virtualising panoptic regime of Body of Lies. 
Forgoing establishing shots entirely, the film opens with a full-screen remediation of the 
drone interface, the drone camera thereby established as synonymous with the film 
camera. While the drone crew’s presence is conveyed via the soundtrack, with their 
radio communications played as voiceover, they are introduced in a visually striking 
manner that reinforces the sense of immersion suggested by the drone/film camera 
equivalence. Nichols gradually begins to cut away from the drone interface, establishing 
a shot/reverse pattern between the operators and the drone screen. Yet these reverse 
shots are uniformly extreme close-ups with a particularly shallow depth-of-field – first 
of an eye, then a mouth, a hand operating a joystick, and finally a foot pressing down on 
a pedal – that offer a highly fragmented sense of the operators and their location. The 
way that the drone operators’ awareness of self and space here is wholly subsumed by 
their absorption in the drone point-of-view clearly evokes the immersive ‘reality-effect’ 
of the drone feed, described by Gregory as the sensation of being ‘not 7,000 miles away 
but just 18 inches, the distance from eye to screen’ (“Lines of Descent” 62).  
This immersion effect is implicitly ascribed as a point of equivalence between 
the drone screen and the film screen. The detail of the imagery – later described by 
Good Kill’s protagonist as ‘so beautifully clear…it couldn’t be clearer if I was there; 
you can see everything, the looks on their faces, everything’ – contrasts unambiguously 
with the soft, grainy appearance of the drone feed in Syriana. In a further contrast with 
the CIA films, the drone feed is here permitted to exclusively fulfil the role of combat 
mediation. Rather than employing a ‘cinematic’ ground-level perspective to 
complement aerial abstraction, Good Kill posits the drone feed itself as inherently 
cinematic, immersively transporting both operators and viewers into the film’s combat 
spaces. As the posters taped to the operators’ cabin doors claim, then, on entering the 
realm of drone mediation, ‘You are now leaving the U.S. of A.’.   
Alongside this evocation of immersion, the fragmentation of the operators’ 
bodies in this opening sequence simultaneously renders them less as individual, distinct 
subjects than as a disjointed collection of organs and motor functions intertwined with 
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the drone apparatus. In doing so, Nichols presents drones as akin to what Alison 
Williams terms an ‘assemblage, composed of both human and machine elements’ (381). 
Williams’ study of the drone assemblage goes on to suggest that this kind of bodily 
fragmentation leads to a fundamental ‘interchangeability’ of the human element as 
bodies begin to ‘perform more like machine components’ (387). While this is consistent 
with the particular vision of the assemblage presented by the opening sequence, the 
majority of the film does however balance this fragmented, distributed sense of 
subjectivity with a dramatisation of the injurious psychological effects of drone piloting 
and a reflection on the ethics of remote warfare which are quite heavily dependent upon 
more conventional models of subjective agency.     
Indeed, protagonist Major Thomas Egan’s sense of individual guilt and ethical 
resistance to drone operation is established quite early in the film. A former pilot made 
redundant by the Air Force’s increasing prioritisation of drone operations over piloted 
missions, Egan reluctantly works as a drone operator but still idealises the embodied 
‘risk’ of flight above the ‘cowardly’ mode of remote combat in which he is now 
imbricated. This contrast between piloting and drone operation is suggestive of the 
binary relationship between embodied combat and the virtualising abstraction of drones 
that runs through Body of Lies, Syriana and Zero Dark Thirty – or perhaps more 
accurately, the relationship between embodiment and technological mediation proposed 
by The Hurt Locker – albeit with a notable concession to conceptualising drones 
through a more cinematic aesthetic. It remains somewhat ambiguous whether the film 
treats this distinction seriously, or simply employs it as a signification of Egan’s fantasy 
of escape from the drudgery of drone assassinations and surveillance, though it clearly 
also contributes to his tendency to assume individual responsibility for the killings 
carried out by his crew despite his Colonel’s repeated invocations of networked 
responsibility through such lines as ‘we all pulled the trigger in that box’.  
In addition to this individualised sense of guilt, the film also posits an inability 
to adapt to drone warfare’s blurring of military and civilian realms as central to Egan’s 
descent into alcoholism, depression and marital discord. Initially, this facet of remote 
warfare is presented somewhat comically, with Egan baffling the sales assistant in a 
local shop with the declaration that he ‘blew away six Taliban in Pakistan just today; 
now I’m going home to barbecue’. However, this ironic approach quickly cedes to a 
more troubled incarnation of blurred boundaries, with the film drawing visual parallels 
between Vegas suburbia and Waziristan via aerial shots of the landscape, and 
highlighting Egan’s increasing detachment from family life as he repeatedly gazes 
101 
 
absently up to the skies. He is warned to ‘keep compartmentalising’, but evinces a 
nostalgia not only for flight itself, but also the clean lines demarcating military and non-
military space, or war and peace, which have been fractured by drone mediation’s 
elision of distance.     
At this point, Egan’s unit is selected to run secret drone missions for the CIA, 
and the film’s distinctions between embodied and remote combat gradually give way to 
more precise ethical distinctions among the procedural applications of drone strikes. 
This is neatly glossed in an introductory speech by Colonel Johns, who notes that the 
CIA have ‘progressed’ (a hint of irony in the intonation of this word) beyond 
personality strikes (i.e. targeting known individuals), operating under alternate rules of 
engagement which permit ‘signature strikes’ on unidentified individuals – or even 
groups – based on ‘patterns of behaviour’. Even more controversial than signature 
strikes, however, is the newly introduced practice of the ‘follow up’ or ‘double tap’ 
strike. During the unit’s first mission for the CIA, Egan and sensor operator Vera 
Suarez are apparently shocked by the instruction to carry out a second strike. The rich 
visual detail of the drone feed is particularly relevant here, allowing the viewer a 
window on the scene which is clearly populated by rescuers with spades rather than 
armed combatants. Although they reluctantly carry out the order, Suarez nonetheless 
rebukes the officers with the question ‘Was that a war crime, sir?’.  
The CIA are villainously figured in the film as a disembodied voice over the 
intercom, addressed only as ‘Langley’. Although obviously connected to the same 
network – such that ‘we see what you see’ – there is clearly something of a disjunction 
between the tightly-knit drone crew and the near-anonymous CIA which is reinforced 
by the increasingly manifest differences in procedure and ethical decision-making. For 
instance, in response to the drone crew’s cautioning over likely civilian casualties, the 
CIA’s response is typically aloof and dogmatic: ‘In our assessment, the combatants we 
are targeting pose a grave enough threat to the United States to justify potential civilian 
casualties; not to mention that this pre-emptive self-defence is approved and ordered by 
the administration. Please engage’. Such callous applications of drone warfare 
ultimately emerge as the prime target of the film’s critique, especially as they are 
increasingly contrasted with the more idealistic aspect of ‘overwatch’. A sequence in 
which Egan willingly puts in overtime to watch over a ground patrol in Afghanistan as 
they sleep is framed as a somewhat redemptive release from the CIA missions, as he 
returns home content that he ‘did something good today’. 
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While this critique of ethical standards in the administering of drone strikes is 
more precise and insightful than the woolly distinction between piloting and remote 
warfare that preceded it, the way that the film ultimately resolves Egan’s internal ethical 
conflict is perhaps the most deeply problematic element of Good Kill. Having been 
downgraded to surveillance duty after deliberately sabotaging one of the CIA double tap 
strikes, Egan finds himself once again watching the house of a supposed Taliban 
commander, a locale in which the crew had earlier witnessed the rape of the 
housekeeper by an unknown visitor. Recognising the return of the same man, Egan 
persuades the rest of his crew to exit the cabin for a break and assassinates the rapist 
with a Hellfire missile14.  
The procedural details of this sequence mirror that of the CIA strikes, 
particularly Egan’s disengagement of the drone apparatus’ recording function, in a 
manner that might suggest a subversive parallel between Egan’s assumption of a 
position of omnipotent and vengeful moral judgement and the CIA’s dogmatic 
standards. However, as he triumphantly exits the cabin and drives off into the horizon, 
the film seems to frame this concluding act as one of liberation and catharsis for Egan, 
as though it were another ‘good deed’ to counterbalance his guilt over the civilian 
casualties inflicted during the CIA operations. This rather disturbing catharsis risks 
undermining the film’s critique of the indiscriminate use of drones under the CIA. 
Although the rapist is undeniably guilty, Egan’s vengeful judgement of him ultimately 
seems to advocate an extension of drone assassinations to any subject deemed guilty by 
the moral conscience of the individual drone pilot, rather than a restriction of their use 
solely for personality strikes without risk of civilian casualties.   
If by this point Good Kill has substituted a somewhat retrogressive and 
problematic model of individual subjective agency for the more distributed, networked 
evocation of subjectivity articulated in the opening sequence, the film does nonetheless 
present a more substantial interrogation of drone warfare than any of the above CIA 
films. Rather than enforcing a binary distinction between the embodied, ground-level 
realm of cinematic space and the virtualising distanciation of drone/satellite 
surveillance, Good Kill does quite successfully demonstrate a more thorough integration 
of drone and cinematic aesthetics. The film also represents the material context of 
drones’ use, ranging from the drudgery of reconnaissance to the varying frameworks for 
strikes, with a precision unparalleled in contemporary war cinema and, despite the 
                                                          
14 Hellfire missiles are the principal munition with which Predator drones are armed, and are 
used for so-called precision strikes of targeted individuals.  
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troubling resolution, is undeniably valuable for inviting its audience to reflect on the 
ethical considerations involved in their application.     
 
* 
         
Omer Fast’s 2011 work Five Thousand Feet is the Best straddles the boundaries 
between cinema per se and gallery artwork, and could equally be termed a short film or 
gallery installation. It was initially exhibited at the Venice Biennale, and subsequently 
at the Imperial War Museum in London. In the latter context, the film played on a 
permanent loop on an LCD screen situated in a minimally furnished room with no 
contextualising panels or information.  
The film is composed of two interweaved parts which innovatively fuse aspects 
of documentary and fiction. In the ostensibly documentary strand, a former drone pilot 
(whose identity is obscured) recounts his experiences as part of the US military’s drone 
program, covering an outline of his specific duties and broadly addressing the 
relationship between drones and gaming as well as PTSD. Most of this material is 
conveyed by voiceover and juxtaposed with drone tracking shots of US landscapes. In 
the other, fictional strand, is an apparently retired drone pilot being interviewed on film 
by a journalist in a Las Vegas hotel room. Clearly struggling with some sort of 
psychological disturbance, he repeatedly evades questions about his work by spinning a 
series of digressive anecdotes, most of which have no apparent relevance to drones 
beyond what he describes as the imperative to ‘keep your work life and your domestic 
life separate’.  
Through the voiceover of the actual drone pilot, drone imaging is described as 
richly, intimately detailed. At the optimal altitude of five thousand feet, he notes that ‘I 
can tell you what type of shoes you’re wearing… I could tell you what type of clothes a 
person is wearing, whether they have a beard, their hair colour, and anything else’. Even 
the imagery of the black-and-white infra-red mode is sensuously poeticised, as he 
describes the heat signature left behind by someone sitting on a cold surface as ‘like a 
white blossom shining up into heaven’. This verbal description is augmented by a 
similarly affective sense of visual detail, as Fast juxtaposes the voiceover with a drone 
tracking shot which prowls over the landscape following a young boy, picking up on 
such haptic details as the churn of his bicycle’s wheels through the dry earth.   
As in Good Kill, then, the striking intimacy of visual and even haptic detail here 
diverges especially from the grainy drone mediation of Syriana or the merging of drone 
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and satellite imagery in Body of Lies, and is more consistent with Gregory, Holmqvist 
and Williams’ descriptions of drone imagery – particularly Holmqvist’s account of the 
‘hyper-vision of drone optics [which] far extends human vision’ (545). This evocation 
of rich sensory detail refutes any sense of remoteness or detachment that is often 
associated with panoptic imagery and, significantly, does so through a distinctive 
conjunction of the body and technology – as opposed to Zero Dark Thirty’s binary 
opposition of these terms. While Pasi Väliaho’s reading of the film links this hyper-
vision from a ‘God’s-eye viewpoint’ to a sense of the drone pilot as ‘an omniscient eye 
and an omnipotent hand that rule Earth from the sky’, 5,000ft actually seems to render 
the pilots as rather more humbled, fragile and deeply disoriented figures whose 
experience of drone hyper-vision is more explicitly linked to PTSD. Indeed, the drone 
operator in the documentary strand of the film outlines the traumatic nature of 
witnessing drone mediated killings in remarkably similar terms to Holmqvist’s account 
of ‘exposure to high-resolution images of killing, including the details of casualties and 
body parts that would never be possible to capture with the human eye’ (542). 
This theme of psychological disturbance is, however, mainly dramatised through 
the disorienting and disturbing blurring of military and civilian realms in the film’s 
fictional strand. These fictional sequences are layered as further repetitions within the 
film’s overall looped structure, as each sequence begins with a near-identical variation 
of the introductory stages of an interview. Each time, the pilot strenuously objects to the 
question, ‘what is the difference between you and someone who sits in an airplane?’, 
insisting that ‘the job is the same’ despite the interviewer’s apparent assumptions of 
difference regarding ‘bodies and places…Euclidean shit’. He also appears to experience 
piercing migraines at each iteration of the opening question, which are sonically 
represented by a short burst of white noise. As mentioned above, this framing interview 
segues into three different monologues which play out as fully-dramatised short 
sketches anchored by the voiceover of the drone pilot. Two of these narratives – 
concerning a man masquerading as a train-driver for a day, and a casino-based scam 
designed to steal the target’s wallet – have no overt relevance to drones, and seem 
intended instead as absorbing digressions designed to avoid any military-related 
questions. As such, they do nonetheless evince a conformity to the pilot’s repeated 
maxim to ‘keep your work life and your domestic life separate’. In the other narrative, 
however, this imperative seems to finally implode through its complex slippages 
between details of civilian and military life.      
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It begins, seemingly innocuously, as the tale of a family’s weekend road trip, 
marred only by the odd detail of the father’s potential ‘problem with the provisional 
authority’. Soon, however, the family’s exit from suburbia takes them through a military 
checkpoint manned by the ‘occupying authorities’. This incongruous juxtaposition of 
civilian and military detail continues throughout, culminating in a sequence in which the 
family encounter three roadside workers who, via the voiceover, are implicitly depicted 
as insurgents burying an IED. Fast then begins to layer in cutaways to a drone 
perspective on this scenario, anticipating the culminating Hellfire missile strike which 
kills the three men, while the family seemingly arise from the dead to continue their 
journey.  
In this sequence, then, what begins as small incongruous military details 
encroaching on an otherwise quotidian narrative ends up as a more comprehensive 
blurring of domestic life in the US with life in a war zone (or at least under permanent 
threat of a drone strike). This dissolution of military and civilian boundaries is clearly 
evocative of both the ambiguous status of ‘drone war’ (i.e. killings in countries that the 
US is not technically at war with), and of the drone pilot’s novel ability to wage war 
remotely, travelling to and from work each day in Las Vegas while at the same time 
being virtually present and carrying out surveillance and strikes in, say, Pakistan. In 
contrast to Body of Lies, which plays this blurring of military and civilian realms as a 
kind of glib comedy, with the CIA chief joking that he knows more about his agent’s 
relationship with his ex-wife than he did, or getting his son ready for school while 
casually directing operations in the Middle East, 5,000ft takes this theme very seriously 
and matches it to a sense of formal experimentation. This ranges from the evocative 
employment of sensory and even synaesthetic detail to embody the film’s conceptual 
dynamics – such as the sonic matching of the pilot’s headache to the Hellfire missile in 
the above sequence through the repeated burst of white noise – to the disorienting 
narrative structure.  
The sense of spatio-temporal fracturing conveyed by the pilot’s narrative in the 
above sequence is deepened by the brief interludes between the interviews during which 
he escapes into the hotel corridor. His observations of other characters that he passes 
here seem to comprise the fragments out of which he constructs the stories that he tells 
to the journalist. Yet this space is also rendered strange and hallucinatory. There are off-
screen echoes of what seem to be military communications, and the pilot also appears to 
re-enter the interview room through a different door each time. As such, the film’s 
rendition of PTSD as a blurring of military and civilian realms seems to be evoked not 
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simply in order to enact a kind of return of the repressed, but rather a more wholesale 
disturbance of identity. Since all of this is triggered each time by the question of the 
drone pilot’s ‘difference from someone who sits in an airplane’, it seems to be 
fundamentally linked to the virtual spatio-temporal experience of drone operation. As is 
emphasised throughout the film though, this particular notion of virtuality is not to be 
equated with disembodiment or abstraction in the same sense as Body of Lies, since the 
haptic imagery and embodied effects of PTSD seemingly disavow any sense of panoptic 
detachment. Rather, as in Gregory’s account of drone operators, it is fundamentally 
‘proximity not distance [that] becomes the problem’ (“From a View to a Kill” 201). 
Indeed, it is precisely the conjunction of virtual presence and the disturbingly affective 
imagery enhanced by the imaging capacities of drones that generates this refraction of 
subjectivity.  
Furthermore, this spatio-temporal fracturing is not merely ascribed to the 
character of the drone pilot, but also mirrored in the very narrative structure of the film 
in order to effect a similar degree of disorientation for the audience. As a looped gallery 
installation, the viewer is clearly denied the linear narrative grounding of, say, Zero 
Dark Thirty. Yet within this overarching loop there are further layers of repetition, as 
outlined above with reference to the introductory stages of the interview, such that the 
viewer is never quite sure whether the film has finally looped back to the beginning (or, 
at least, the viewer’s point of entry, given the lack of a ‘beginning’ or ‘end’ per se) or is 
continuing its pattern of repetition with a slight difference. Through this metafictional 
mise-en-abyme structure and complex intersections between documentary and fiction, 
as well as military and civilian realms, 5,000ft ultimately comprises a series of recurring 
and destabilised fragments of haptic sensation which challenge both pilots and viewers 




To conclude, then, one can sum up the differing figurations of drone imaging 
that I have analysed in this chapter as corresponding to two distinct regimes: one, the 
reduction of drone imagery to purely optic information as part of a uniform digital 
surveillance aesthetic, and the other, a radically new, disturbingly affective and intimate 
means of remotely visualising war zones. The former tendency is most clearly 
exemplified by the collapse of drone and satellite streams in the closing montage 
sequence of Body of Lies; more generally, it manifests in the formal and ontological 
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distinction between disembodied drone mediated space and the privileged embodied 
perceptions of ground-level agents that characterises not only Scott’s film but also 
Syriana and the later Zero Dark Thirty.  
This division is maintained by a generally hypermediated remediation of drones 
in these films. Certainly, no sense of immediacy is conveyed by the low-resolution 
drone feed in Syriana; indeed, it is precisely because the drone feed does not seamlessly 
transport the viewer into the drone mediated space that Gaghan supplements this 
perspective with a complementary ground-level point-of-view deemed necessary to 
clarify the action. Although the drone feed in Body of Lies is somewhat sharper, it is 
even more bluntly differentiated from the cinematic through its fetishistic presentation 
as part of a uniform digital surveillance aesthetic that is bleached of colour, heavily 
annotated, and ultimately dissolves into a haze of digital static. In neither of these cases, 
then, is the drone image transparently ‘poured into’ the cinematic, with the viewer 
‘stand[ing] in the same relationship to the content as she would if she were confronting 
the original medium’; rather, one is made continually aware of the process of 
remediation itself (Bolter and Grusin 45). This sense of hypermediacy is further 
heightened by the embedding of the drone feed within a CIA control room in each of 
these (first group of) films, where it often nestles alongside satellite streams or maps, 
and may be interacted with through rewinding, annotating, or activating infra-red or 
thermal-imaging modes. 
Despite these clearly hypermediated aspects of the films’ remediations of 
drones, it nonetheless seems particularly significant that they do not quite conform to 
Bolter and Grusin’s definition of hypermediacy in one key regard; that is, none of the 
films really seem to express an ‘enjoyment of the opacity of media themselves 
[emphasis added]’ (21). Perhaps Body of Lies’ tortuously paradoxical ‘high-tech 
technophobia’ comes closest to a sense of enjoyment (Stewart, Closed Circuits 173). 
Yet for the most part the drone interface is presented more as a kind of unwelcome 
intrusion of hypermediacy, which is perhaps deemed necessary to depict contemporary 
warfare with a broad sense of technological verisimilitude but is nonetheless vilified 
and disconnected from the properly cinematic realm of embodied mediation as much as 
possible.  
This division between embodied experience and technological mediation would 
seem to mirror the aesthetic and thematic concerns of the experiential war film as 
outlined in the previous chapter, albeit with drones figuring here as a more precise 
remediated signifier of the discrete realm of digital mediation which is typically elided 
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in the experiential mode. In the previous chapter’s analysis of Restrepo, I noted the 
significance of the desire expressed by the film’s subjects for a kind of unmediated 
‘contact’, declared most bluntly in the frustrated lament of a long-range artillery 
operator (‘I just wish they were closer so I could’ve actually seen them when I killed 
them’), and linked this to Joanna Bourke’s account of combatants creating ‘fantasies 
about the effects of their destructive weapons, especially when the impact of their 
actions was beyond their immediate vision’ (6). In The Hurt Locker, James’ disdain for 
the robotic device used to remotely disarm IEDs expresses a similar oppositional 
relationship between the pleasure of embodied combat and the distancing, almost post-
human mediation of contemporary military technologies. This robot constitutes a 
relatively rare example of a specifically remediated technology in the experiential war 
film, though one might infer that the regime of drone imagery in this chapter’s CIA 
films signifies an extrapolation of the same underlying assumption regarding the body’s 
relationship to war and digital mediation.  
In terms of diegetic subjectivities, Body of Lies, Syriana and Zero Dark Thirty 
do not express quite the same degree of craving for the ‘contact high’ of combat as, say, 
The Hurt Locker’s protagonist. This may be a simple consequence of the more 
investigative work carried out by these films’ CIA agents in contrast to the more 
explicitly military realm of Restrepo and The Hurt Locker. However, it is worth noting 
that the key action sequences in the CIA films primarily tend to be mediated by a 
ground-level, embodied point-of-view; which may imply that on the level of 
spectatorship, the alignment of pleasure with embodied mediation persists just as 
strongly. The concluding raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Zero Dark Thirty is 
perhaps the best exemplification of this, as the sequence finally abandons the strictures 
of the hypermediated CIA base (and its frustrated surveillance) in favour of the 
distinctly embodied points-of-view of Navy SEALs’ helmet-mounted cameras. Indeed, 
critical opinion coalesced rather favourably around this sequence (in an otherwise 
controversial and divisive film), with Manohla Dargis’ New York Times review lauding 
Bigelow’s ‘genius for infusing even large-scale action set pieces with the human 
element’ (“By Any Means Necessary”).  
These CIA films thus mirror the experiential mode’s fundamental division 
between embodiment and technological mediation as well as the presumed alignment of 
spectatorial pleasure with a kinetic form of embodied mediation particularly manifest in 
such action sequences. Given the fairly overt technophobia on display here, this schema 
is likely intended as a critique of drone warfare, with the disembodied travails of drone 
109 
 
mediated surveillance and assassinations deemed irreconcilable with the more ‘human’ 
pleasures of action-oriented entertainment. As such, the oppositional relationship 
between embodiment and drone mediation in this group of films corresponds to my 
initial hypothesis (in the literature review) that embodied perception in the 
contemporary war film might be posited as a reaction against (or grounding of) the 
virtualising distanciation of military-technological mediation.  
However, this hypothesis is radically upended by the second regime of drone 
imagery discussed in this chapter with reference to Good Kill and Five Thousand Feet is 
the Best, as well as recent academic studies of drones by Derek Gregory, Caroline 
Holmqvist and Alison Williams. The mediation of combat in Good Kill takes place 
exclusively through the drone interface; and while 5,000ft evinces a more ambiguous, 
even troubled, relationship to the very notion of ‘combat space’, it is composed 
primarily of drone footage. Neither film juxtaposes the drone perspective with a 
complementary ground-level point-of-view, thus avoiding the formal opposition 
between drone mediation and embodiment set out by the CIA films. Instead of 
rendering drone mediation as a mode of disembodied virtuality, then, Good Kill and 
5,000ft portray it as an intimate and immersive form of ‘hyper-vision’, with the drone 
camera figuring as a prosthetic extension of the operator’s embodied perception 
(Holmqvist 545).  
The immediacy with which the drone perspective is remediated here is clearly 
evident in the way that Good Kill and 5,000ft establish an explicit alignment of the 
drone camera and the film camera. As noted in my analysis, Good Kill opens directly 
onto a full-screen remediation of the drone point-of-view, and does not embellish this 
image with any signifiers of its digital ‘otherness’, but instead allows the roving, aerial 
point-of-view to function synonymously with the cinematic establishing shot. Similarly, 
the ostensibly documentary strand of 5,000ft is composed near-exclusively of drone 
footage (albeit of US landscapes rather than war zones per se) as if to suggest that this 
remediated perspective can be seamlessly ‘poured into’ the cinematic (Bolter and 
Grusin 45). Indeed this latter example, with its blurring of military and civilian space, is 
particularly evocative of the wider process of convergence between drone imaging and 
cinema, whereby drone cameras are increasingly detached from their militaristic origin 
and marketed as a filmmaking tool. A further sense of immediacy is conveyed by the 
drone image’s strikingly intimate visual (and at times even haptic) detail in both films. 
The former drone pilot in 5,000ft observes that ‘I can tell you what type of shoes you’re 
wearing… I could tell you what type of clothes a person is wearing, whether they have a 
110 
 
beard, their hair colour, and anything else’, which is echoed in Good Kill by Egan’s 
description of the drone image as ‘so beautifully clear…it couldn’t be clearer if I was 
there; you can see everything, the looks on their faces, everything’. Both, then, evoke 
the sense of presence and transparent mediation (as a window onto the world) which 
Bolter and Grusin define as the key elements of immediacy.  
There are a couple of hints in Good Kill and 5,000ft which suggest that this 
immediacy is achieved via hypermediacy, as per Bolter and Grusin’s account of how 
these twin logics may be ‘complementary rather than contradictory’ (233). This can be 
identified primarily in terms of the models of subjectivity implied by the two films. The 
opening sequence of Good Kill, for example, introduces the characters through a series 
of extreme close-ups, thus fragmenting the body into a disjointed collection of 
perceptual and motor functions and evoking Alison Williams’ account of drones as a 
hybrid human-technological ‘assemblage’ (381). This seems to approximate Bolter and 
Grusin’s ‘definition of the self’ under the ‘logic of hypermediacy’ as one whose ‘key 
quality’ is a sense of being ‘connected’, often in relation to ‘digital multimedia and 
networked environments’ (232). At the same time, however, these fragmented subjects 
are intercut with a drone point-of-view which (as noted above) is made synonymous 
with the film camera itself. The contrast between the rich visual field of drone mediated 
space and the extreme shallow-focus on the drone operators, which elides the cabin 
setting in which they work, is highly suggestive of the immersive effect of the drone 
feed. This latter aspect clearly coincides with Bolter and Grusin’s ‘logic of transparent 
immediacy’ in which the subject is characteristically ‘immersed’ (232). By 
simultaneously evoking an immersive/immediate experience of drone mediation and a 
‘networked’ subject, then, the opening sequence of Good Kill can certainly be read as an 
expression of immediacy that is effected by the subjective logic of hypermediacy. 
Although 5,000ft does not contain quite so precise a visual delineation of the networked 
subject, the disturbingly fractured sense of identity ascribed to the film’s fictional drone 
pilot is nonetheless similarly evocative of a subject whose presence is radically 
distributed across vast spatio-temporal divides and across military and civilian space.  
This evocation of immediacy via hypermediacy differentiates Good Kill and 
5,000ft from the more straightforward mode of immediacy characteristic of the 
experiential war film. The shared privileging of immediacy does create some formal 
parallels between the two groups of films and implies that drone mediation may actually 
(in contrast to the CIA films) be commensurate with a cinematic aesthetic historically 
grounded in the genre’s predilection for the embodied and experiential. Yet the 
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alignment of embodied experience with drone mediation significantly relocates this 
presence from the curiously depoliticised and detechnologised realm of the experiential 
war film to situate it amidst the carnage wrought by extremely powerful aerial missiles 
whose impact upon the body was not quite so transparent prior to the advent of drones. 
It is almost as if drones thus fulfil the wish of Restrepo’s artillery operator to see the 
impact of long-range weaponry, yet by doing so extend the scope of embodied 
witnessing to encompass what Holmqvist terms ‘exposure to high-resolution images of 
killing, including the details of casualties and body parts that would never be possible to 
capture with the human eye’ (542). This is precisely why the immediacy of drone 
mediation entails that it is ‘proximity not distance [that] becomes the problem’ 
(Gregory, “From a View to a Kill” 201). 
The very notion of proximity as a ‘problem’ indicates a substantial deviation 
from the experiential mode’s implicit association of spectatorial pleasure with an 
immersive and visceral rendition of the body at risk. However, the evocation of a 
distinctly traumatic sense of witnessing here does open up another substantial and 
potentially problematic point of comparison between the experiential and this second 
regime of drone remediations: specifically, that the latter may reinstate the 
internalisation of warfare that, for Stahl, ‘portray[s] war as an internal crisis located 
neither in the field of politics nor between combatants but within the soldier himself’ 
(79). I think it must be acknowledged that Good Kill does effect an internalisation of 
war to some degree through the substitution of a more retrograde model of subjective 
agency and moral responsibility in place of the opening sequence’s evocation of 
networked assemblage. The contrast drawn between Egan’s guilt and willingness to 
assume individual responsibility for the drone strikes carried out by the crew (implicitly 
linked to his background as a conventional pilot), and the new recruits with gaming 
backgrounds for whom war is akin to a first-person-shooter, is presumably intended as a 
critique of the increasingly callous institutional negation of moral responsibility 
concomitant with drones’ networked reconfiguration of the military subject. However, 
as the film gradually loosens the connection between Egan’s guilt and the controversial 
drone strike practices inaugurated by the CIA missions, it does ultimately become a 
rather individualised, internalised and depoliticised sense of trauma. This is exactly 
what makes the film’s ending so problematic, since Egan’s rogue strike on the rapist is 
framed as a liberating moment of individual catharsis which is further accentuated by 
his joyous final drive into the horizon. By releasing the protagonist from his moral 
burden in this particular manner, Good Kill risks undermining the more pertinent and 
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precise critique of drone strike procedures established earlier in the film via the 
implication that Egan’s cleansed conscience cathartically absolves him from a 
complicity in the institutionalised and indiscriminate killing of civilians. Drone war is 
thereby rendered (to borrow Westwell’s phrase) ‘a personal ahistorical trauma that can 
be overcome’ (81).    
One might consider the psycho-geographic rendition of warfare in 5,000ft open 
to the same charge of internalisation. Yet, while the film does principally explore the 
psychological effects of drone mediated combat, it does so in a highly context-specific 
manner which manifests a much more complex conceptualisation of the subject. Where 
Good Kill may ultimately contain the experience of conflict within a clearly demarcated 
individual conscience, 5,000ft problematises the very stability of the individual through 
the evocation of a networked subject whose presence is radically and ambiguously 
dispersed across the blurred realms of military and civilian space. The representation of 
PTSD is therefore intimately bound up with the specific effects of drone mediation’s re-
orientation of the subject, rather than a regressive retreat from political/technological 
context into the realm of the individual conscience. Furthermore, for Martin Barker, the 
evocation of PTSD in Iraq War films is primarily problematic because it glosses over 
the potential political charge of the disjunction between ‘over there’ (i.e. the hostile 
space of combat) and ‘over here’ (i.e. the civilian realm), with PTSD ‘packag[ing] 
soldiers’ responses to war as bundles of symptoms within the individual’ (85). Yet the 
sense of PTSD in 5,000ft is also distinctly shaped by drone mediation’s erosion of the 
distinctions between ‘over there’ and ‘over here’. As such, it cannot therapeutically and 
‘apolitically’ bridge this dichotomy, since it actually figures as a specific symptom of 
the way that drones have broken this division down through the geographical implosion 
of remote warfare.   
One must bear in mind, then, that psychologising warfare is not in itself 
problematic; it only becomes so when internalisation effects a withdrawal from the 
material, political and technological context of warfare into the therapeutically-
resolvable plane of individual psychological experience. The depoliticised and 
detechnologised realms of Restrepo and The Hurt Locker might plausibly be considered 
as such, but this isn’t quite the case with 5,000ft – or, indeed, even with much of Good 
Kill (the individualistic and therapeutic ending exempted). This difference between the 
experiential mode and the second regime of drone imagery is, I believe, further 
explicable via the concept of immersion. I have employed the term ‘immersion’ 
throughout this chapter primarily to distinguish this intimate/immersive 
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conceptualisation of drones (derived from Gregory, Holmqvist and Williams) from 
accounts which claim that they effect a distancing virtualisation of embodied experience 
and ethical consequence. Yet the immersive effect of drones does require further 
qualification in relation to the experiential mode of immersion.  
Alison Griffiths’ definition of immersion as a sense being enveloped within ‘a 
space that immediately identifies itself as somehow separate from the world’ could be 
considered consistent with the experiential mode since the exclusive privileging of 
embodied experience in those films creates a distinct sense of disconnection from the 
technological and political context of contemporary warfare (2). The immersive effect 
of drone mediation here offers a similarly immediate ‘mode of virtual transport’; 
however, it is not quite transport to a separate space (Griffiths, 40). Instead, the 
intertwining of embodied experience and technological mediation more closely 
approximates Mark Hansen’s notion of ‘mixed reality’. In Bodies in Code, Hansen 
defines mixed reality as the ‘fluid interpenetration of […] virtual and physical realms’, 
relying on a conceptualisation of digital mediation which rejects ‘conceiving the virtual 
as a total technical simulacrum and as the opening of a fully immersive, self-contained 
fantasy world’ in favour of ‘the mixed reality paradigm [which] treats it as simply one 
more realm among others that can be accessed through embodied perception’ (2-5).  
Extrapolating from Hansen’s argument, then, I believe the division between 
embodied experience and technological mediation in both the experiential mode and the 
first regime of drone imaging seems to render both realms as akin to ‘self-contained 
fantasy worlds’. The embodied realm, through its detachment from political and 
technological context, signifies a regressive fantasy of face-to-face combat following an 
assumed alignment of spectatorial pleasure with embodied mediation; while the discrete 
realm of digital mediation appears as a rather weightless, post-human construct due to 
its fundamental separation from embodied experience. In contrast, the regime of drone 
imaging suggested by 5,000ft and Good Kill posits a thorough permeation of ‘virtual 
and physical realms’. There is a broadly comparable sense of immersion, though it is 
not immersion within a ‘separate space’ or ‘self-contained fantasy-world’, but rather 
one in which the effects of drone mediation remain firmly grounded in embodied 
experience. 
Finally, Hansen’s account of the necessary entanglement of embodiment and 
digital mediation can also be used to further reflect upon the distinctive form of psycho-
geographic internalisation in 5,000ft. In New Philosophy for New Media, he 
acknowledges ‘how radically alien the formal field of the computer is from the 
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perspective of the phenomenal modes of embodied spatial experience’ (206). Yet, rather 
than producing the kind of disjunction between embodied perception and digital 
mediation that characterises Body of Lies, Hansen argues that the impossibility of visual 
mastery of such spaces produces a shift to a deeply affective, ‘alternate mode of 
perception rooted in our bodily faculty of proprioception’ (203). This ‘affective 
proprioception’ is a ‘form of bodily vision’ which constitutes a ‘creative, autopoietic 
response on the part of the body itself [emphasis in original]’ (229).  
While drone mediation’s fusion of geographically distinct spaces does not 
produce quite so radically ‘other’ a space as the ‘perspectival crisis’ of Robert 
Lazzarini’s skulls (to which the first quotation above explicitly refers), this account of 
‘affective proprioception’ as a form of spacing produced by the body in conjunction 
with digital mediation can nonetheless be related to the virtual presence of the drone 
operator in 5,000ft. The ‘internalisation’ at work in Fast’s film is not quite so neatly 
bound within the circumscribable space of individual conscience, but rather appears as a 
direct effect of drone mediation’s fusing of military and civilian space. As such, 
‘internalisation’ may not even be the most apposite term to describe this psycho-
geographic portrait of the drone operator’s experience. Instead, one might consider it as 
the distinctive, disorienting and (in this context) traumatic subjective effect of the 
proprioceptive sense of being simultaneously ‘embodied’ in two distinct spaces that are 
conjoined by the drone interface.   
I will return to Hansen’s work in the concluding discussion of the following 
chapter, in order to explore how this sense of affective proprioception may function in 
relation to other kinds of digital environments. Specifically, the next chapter will 
address the US military use of networked digital simulations of combat for both training 
purposes and the treatment of PTSD, a theme which will be explored in relation to the 
documentary Full Battle Rattle (2008) and four short films by Harun Farocki 

















Continuing the examination of digital technologies’ impact on contemporary 
war films, this chapter will explore the US military use of simulations for both training 
purposes and the treatment of PTSD. Simulations, also variously known as ‘serious 
games’ or simply ‘war games’, are not by definition digital. Indeed, while their origins 
are ambiguous, they do clearly pre-date digital media, stretching back at least as far as 
the Prussian ‘Kriegsspiel’ of the early 1800s. Historically, there has also been a 
significant degree of imbrication with the cinematic apparatus. The 1940 ‘Waller 
Flexible Gunnery Trainer’, for instance, presented trainee anti-aircraft gunners with a 
dynamic onslaught of enemy fighter planes on the panoramic Vitarama cinema screen, 
at which they fired ‘electronic bullets’ (Belton, 101). Paul Virilio’s War and Cinema 
details a comparable cinematisation of war, albeit primarily oriented around the remote, 
screen-based interfaces of actual weaponry rather than training simulations per se. This 
work is also among the first to note the technological transition from cinematic to 
digital war games, in a brief discussion of the emergent (in 1984) ‘electronic battlefield’ 
created at the US Army’s National Training Centre (NTC) in Fort Irwin, California 
(110).  
Indeed, contemporary forms of military simulations tend increasingly to be 
bound to digital technologies, ranging from live-action scenarios which incorporate 
digitised weaponry systems such as the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System 
(MILES) used in the US Army’s war games, to the fully CG environments of gaming-
derived simulation training programs, often navigated via Head-Mounted Display. 
Among critical writing on this topic, there are two institutions which recur with 
significant regularity: the aforementioned NTC, and more recently the Institute for 
Creative Technologies (ICT), based at the University of Southern California. The 
former is the primary focus of James Der Derian’s 2009 work Virtuous War, a critique 
of the ‘virtual revolution’ in digitised military simulations which questions the extent to 
which such applications may virtualise warfare by eroding the boundaries between 
preparation and execution (xxxi). As implied by the timeframe of these references to 
Virilio and Der Derian, the NTC has developed from modelling Cold War scenarios 
through to its contemporary emphasis on counter-insurgency situations. Most recently, 
it has garnered attention for its large-scale simulation of Iraq, as depicted in the 
documentary Full Battle Rattle. This film tracks Army recruits’ progress through a 
mission in the simulacral village of Medina Wasl, largely populated by Iraqi refugees 
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whose semi-scripted interactions with the troops form the basis of both cultural and 
military-strategic training.  
While the Institute for Creative Technologies’ links to military simulations may 
not be immediately apparent from a cursory glance at their website, the applications 
developed through this collaboration of film and gaming industry personnel as well as 
computer scientists are actually central to contemporary innovations in military 
simulation technology. The history of the institute’s formation, and its centrality to the 
‘military-entertainment complex’ are recounted in Tim Lenoir’s 2000 article “All but 
War is Simulation: The Military-Entertainment Complex” (331-335). Exemplary among 
its outputs is the Full Spectrum Warrior software, a hybrid military training program 
and commercial video game. In 2005, this game was adapted as the basis for the Virtual 
Iraq application – essentially a set of customisable CG scenarios designed to treat PTSD 
among veterans of the Iraq War. The latter is depicted in one of a series of short films 
by Harun Farocki collectively known as Serious Games. Also featuring in these films is 
the software Virtual Battlespace 2, which seems to have supplanted Full Spectrum 
Warrior as the training application of choice (at least within the Marine units depicted 
in Farocki’s films). This program overlaps with commercial gaming in a similar way, as 
its simulation engine is shared by ARMA II. 
Thus, the NTC’s training simulations, Virtual Battlespace 2, and the ICT-
developed software Virtual Iraq will be the main focal points of this chapter’s analysis, 
uniting the initial discussion of critical work on simulations and subsequent analyses of 
Full Battle Rattle and Serious Games. The chapter will begin by engaging with critical 
debates on simulations from both journalistic (Der Derian) and academic (Chris Hables 
Gray, Pasi Väliaho, John Protevi) sources, deriving from these discussions a theoretical 
framework for assessing digital war games’ effects, particularly in terms of an alleged 
virtualisation of warfare and transfiguration of military subjectivity. As will become 
apparent, these critical perspectives span a range of disciplines from military history to 
biopolitics and affective neuroscience; among them, only Väliaho has any connection to 
film studies per se. The volume of critical work on digital military simulations is also 
rather slender, even in comparison to more recent technologies such as drones. As such, 
some of the discussions and analysis that follow will focus on issues (such as 
‘endogenous imagery’) that don’t typically fall within the purview of film studies, yet I 
believe this theoretical hybridity is a virtue (perhaps even a necessity) for examining the 
increasingly intermedial nature of contemporary conflict and its hypermediated 
cinematic representations.   
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Following this theoretical contextualisation, I will present extended readings of 
Tony Gerber and Jesse Moss’ documentary Full Battle Rattle and Harun Farocki’s 
Serious Games. To my knowledge, these are the only films within the corpus I have 
delineated to address contemporary digital war games15. Since they may both appear as 
outliers relative to some of the mainstream genre work that figured more prominently in 
the previous two chapters, I will briefly contextualise the directors’ work here. Jesse 
Moss is a US documentary filmmaker who tends to work in a vérité style, and is 
perhaps best-known for winning the special jury award at Sundance film festival for The 
Overnighters (2014), a study of the North Dakota oil boom. His collaborator on Full 
Battle Rattle, Tony Gerber, is a director and producer with a somewhat more eclectic 
background that includes the Merchant Ivory produced Side Streets (1998), numerous 
National Geographic documentaries, as well as collaborations with artists such as 
Matthew Barney and Ann-Sofi Sidén. Harun Farocki’s work, from the late 1960s 
through to his death in 2014, has always been positioned at a slight tangent to what one 
might conventionally demarcate as cinema. Towards the end of his career, Farocki was 
increasingly identified as an international video artist, with serial (short film) works 
such as Serious Games, Parallel (2012-14) and Eye / Machine (2000-3) appearing as 
gallery installations. The earlier works are somewhat difficult to categorise, moving 
fluidly between, and often exploring the interstices of documentary, the essay film and 
experimental work. Though Farocki’s interests are notably diverse, the relationship 
between military and media technologies (particularly in reshaping the 
phenomenological and ontological role of images) is a recurrent theme from As You See 
(1986) and Images of the World and the Inscription of War (1989) through to Eye / 




 While Virilio’s brief discussion of the NTC’s ‘electronic battlefield’ implicitly 
links this mode of military simulation to broader trends in the derealisation and 
cinematisation of warfare, subsequent critics such as Der Derian have more closely 
examined the links between military training and the gaming industry to suggest that 
this sense of derealisation is innately tied to the virtualising influence of CG 
                                                          
15 There are of course earlier precedents, such as War Games (1983). As per my definition of the 
corpus, science fiction treatments of similar themes in films like Ender’s Game (2013) are 
excluded here.  
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environments. Analogies with cinema per se seem to have disappeared entirely, with the 
emphasis firmly placed upon the ways in which ‘video war games’ may effect a 
collapse of ‘the gap itself between the reality and virtuality of war’ (10).  
  Reflecting on his visit to the NTC, Der Derian expands on this notion of high-
tech derealisation:  
 
The reality of death had been twice removed, by video and by simulation. My 
grandfathers’ wars disappeared into the multiple levels of virtuality inscribed on 
the blank desert slate of Fort Irwin. There the landscape was a five-dimensional 
“battlespace”, with soldiers as “land warriors”, and the enemy not as flesh and 
blood but as iconic symbol, a “target-of-opportunity” on a computer screen [...] 
my grandfathers could not have even seen let alone recognised this virtualised 
enemy (9) 
 
Thus, the realising force of warfare in Der Derian’s account is fundamentally an 
embodied sense of ‘flesh and blood’, and the simulation is critiqued specifically on the 
grounds of abstracting this in favour of a clinically distanced, increasingly virtualised 
process of killing.   
 This has, of course, become a somewhat commonplace observation, re-iterated 
in countless articles and employed in response to a range of technological innovations – 
including drones, as discussed in the previous chapter. Yet what really distinguishes Der 
Derian’s work is the more radical extension of this argument regarding the conflation of 
the real and virtual, in his suggestion that ‘simulations can precede and engender the 
reality of war that they were intended to model and prepare for’ (15). This theory is, 
within Virtuous War, not fully assessed in relation to the NTC’s simulation of Iraq, but 
is nonetheless illustrated through a series of infamous accidents such as the USS 
Vincennes’ shooting of an Iranian commercial airliner:  
 
On a tour of one of your Aegis missile cruisers at the experiment, I was struck by 
the number of computers everywhere, how everyone was staring at screens, and 
not much else. I had this flashback to the USS Vincennes, where they had trained 
for months with computer simulations, and nowhere in the training had there been 
an Iranian Airbus in the skies overhead. Even when their screens told them there 
was something that did not correspond to the track of an F-14, they didn’t believe 





Such instances certainly go some way toward demonstrating Der Derian’s argument 
regarding simulative preparation ‘overriding’ the immediate evidence of a present 
combat situation. However, Der Derian does not fully explore how the conditioning 
power of simulations may ‘precede and engender’ new ‘realities’ of combat on a 
subjective level. Thus, I will address this gap later in the chapter by juxtaposing Der 
Derian’s argument with works by John Protevi and Pasi Väliaho which focus more 
specifically on the ways in which simulations may reconfigure and pre-determine the 
experience of war in subjective, perceptual terms. Arguably, the absence of such 
analysis in Virtuous War does seem to compromise the more radical implications of Der 
Derian’s position, allowing him to instead revert to a sceptical critique of simulations’ 
inability to ‘survive first contact with the enemy’ (281). 
 This critique is echoed in Chris Hables Gray’s essay “Perpetual Revolution in 
Military Affairs, International Security and Information”. Ostensibly assessing various 
post-modern ‘Revolutions in Military Affairs’ (such as ‘electronic war’, ‘information 
war’), this piece nonetheless reads largely like a diatribe against military attempts to 
model and predict war through simulation, ultimately claiming that: 
 
the fog of war will never lift, because it is generated by the three main “problems” 
of war – your side’s behaviour, your antagonist’s behaviour, and nature (the 
weather mainly). How will your soldiers act in the face of death? How will your 
machines perform? What will your enemy do and how will they react to what you 
do? How well will they perform? What will the weather be? These questions are 
not completely answerable, let alone predictable or controllable. They never will 
be. In terms of information theory, these are incomputable complex systems. War 
is an intractable problem conceptually; really the only way to know how a war is 
going to come out is to fight it. (204)   
  
Gray’s earlier monograph Postmodern War is similarly dismissive of military 
simulations, finding the seminal Battle of 73 Easting16 model ‘impressive’ but of limited 
value for ‘other kinds of battles’, and generally asserting that ‘simulations are not as 
important as the real’ – as though they were simply a superficial technological gloss 
over ‘war like war has been for thousands of years […] real bodies really dead at 
another’s hand, no matter how remote’ (62; 48).  
                                                          
16 The Battle of 73 Easting features prominently in Tim Lenoir’s historical outline of military 
simulations in ‘All But War is Simulation’; see p.330. 
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Postmodern War is intermittently valuable as a descriptive record of the 
digitisation of military simulations and, like Virtuous War, evinces a distinct sense of 
(Virilio’s) cinematic analogies being supplanted by gaming metaphors (as in the 
‘Nintendo’ room used for Bosnian peace talks). However, the critique of simulations 
here is rather simplistic, particularly in postulating a fundamental division between the 
reality of the body and the corresponding, implicit unreality of simulations. If these two 
realms were really as mutually exclusive as Gray claims, then the technologies involved 
in simulating and waging war would be rendered fundamentally redundant and thus 
unworthy of this kind of critical examination. Yet this position arguably overlooks the 
sense that, for those who wage war in this technologically-asymmetrical way, the ‘flesh 
and blood’ victim does not appear such, but rather as (to borrow Der Derian’s phrase) 
an ‘iconic symbol, a “target-of-opportunity” on a computer screen’ (9). This shows how 
the precise intersection of embodied reality and technological abstraction is not merely a 
superficial issue of representation, but a highly ethically-charged encounter. While 
acknowledging that ‘compared to the real trauma of war, the pseudotrauma of 
simulation pales’, Der Derian also emphasises precisely this ethical dimension in his 
claim that ‘one learns how to kill but not to take responsibility for it, one experiences 
“death” but not the tragic consequences of it’ (10). Gray’s argument is also neglectful of 
the effects that simulative training may have on military subjects, and the ways in which 
this conditioning delimits the subjective experience of actual warfare as well as wider 
US military strategy. Some indications of how simulations may ‘engender’ new 
‘realities’ of combat are, however, proposed in recent articles by John Protevi and Pasi 
Väliaho (Der Derian, 15). 
 Protevi’s “Affect, agency and responsibility: the act of killing in the age of 
cyborgs” examines the modes of subjectivity at stake in both military training 
simulations and actual combat, and posits various strategies that are applied to transcend 
individual subjective agency. Noting a ‘deep-seated inhibition against one-on-one, face-
to-face, cold-blooded killing on the part of some 98% of soldiers’ based on an affective 
‘proto-empathic identification’, Protevi argues that this necessitates the activation of ‘a 
de-subjectified state’ (406-407). Historically, the most common mode of this is the 
‘berserker rage’, yet Protevi emphasises how this is typically avoided (due to its 
tendency to exacerbate PTSD) in contemporary military training in favour of other, 




(1) there is another sense of “agent” as non-subjective controller of bodily action, 
either reflex or basic emotion, and (2) that in some cases the military unit and 
non-subjective reflexes and basic emotions are intertwined in such a way as to 
bypass the soldiers’ subjectivity qua controlled intentional action. In these cases 
the practical agent of killing is not the individual person or subject, but the 
emergent assemblage of military unit and non-subjective reflex or equally non-
subjective “affect program” (408)  
 
Thus, the broad aim of military training in this account is to directly condition and 
control ‘affect programs’, glossed as pre-subjective ‘basic emotions […] that run the 
body’s hardware in the absence of conscious control’, and to instil a sense of trans-
subjective group identity (408). The former is targeted primarily via ‘shoot/no shoot’ 
simulator training, through repetitive exercises which establish a ‘conditioned response’ 
to key perceptual traits and are said to ‘operate at the very edge of the conscious 
awareness of the soldiers and involve complex subpersonal processes of threat 
perception’ (409-411). This is further augmented by the virtualising effect of CG 
environments which ‘increase the desensitisation effect of training’ (411). The latter 
sense of constituting ‘a new cognitive group subject’ is produced by the 
‘extended/distributed cognition’ of networked simulation training (411). Protevi further 
outlines this process in a particularly significant passage: 
 
In other words, contemporary team-building applications through real-time 
networking are a cybernetic application of video games that goes above the level 
of the subject. In affective entrainment, instant decision-making and cognitive 
“topsight” the soldiers produced by rhythmic chanting and intensive simulation 
training are nodes within a cybernetic organism, the fighting group, which 
maintains its functional integrity and tactical effectiveness by real-time 
communication technology. It’s the emergent group with the distributed decisions 
of the soldiers that is the cyborg here, operating at the thresholds of the individual 
subjectivities of the soldiers. (412) 
 
 Protevi’s argument thus extends the understanding of how simulations may, in 
Der Derian’s terms, ‘produce and engender the reality of war that they were intended to 
model and prepare for’ at the level of subjective experience (15). It would also seem to 
problematise the dialectical use of subjective experience in the war film as a mode of 
critiquing the virtualisation effected by simulations and their gaming aesthetic by 
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demonstrating the complicity of these two apparently opposed concepts. The subsequent 
analyses of Full Battle Rattle and Serious Games will therefore attempt to extrapolate 
on this issue by examining in detail the modes of subjective and trans-subjective 
experience depicted, with a particular focus on the distributed group identities produced 
by networked simulation training.  
  Notably influenced by Protevi (as well as the work of neuroscientist Jaak 
Panksepp), Pasi Väliaho’s “Affectivity, Biopolitics and the Virtual Reality of War” is 
also worth considering here for its complementary analysis of the military governance 
of ‘affect programs’ through the Virtual Iraq treatment for PTSD (73). This article will 
be particularly useful as a critical framework for discussing Harun Farocki’s Serious 
Games III: Immersion (2009) (which focusses on Virtual Iraq) and also forms an 
interesting adjunct to the previous chapter’s work on PTSD. Adapted from the Full 
Spectrum Warrior training tool, Virtual Iraq essentially allows for the recreation of 
traumatic scenes using a customisable base set of CG scenarios, with which the patient 
engages via a Head-Mounted Display interface. Väliaho broadly describes the program 
as ‘an example of the biopolitical work of contemporary screen media in which the 
reality of images starts to concern the organism’s internal functioning instead of being 
anthropological or communicative’ (63). This is based primarily upon an understanding 
of PTSD as rooted not within conscious ‘biographical memories’, but rather pre-
subjective ‘affective and emotional charges’ or ‘bodily memory’ (70). The program is 
thus termed an example of ‘evocative media’, in that its imagery is ‘fundamentally 
endogenous rather than exogenous…they are not representations, at least in the 
traditional sense of mediators between inner and outer worlds, but […] sensori-
affectivo-motor evocations and modulations of a traumatic past’ (70-71).  
Through this notion of ‘endogenous’ imagery, Väliaho appears to be broadly 
following Mark Hansen’s theorisation of digital imaging as formless and essentially 
produced by the body/brain of the observer/participant, which is echoed here in 
Väliaho’s claim that ‘VR completely abolishes distinctions between internal and 
external worlds […] becom[ing] simulations of the brain’s internal activity’ (77). He 
expands on this notion in a key passage to summarise its centrality to simulations: 
 
In a sense, then, the reality of the liberal war the soldiers wage does not originate 
in the brain’s orientation toward and interpretation of the external world but, 
rather, in the media technological regulation of basic affect programs and the 
endogenous imagery they produce. This at least is the key function of the 
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immersive virtual environments, which are nowadays commonly used in military 
training and which basically replicate commercial first-person-shooters in the 
context of warrior production (76) 
 
The prime function of Virtual Iraq as a specific instance of such virtual 
environments is, of course, to ‘revisit and revise the past so as to (re)produce subjects 
amenable to the contingencies of war’, which is achieved by ‘modulating the patient’s 
affective life and blocking and transforming the quality of emotional intensity attached 
to certain memories – from politically subversive “guilt” to de-politicised “acceptance”’ 
(65-69).  
This notion of PTSD treatment as complicit in depoliticising soldiers’ responses 
to war coincides strikingly with Martin Barker’s account of it in A ‘Toxic Genre’ as a 
repackaging of politically-charged discontent as treatable individual symptoms (85). 
Yet, while both effect a similar sense of depoliticisation, there is evidently something of 
a formal or ontological disjunction in terms of the way these two media operate. Where 
the contemporary war film often displays a tendency to ground this psychological 
‘journey’ within a realist aesthetic, the endogenous imagery of Virtual Iraq in Väliaho’s 
account has no equivalent ‘orientation toward […] the external world’. Virtual Iraq 
thereby radically erases the dependence on familial/social structures and perhaps the 
entire therapeutic narrative arc common to war cinema’s depiction of PTSD in favour of 
a pure (although paradoxically, highly technologically-enhanced) internality. The very 
notions of endogenous imagery and evocative media thus seem to break entirely with 
what Jonathan Crary terms the ‘referential illusion’ of cinema/photography, illustrating 
how digital media may effect a ‘sweeping reconfiguration of relations between an 
observing subject and modes of representation that effectively nullifies most of the 
culturally established meanings of the terms observer and representation [emphasis in 
original]’ (Techniques of the Observer, 1).  
Clearly, these works by Protevi and Väliaho evince a radically different 
conceptualisation of subjectivity as it relates to ‘evocative’ digital media rather than a 
cinematic embodied grounding of representation. The following readings of Full Battle 
Rattle and Serious Games will thus closely examine the various modes of subjectivity 
engaged both diegetically within the simulations depicted and in more familiar terms of 
the cinematic language employed. Furthermore, I will explore how the films more 
generally posit simulations as reconfiguring the experience of war, and to what extent 
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they may fulfil Der Derian’s claim regarding the engendering of new ‘realities’ of 




 Full Battle Rattle charts the progress of a US army battalion through training 
scenarios in the simulated Iraqi town of Medina Wasl, created at the Fort Irwin National 
Training Centre. The simulation – just one ‘town’ that is part of a larger, interconnected, 
simulation of Iraq – comprises role-playing Iraqi refugees as the local community, 
‘Anti-Iraqi Forces’ (i.e. insurgents, played by trained US military personnel rather than 
Iraqis) who plot to disrupt the battalion’s missions, and even a simulation of the media, 
who film and broadcast televised reports from the town. This is combined with a high-
tech simulation of conflict, using the aforementioned MILES (Multiple Integrated Laser 
Engagement System) harness to record the outcomes of virtual combat with insurgents. 
Alongside the traditional emphasis on military strategic training (albeit specifically 
tailored to counter-insurgency scenarios), the film also captures what Scott Magelssen 
(in his article on the NTC) terms the ‘human elements’ of cultural sensitivity training 
and the indoctrination of a ‘warrior ethos’, specifically intended to achieve ‘decreased 
collateral damage and improved US-Iraqi relations’ (49-51). Interactions between the 
troops and the population of Medina Wasl within the film are as often diplomatic as 
they are militaristic, beginning with meetings between the Battalion’s Commander Lt. 
Col. Robert McLaughlin and the local authorities (Mayor, Police Chief, etc.). Within the 
battalion, there is also a particular emphasis on transforming trainees’ attitudes to what 
they initially dismiss as the ‘Al Salaam a’alaykum shit’. 
Formally, the film’s opening sequence suggests an immersively rendered 
subjective portrait of the experience of war very much in line with wider genre trends. A 
series of static establishing shots seem to locate the diegesis within Iraq, depicting local 
inhabitants and an approaching US military convoy against an iconographic desert 
backdrop littered with burned out cars. This segues into a series of loosely connected, 
handheld, rapidly-edited action sequences of somewhat generic counter-insurgency 
scenarios including roadside checkpoints and IED explosions. The viewer’s suspension 
of disbelief is, however, abruptly jolted as an off-screen voice yells ‘everybody stop’ 
and the seemingly dead and wounded rise to their feet.  
The frenetic, handheld aesthetic employed here evokes a distinctly subjective 
perspective familiar from a range of Iraq War films, particularly the video diary 
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aesthetic which has migrated from documentary to fiction via films such as Redacted 
and Battle for Haditha or the television series Generation Kill. Coupled with the in 
medias res opening, it serves to immerse the viewer within the NTC’s construct prior to 
any contextualisation or metafictional orientation. In doing so, it seems to promise a 
sense of formal experimentation that is deftly suited to the film’s subject matter, with 
the blurring of the boundaries between documentary and fiction reflecting how the 
NTC’s war games may erode distinctions between the real and the simulated. It may 
also imply the complicity of such immersive approaches to cinematically representing 
war with wider trends toward virtualising simulations.     
However, beyond this brief yet canny metafictional commentary on the capacity 
of film to create similarly immersive, simulated ‘realities’, Full Battle Rattle is 
otherwise structured through a somewhat conventional mix of direct-to-camera 
interviews interspersed with occasional set-piece extracts from the simulation. Narrative 
point-of-view, contrary to the majority of Iraq War films, is omniscient rather than 
subjectively restricted, leading to an ostensibly more objective portrait of the NTC’s 
machinations. Indeed, narrative perspective is fairly evenly balanced between trainee 
troops, Iraqi role-players and insurgents. For instance, the preparations for the initial 
meeting are shown from dual viewpoints, while the ‘surprise’ attack on the Forward 
Operating Base is preceded by a scene depicting the insurgents’ planning of it. 
Furthermore, the limitations of individual agency are repeatedly highlighted by regular 
cutaways to interviews with the ‘simulation architects’ and the constant presence of 
advisors directing participants’ performative interpretations of the scripted ‘injects’.  
This narrative structure does allow for an informative overview of the entire 
training process, mapping the consequences of each interaction between the troops and 
the population of Medina Wasl, thus outlining the ultimate control maintained by the 
architects and potentially allowing for political commentary on the US military ‘script’ 
for the occupation of Iraq. Although Gerber and Moss refrain from any explicit analysis 
of the underlying political/ideological assumptions, one can nonetheless construct a 
reading of this from the film’s depiction of character construction and narrative 
causality within the simulation. 
Two somewhat conflicting explanations are given for the presumed political 
inclinations of Medina Wasl’s inhabitants at the start of the simulation. Firstly, 
simulation consultant Amber Gates notes that each role player is provided with ‘as 
much information about their new family as we can possibly get’, with a particular 
emphasis on family members who may be ‘deceased’ or ‘out of town’ in Syria or Iran. 
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This, she explains, determines ‘how they’re going to feel about US soldiers’, which 
suggests that the simulation is ultimately attempting to model a complex range of 
political inclinations. A subsequent gloss on this theme by the commander of Medina 
Wasl’s Anti-Iraqi Forces, however, claims that: 
 
Medina Wasl starts off neutral, what we call grey, and as Blue Force [i.e. the US 
Army trainees] interacts with us correctly, they’re rewarded with less insurgent 
activity. But as they make mistakes, like killing innocent civilians through poor 
use of escalation of force and things like that, then it becomes a more hostile 
environment for them. 
   
On the evidence of the film as a whole, it seems that the second of these 
explanations tends to override the first, since interactions with the troops tend to have a 
greater influence on events than any pre-existent political commitments. The sole 
exception to this is Medina Wasl’s insurgents, yet their oppositional ideology is largely 
neutralised by the fact that these roles are played by US troops with no evident political 
understanding of their characters. While Paul Greene, who portrays one of the 
insurgents, does assert the usefulness of the role in ‘making you think like them’, this is 
articulated only in the military-strategic sense of asymmetrical warfare, rather than as a 
coherent ideological alternative, as conveyed by his enthusiasm for the hijinks of acting 
the ‘bad guy’. Their politics are also entirely dismissed by the Army trainees, with the 
Battalion’s Commander (Robert McLaughlin) designating them as ‘thugs’, disruptive of 
the people’s desire for ‘peace and prosperity’.  
Furthermore, as the US-Iraqi interactions are gradually reduced to the level of 
financial transactions, the model’s capitalist prejudices become ever more evident. The 
seemingly catastrophic series of errors committed by the trainees – from mistaken 
checkpoint killings of civilians and the neglect of Deputy Mayor Bassam Kalasho as a 
potential co-operator, to their inability to subdue Medina Wasl’s insurgent activity – are 
ultimately appeased by offers of bereavement pay and water/sewage treatment 
contracts. The simulation’s modelling of overarching political and ideological issues is 
thus revealed as distinctly privileging the conciliatory power of democratic-capitalist 
forces. It remains unclear whether this flaw in the realist value of the model is 
intentional or unconscious. It may be that, in confronting what Gray terms an 
‘incomputable complex system’, the architects of the simulation optimistically chose to 
privilege desired results in an attempt to pre-determine the outcome (204). Either way, it 
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clearly serves a propagandist purpose by attempting to instil its trainees with a belief in 
the initial ideological neutrality of Iraq and the susceptibility of its power structure to 
the adoption of a capitalist democracy. By exposing the causal logic of the simulation in 
this way, the film does at least suggest some sense in which the NTC may, in Der 
Derian’s terms, ‘produce and delimit […] the future [it] claim[s] only to anticipate’ 
(33).  
On the more subjective, experiential level, however, Full Battle Rattle is 
somewhat limited in its exploration of how simulations may reconfigure or pre-
determine the experience of war, particularly in the modes suggested by Protevi and 
Väliaho’s work. There is no attempt made to cinematically mirror the purportedly 
immersive subjective experience of the NTC as described within one the film’s 
interviews: 
 
Everybody that arrives at the NTC knows that they’re coming here for training. 
By the second or third day of the training that kind of disappears. The soldiers get 
into the reality of what they’re doing, and even though they are out here in the 
middle of the Mojave desert, in a simulated Iraq, it gets real, and they get lost in 
the scenario. 
 
Outside of the opening sequence, the viewer is afforded little opportunity for this 
kind of immersive experience of ‘getting into the reality’ of the simulation (in other 
words, for a cinematic suspension of disbelief). Thus, Mike Dillon’s review of the film 
critiques its perceived ‘fail[ure] to pursue the implications of its own status regarding 
media’s engagement with a war famously called “fictitious” by fellow documentarian 
Michael Moore in his incendiary 2003 Oscar speech’, arguing that it is ultimately 
‘uncommitted to any form of political commentary’ (120). Certainly, the verisimilitude 
of the simulated Iraq afforded opportunities for the filmmakers to engage in a greater 
degree of formal or ontological play, perhaps through a more ambiguous and 
challenging blurring of the boundaries between real Iraq, simulated Iraq, and the 
complicity of media in virtualising such distinctions – an opportunity which is largely 
passed over in favour of more conventional documentary tropes which attempt to erect a 
critical distance from the simulation depicted.  
Zack Whitman Gill’s “Rehearsing the War Away: Perpetual Warrior Training in 
Contemporary US Army Policy” does, however, prompt a potential alternative reading 




The goal of military training is precisely not to have soldiers completely absorbed 
in the realism of combat and its simulations, but quite the opposite—theatre 
immersion works to institute combat-as-rehearsal, in which soldiers have already 
been exposed to the horrors of war and are trained to remain so collected in their 
decision making that combat becomes simply another rehearsal, always 
downplayed as merely another step towards a perpetually deferred performance. It 
is therefore of the utmost importance that the mimesis continuously fails, that 
soldiers never fully suspend their disbelief in training and remain capable of 
reflecting on their actions (154) 
 
This would seem to contradict the opinions espoused by military personnel within the 
film, who repeatedly emphasise the simulation’s comprehensive mimetic detail and 
intricate narrative design. Yet it chimes interestingly with Dillon’s questioning of ‘why 
the army would even grant a documentary team such access, given how disruptive their 
presence presumably would be amidst training exercises that rely on its participants not 
to question their realism’ (121). For there are multiple layers of performativity evident 
in the film which may preclude total immersion in the scenario – from interpreting 
injects, demonstrating ‘warrior ethos’ and cultural sensitivity, interacting with the 
simulated media (‘INN’), and, of course, performing for Gerber and Moss.  
Perhaps, then, the issue of immersive realism in the NTC’s simulation is 
somewhat more complex than a straightforward striving for maximum mimetic detail, 
designed to ontologically convince its participants into behaving as if it were the real 
Iraq. Instead, there may be a dual trajectory in play, which both strives toward realist 
detail but simultaneously incorporates timely, small reminders of its artifice. This seems 
particularly evident in the simulation of injuries – an issue of marked significance in 
this context given Der Derian’s claim that simulations detract from the realising force of 
‘flesh and blood’ (9). In Full Battle Rattle, the visceral force of realistically simulated 
injuries, created by make-up, is emphasised by the medical consultant interviewed, who 
notes the intense physical reactions (vomiting, fainting, etc.) of some trainees. However, 
this effect is somewhat countered by the use, alongside simulatively injured 
participants, of dummies. Of course, there are ethical and budgetary limits in simulating 
injuries to a fully realistic extent, yet the clear artifice of this element may be intended 




By subtly highlighting this performative sense of ‘combat-as-rehearsal’ and 
resisting formal tendencies toward immersive subjectivity, Full Battle Rattle remains 
something of an anomaly in the war film genre. In contrast to the dominant experiential 
mode, the film does not substantially attempt to explore the subjective or psychological 
experience of soldiering and thus does not really enter into the terrain of Protevi and 
Väliaho’s work on simulations’ alterations of the subjective, perceptual experience of 
war. In spite of this, the film does however seem to maintain a fundamental anchoring 
in individual experience, which emerges with particular clarity in the concluding 
‘chapter’.  
Within the bounds of the simulation, this is somewhat restricted given the 
recurrent emphasis on the role-players’ subservience to the script, expressed most 
explicitly through the supervisors of Medina Wasl’s role-players repeated injunctions to 
‘read the inject’ whenever a performer is struggling to imagine their role. This does at 
least gesture towards the limitations of individual agency within the simulation. 
However, Gerber and Moss ultimately look outside the limitations of this simulated 
scenario for the cathartic, redemptive individual narrative arcs that conclude the film. In 
particular, they foreground the refugee tale of Nagi Moshi (playing an Iraqi police 
officer), detailing his heroic journey from Iraq to the US and his ultimately successful 
legal battle for US citizenship. Other individual stories addressed in the film’s final 
section include Bassam Khalasho’s return to his family, and Paul Greene’s emotional 
departure from his family for another tour of Iraq. 
While the use of these dramatic yet resolutely individualistic story-arcs in the 
film’s concluding section may lend its finale a conventional sense of catharsis, they also 
serve to highlight the film’s ultimate inconclusiveness regarding the simulation as a 
trans-subjective, or even de-subjectified, network. There remains, therefore, a rather 
unsatisfying gap between the film’s representation of the simulation and critical 
literature on the subject. Interviews with the simulation architects may go some way 
toward explaining the overarching function of the NTC’s training, but, as Dillon’s 
review of the film notes, ‘any opinions about the American occupation of Iraq not 
finessed by the camp’s tacticians are left off the table’ (121). This is perhaps a 
somewhat harsh evaluation, since the film does implicitly draw out some of the 
ideological assumptions embedded within the architects’ script, as I have noted above. 
Yet there is certainly an element of validity to this critique of the film since Gerber and 
Moss do not demonstrate the structuring of the simulation network beyond the 
information offered up by the architects.  
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This may in part be due to the film’s relative lack of emphasis on the role of 
digital technologies. Der Derian’s account of the NTC in Virtuous War explicitly notes 
the ‘digital buzz’ with which it was marketed to the press, emphasising the novel means 
by which ‘computers control the battlefield’ (4). Since this is almost entirely absent 
from the film, one is simply left to speculate on the balance of control between the 
(visible) architects and the (elided) digital network. Admittedly, the film does directly 
address the digitised simulation of battle through its outline of the MILES harness, yet, 
on film, these are barely distinguishable from real weaponry. As such, the film may 
appear a little anachronistic to viewers with a keen awareness of critical literature on 
digitised military simulations: closer, perhaps, to Virilio’s account of the cinematisation 
of warfare than to the digitised virtualisation explored by Der Derian. Furthermore, its 
formal conservatism can be justly critiqued for steering a middle ground between 
immersive subjectivity and an objective examination of the network as a whole, and 
thus not quite satisfactorily analysing either aspect. 
Nonetheless, Full Battle Rattle remains a fascinating portrait of a vitally 
important yet largely under-acknowledged trend of contemporary warfare. Its opening 
sequence evokes the complex interplay of documentary/fiction and simulated/real, 
suggesting how an immersive, subjective aesthetic may be complicit in blurring these 
boundaries. Gerber and Moss also subtly expose the ideological assumptions embedded 
within the simulation architects’ script for the Iraq War, and provide ample material for 




While the focus of Full Battle Rattle was on the NTC’s digitally enhanced yet 
largely live-action simulations, Harun Farocki’s Serious Games is embedded within the 
more overtly digitised realm of the ICT-developed applications Virtual Battlespace 2 
and Virtual Iraq. Clearly, the very notion of documenting these CG training 
applications with a camera presents something of a formal challenge. In particular, the 
medial juxtaposition here raises the question of what kind of distance one assumes in 
relation to these CG environments; in other words, whether to seamlessly remediate the 
CG interface and thus elide any embodied depiction of the military subjects, or to focus 
on this material context to the exclusion of an immersive rendition of the CG realm. 
Farocki’s solution to this is to employ a split-screen aesthetic throughout the majority of 
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the films, typically juxtaposing one screen set within a CG simulation with another 
recording the participants/trainees. 
 The first film of the four part series, Watson is Down (2010), opens with an 
armoured vehicle driving down a desert road, which is revealed to be part of the 
‘Recognition of Combatants – Improvised Explosive Devices’ training mode of the 
Virtual Battlespace 2 simulation. Short bursts of radio chatter imply the presence of the 
vehicle’s operators, who are subsequently revealed in the right-hand panel of the split-
screen. The remainder of the film tracks their progress through this landscape as they 
attempt to detect and avoid any IEDs while searching for enemy militants. Cutaways to 
an instructor depict the injecting of these IEDs and ‘enemies’ into the environment, 
which are selected from a drop-down list of objects (e.g. cement block, Coke can, dead 
dog) and customisable (in terms of clothing, but little else) yet generic combatants.   
 This split-screen juxtaposition is a novel and formally effective means of 
informatively and dramatically documenting the waging of virtualised war, since either 
of the two interconnected screens taken in isolation would perhaps appear insufficient. 
The former is essentially a filmed record of gameplay, dominated entirely by video 
game aesthetics and thus not necessarily ‘cinematic’; the latter consists solely of a 
recording of military personnel interacting with screens and would be dramatically 
rather flat without the parallel visualisation of the simulated environment. It also, in the 
very act of separation and juxtaposition, might seem to effect a sense of formal 
resistance to what Der Derian terms the collapsed ‘reality and virtuality of war’ (10).  
 Beyond this technical innovation, Watson is Down has a more straightforward 
documentary value in depicting the processes of subjective perceptual conditioning 
described by Protevi. The primary aim of the training program is clearly to enhance 
reflexive identification of threats, whether IED or enemy combatant, and to elicit 
appropriate responses to each. This coincides precisely with Protevi’s definition of 
cyborg simulation training in its emphasis on identifying the ‘presence or absence of 
key traits in the gestalt of the situation’ and reacting to this with ‘instant decisions [that] 
are more than reflexes, but operate at the very edge of the conscious awareness of the 
soldiers and involve complex subpersonal processes of threat perception’ (411).  
 As this suggests, there is also a distinctly reconfigured sense of subjectivity in 
effect here, which renders individual agency largely redundant in favour of an emergent 
trans-subjective group identity. Indeed, in contrast to Full Battle Rattle, Watson is Down 
seems largely uninterested in individual experience. Farocki’s framing is predominantly 
static, using a medium-shot to depict a row of four uniformed Marines in profile. No 
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attempt is made to capture individual expressions via reframing or close-ups; indeed, 
throughout the film, Farocki does not even isolate any of them within the frame. The 
only exception to this is within a cutaway to the instructor, yet the close-up used here 
does not focus on his face, but rather on his hand clicking a mouse in sync with the 
juxtaposed menu of IED injects. To employ such an image as the sole close-up in the 
film suggests an ironic subversion of cinematic grammar, whereby a space customarily 
dominated by the affective has here been supplanted by an image of clinical 
functionality. In doing so, Farocki perhaps implies that this context has reduced the 
individual to little more than a series of trained reflexes. 
 Rather than individual experience, then, Farocki seems to be interested in the 
networked group itself and its functioning as what Protevi terms a ‘cybernetic 
organism’ with ‘distributed decisions […] operating at the thresholds of the individual 
subjectivities of the soldiers’ (412). In its most basic form, this is conveyed by the 
perpetual presence on the soundtrack of communications between different units and the 
(off-screen) air support, and by the occasional cut to a dynamic, real-time map of the 
operation. The single instance of camera movement within the film is also directly 
motivated by this focus on teamwork: as a second vehicle enters the frame of Virtual 
Battlespace 2, Farocki pans to an adjacent desk to depict its operators. Though their 
actual proximity renders their radios largely redundant since they are clearly able to 
converse without them, it is notable that throughout these dialogues each Marine 
remains wholly absorbed in the screen before them, rarely if ever looking at each other. 
Ultimately, then, this networked identity is not so much an objectively identifiable 
element of either frame, so much as it is a process occurring in the interstices of the two 
juxtaposed frames. In other words, Farocki’s split-screen juxtaposition of the real and 
virtual can also be read as evoking precisely the ‘cyborg’ trans-subjective identity which 
transforms the distributed reflexes of the live-action screen into a coherent, unified 
operation within the realm of Virtual Battlespace 2.   
 In contrast to Watson is Down, Three Dead (2010) experiments with an 
alternative formal means of juxtaposing CG and live action. The split widescreen 
(2.35:1) format is here replaced with a single 4:3 frame, but the film is noteworthy 
primarily for two key cuts – from CG to live-action, then vice-versa. The film opens in 
a CG environment with a dramatic elevated tracking shot taken from the outskirts of a 
desert town as a group of helicopters swarm toward it, in a sequence that seems to 
resemble an introductory video game cutscene. Following this brief, virtual 
contextualisation, Farocki abruptly cuts to the live-action section of the film. Initially 
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rendered through static, elevated long-shots, these languorous scenes depict crowds 
milling outside a mosque kitchen and cheerily attempting to engage the dispersed 
military figures in casual conversation, yet hindered by the language barrier. At this 
point, Farocki briefly engages a more intimate aesthetic, bringing the camera down to 
human eye level for a series of two shots. This tranquillity is quite suddenly interrupted 
by the attack of two gunmen, who are subsequently detained by the soldiers. The 
violence is rendered rather mundanely, with no accompanying score and the camera 
position remaining fixed in a medium-long shot throughout the attack. Gradually, it 
becomes evident that this entire sequence is part of a live-action simulation exercise not 
dissimilar to that portrayed in Full Battle Rattle, in this case taking place in the Marine 
Corps Air Ground Combat Centre at Twentynine Palms, California. Though this 
delayed revelation of the ostensibly ‘real’ as performed/simulated is similar in effect to 
the opening sequence of Full Battle Rattle, it is not quite as jarring given the 
forewarning of Three Dead’s virtualised introductory sequence. Nonetheless, there is a 
comparable sense of metafictional commentary on the inability of the film’s spectator to 
distinguish between the real, performed or simulated.  
This is compounded by the final cut back to the CG simulation, as Farocki 
employs a sweeping, melodramatic tracking shot past troops marching in formation 
through the town, helicopter landings and perfectly aligned vehicle convoys, all 
accompanied by a rousing dramatic score. It is also notable that the bland, uniformly 
cream coloured exteriors of the town are here transformed by vivid and omnipresent 
billboards advertising Coca-Cola and Pepsi, as if the town has undergone a sweeping, 
corporate Americanisation. This overt exaggeration of the apparently cinematic nature 
of the simulation forms a somewhat odd contrast to the rather sober mechanics of 
Watson is Down. Yet it seems as though Farocki is attempting to gradually escalate the 
levels of virtualised dramatization throughout the film, demonstrating the performative 
transformation of the original event through its dramatic re-enactment, as well as its 
virtualisation through a kind of digitised cinematisation17. Through this virtualising 
process, Farocki also seems to be suggesting that a gradual homogenisation of the 
complexity of Otherness seems to take place, culminating in a perspective on warfare 
that explicitly aligns virtualisation with US imperialism.  
Immersion, the third and longest of the Serious Games shorts, diverges slightly 
from the first two films in that it focusses on the Virtual Iraq treatment for Post-
                                                          
17 The employment of cinematic grammar within the CG scenario here perhaps connects 
Virilio’s ‘cinematisation’ of warfare to the digital virtualisation outlined by Der Derian et al.  
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Traumatic Stress Disorder rather than a training application. As noted above, this 
program was however developed from the Full Spectrum Warrior software, which bears 
many similarities to Virtual Battlespace 2 and as such has a comparable aesthetic 
despite the differing function. The film, which reverts to the split-screen aesthetic of 
Watson is Down, opens within a CG environment which is at first glance 
indistinguishable from the urban setting of Three Dead. As the camera begins to 
traverse this scenario, however, it becomes evident that the movement is of a rather 
different quality. In place of the smooth vehicular motion of Watson is Down, or the 
highly stylised tracking shots of Three Dead, the landscape of Immersion is navigated in 
a much more halting manner. The camera, clearly adopting a first-person point-of-view, 
is positioned at human eye level, moves at walking pace and perpetually adjusts 
perspective with slight pans and tilts in imitation of embodied vision. No 
contextualisation is provided for this pre-credit sequence, and the action proceeds in a 
seemingly uneventful manner (reading an inscription on the wall, passing a fruit stall) 
until the culminating explosion. The entirety of this sequence takes place in the right-
hand panel of the split-screen, with the left remaining blank – perhaps evoking through 
elision (given the split-screen dynamic established in Watson is Down) the off-screen 
operator. Given the first-person point-of-view and lack of contextualisation, then, this in 
medias res opening can be posited as formally coinciding with the kind of immersive 
aesthetic encountered at the beginning of Full Battle Rattle, albeit in the markedly 
digitised form of a CG environment.  
This is followed by a didactic introduction to the Virtual Iraq application, as a 
technical advisor outlines the various capabilities of the technology, giving a brief 
demonstration of the customisable scenarios (roadside ambush, military checkpoint, city 
ambush) and various real-time adjustments that can be made to light, smoke, and the 
spatial qualities of mortar/bullet sound effects. The individual nature of the user 
experience is implied by the presence of Head-Mounted Displays (henceforth HMDs), 
though the exact function of the software (i.e. PTSD treatment) is not made explicit 
until the following section’s excerpts from Virtual Iraq treatment.  
These three brief, overlapping accounts of a roadside IED explosion and 
subsequent ambush on a convoy outside Baghdad are visualised in CG form in the left-
hand section of the screen, while the right depicts the soldier/patient, equipped with 
HMD, in a medium shot. For the first two accounts, Farocki alternates between 
depictions of soldiers describing the scene and the CG representation. For the third, 
more extensive account, he uses both sides of the screen simultaneously, with the CG 
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visualisation synced to the soldier’s description. This is evident from both the 
simultaneity of movement (as the soldier turns his head, the Virtual Iraq POV pans at 
exactly same time), and from the real-time updating of the CG image based on the 
soldier’s description. Following the IED explosion, for instance, he recalls that ‘the sun 
was blacked out at that point, smoke everywhere’ – a detail which is instantly 
incorporated into the Virtual Iraq visualisation.  
It is also worth noting that the three monologues in this section of the film are 
not solely concerned with visual detail, but also encompass a raw sense of emotional 
response. These range from rage at seeing a fellow soldier wounded by shrapnel (‘so 
mad that I just wanted to shoot somebody’) to the fearful intuition that ‘it had been a 
long day and there hadn’t been any trouble and that had me worried… I remember just 
feeling like something bad might happen… it was right then that we got hit by an IED 
on the right’. Since this section of the film keeps the Virtual Iraq instructor(s) largely 
off-screen and mute, it is unclear at this point whether these kinds of responses are 
encouraged. Nonetheless, it is clear that these verbal descriptions of traumatic 
experience do contain an element of affective response in excess of what is strictly 
captured by the recreation in Virtual Iraq. Indeed, Farocki’s split-screen aesthetic seems 
to heighten this contrast; despite the ostensibly more immersive style of the first-person 
POV in Virtual Iraq, it is actually the embodied performances of the soldiers filmed in 
mundane yet direct medium shots that carry the film’s ‘affective and emotional charge’ 
– which is precisely the target of this treatment in Väliaho’s account (70).   
Following these three short excerpts is a longer, sustained session of Virtual Iraq 
PTSD treatment which occupies more than half of Immersion’s twenty minute running 
time. Formally, it is similar to the previous segment of the film, with a medium shot of 
the soldier on the right hand screen accompanied by a CG visualisation on the left. Thus 
the viewer is once again offered both an embodied first-person perspective within the 
CG environment, and a third-person perspective on the HMD-wearing soldier. 
Prompted by the off-screen instructor, the soldier (referred to as ‘Kevin’) describes the 
traumatic witnessing of his partner’s (‘Jones’) death in an explosion during the course 
of a routine patrol of an unnamed city in Iraq. Once Kevin has recounted this memory in 
exhaustive detail, Farocki jarringly disrupts the audience’s suspension of disbelief as the 
instructor announces ‘cut’, the applause of the heretofore unnoticed audience breaks out 
and the soldier removes his headset, casually joking that ‘some of the nausea was real’. 
In a similar manner to Three Dead, or indeed Full Battle Rattle, Farocki once again 
reveals the ostensibly real to be a performative construct, thus cautioning the audience 
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against the passive, accepting consumption of such war narratives. Yet perhaps more 
interesting than this repeated metafictional revelation is the contrast drawn between the 
two screens as interrelated but somewhat divergent representations of the traumatic 
event, and the ways that this sequence may be read in light of Pasi Väliaho’s 
theorisation of Virtual Iraq in “Affectivity, Biopolitics and the Virtual Reality of War”.  
The Virtual Iraq interface in this instance is notably lacking in some of the finer 
visual details of Kevin’s monologue, such as the presence of ‘posters and propaganda 
[…] everywhere’. As a demonstration of the technology’s capabilities, it also appears 
somewhat flawed, repeatedly pulling the first-person perspective up towards a skyward 
gaze (contrary to Kevin’s actual bodily movements) and requiring resetting by the 
instructor. Finally, as Kevin reaches the point in his narrative at which he finds Jones’ 
corpse, Farocki fades the left screen to black. This perhaps raises the question of why 
Farocki chooses to use the Virtual Iraq representation here at all, since it initially 
appears to contribute little more than a generic visualisation of the setting.  
As in the preceding excerpts of Virtual Iraq treatment, much of the affective 
power of the sequence is drawn from the intensely embodied performance of the soldier. 
As Kevin’s reported SUDS (later glossed as Subjective Units of Disturbance Scale, 
rated between 0 and 100) ratings increase, this is notably accompanied by heavier 
breathing and stuttering. Furthermore, his description of finding Jones and ‘freaking 
out’ in fear is accompanied by a physical re-enactment of his defensive crouch as he 
‘curls up into a ball’ and covers his head with his hands. This certainly suggests an 
embodied recurrence of the affect associated with the traumatic event, which again 
coincides neatly with Väliaho’s definition of Virtual Iraq as designed to evoke 
‘affective and emotional charges’ or ‘bodily memory’ (70).  
As this recurrence of affect peaks, it is important to note how the spatio-
temporal co-ordinates of the soldier’s monologue begin to collapse. For instance, in 
noting ‘I actually go to this one area…which is a little hard to get to right now’, the 
temporal distinction between the original event and the relived experience seems to 
disappear. A similar spatial collapse is also evident as, in response to the instructor’s 
question of ‘how long are you there before you see someone?’, he replies: ‘do I have to 
be here that long?’. This effect seems to be specifically induced by some of the 
instructor’s prompts, particularly the recurrent directive to ‘stay with it, tell me what’s 
happening now’. It may require something of a neurological leap to definitively posit 
this as corroborating Väliaho’s argument regarding the pre-subjective nature of such 
137 
 
affect programs; at the very least though, it is clearly disruptive of a stable, coherent 
position of subjectivity.  
Given this radical coinciding of the original traumatic event and the experience 
of using Virtual Iraq, it thus seems inaccurate to speak of the soldier/patient reliving the 
experience. The merest hint of a distinct present perspective – conveyed by Kevin’s 
assertion that ‘now I know it was a big deal’ to split up from Jones – quickly falls away 
in favour of an affective experience that is apparently (for the Virtual Iraq user) 
indistinguishable from the initial occurrence. As such, the production of spatio-temporal 
experience in Virtual Iraq does seem to conform to the ‘body-brain achievement’ of 
simulating space via VR enunciated in Mark Hansen’s New Philosophy for New Media, 
and to Väliaho’s description of the manner by which Virtual Iraq ‘abolishes distinctions 
between internal and external worlds […] becom[ing] simulations of the brain’s internal 
activity’ (169; 77).  
In this section of Immersion, Farocki’s multi-screen aesthetic achieves its richest 
expression of the complexity of simulated experience by depicting the operation of 
Virtual Iraq as an endogenous medium. Clearly, what the viewer sees in the left screen 
does not exactly coincide with what the patient/soldier sees in it. Yet one can only 
understand this difference by watching the soldier, in the right screen, as he experiences 
the Virtual Iraq scenario. It is only through his affective, embodied performance and the 
collapsed spatio-temporal co-ordinates of his monologue that the viewer can begin to 
comprehend the difference between the soldier’s experience of Virtual Iraq and one’s 
own viewing. While it may appear to the viewer as technically flawed and lacking in 
precise visual detail, it nonetheless seems to be sufficiently ‘evocative’ (to use 
Väliaho’s term) to induce this intense affective recurrence for the user. Thus, one can 
infer that the combination of the original traumatic experience, the immersive mode of 
navigation enabled by the HMD interface and first-person perspective, and perhaps also 
a forcefully conditioned subjective association of the CG environment (as used in the 
Virtual Battlespace 2 training application) with actual combat, all contribute to 
producing this alternative, endogenous mode of interacting with (rather than merely 
viewing) Virtual Iraq. 
However, while Immersion certainly demonstrates the affective recurrence 
which Väliaho defines as the prerequisite for therapeutic modulation, the degree of 
therapeutic value attributed to this process in the film remains somewhat more 
questionable. During Kevin’s apparent breakdown, he despairs, ‘I don’t want to do this 
anymore… Do people get worse doing this?’; and when asked to repeat the entire 
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narrative, he removes the HMD and incredulously exclaims, ‘Back to the beginning?!... 
I can’t do this again’. If this may be partially disregarded as a demonstration of the kind 
of resistance typical of the therapeutic process, it is nonetheless reinforced by Farocki’s 
open-ended, circular structure. This extends beyond the diegetic bounds of the therapy 
session – which in itself ends at the beginning, with Kevin re-initiating the traumatic 
narrative – to the repetition of Immersion’s opening sequence which closes the film. 
Contrary to many of the Iraq War films dealing with PTSD, then, the therapeutic 
closure achieved here remains indeterminate. Where, for instance, In the Valley of Elah 
and Redacted ultimately attain a sense of closure through the exposure of a repressed, 
traumatic truth and an (at least partial) assertion of familial reabsorption, Immersion 
refuses any such closure. Instead, the intensity of affective recurrence and collapse of 
the distinction between the original event and its evocation through Virtual Iraq seem to 
overwhelm therapeutic modulation, while the immersively individualistic nature of the 
HMD mediated environment further seems to preclude any sense of social assimilation.  
 In A Sun Without Shadow (2010), the final film of Serious Games, Farocki 
repurposes footage from the previous three films to (somewhat more didactically, via 
intertitles) compare the imagery used for training with that used for PTSD treatment, 
and draws conclusions which seem to diverge somewhat from this endogenous reading 
of Immersion. Farocki observes that ‘the follow-up images resemble those that prepare 
for war’ with one salient exception: ‘the follow-up images have no shadows’. He uses 
this detail to assert that ‘the system for remembering is a little cheaper than the one used 
for training’, implying the privileging of preparation over remembrance, and the relative 
importance of combat preparation over the mental health of veterans. While this is not 
strictly incommensurate with an endogenous understanding of Virtual Iraq, it does seem 
to overlook the point that ‘remembering’ via precise visual representation is not the 
purpose of PTSD treatment in this case. Rather, as Immersion has demonstrated, the 
lack of explicitly customised detail is no hindrance to its evocative purpose since what 
the patient/soldier sees via an immersive engagement with this environment is 




 This chapter set out to explore the ways in which military simulations are 
reshaping contemporary warfare, and has certainly found enough evidence of this to 
refute Gray’s claim that simulations do not fundamentally affect ‘war like war has been 
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for thousands of years’ (48). The other theoretical frameworks used to explore and 
conceptualise transformations in military strategy and subjectivity have proved more 
insightful. However, even Protevi and Der Derian’s arguments posit somewhat 
generalised effects of simulations, as a singular concept, which do not comprehensively 
account for the sheer diversity in the specific types of simulations encountered via the 
readings of Full Battle Rattle and Serious Games. Protevi ascribes an innately 
desensitising effect to CG environments, while Der Derian similarly contends that the 
reality of war is increasingly eroded by the virtualising influence of ‘video war games’ 
(10). At the most basic level, these claims are difficult to adjudicate in relation to the 
predominantly live-action simulation depicted in Full Battle Rattle. Even within the 
more overtly digitised realm of Serious Games, I think they need further qualification. 
For instance, this position may have some validity in relation to the type of simulation 
depicted in Watson is Down, in which the generic CG insurgents coincide with Der 
Derian’s questioning of the ethics of rendering the enemy as an ‘iconic symbol, a 
“target-of-opportunity” on a computer screen’ rather than ‘flesh and blood’ (9). Yet in 
Immersion, the CG simulation of traumatic experience is anything but 
derealising/desensitising, instead evoking a radically endogenous reality-effect. The 
‘virtuality’ here thus corresponds less to Der Derian’s sense of ethical distanciation, and 
perhaps more closely approximates Mark Hansen’s definition of the virtual as an 
embodied ‘capacity […] to be in excess of one’s actual state’ (New Philosophy for New 
Media 51). As such, I am reluctant to make this kind of broad classification of 
simulations (even CG simulations specifically) as inherently derealising. This is, in part, 
because such positions may tend toward a form of technological determinism that 
quashes significant contextual differences, but also because simulations do not really 
seem to constitute a uniform medium or technology. In comparison to drones, which the 
previous chapter was able to address as a singular object, the technological elements 
comprising simulations here are actually much more diverse, ranging from digital 
weaponry which supplements live-action simulations to the networked gaming interface 
of Virtual Battlespace 2 and the HMD-navigated Virtual Reality of Virtual Iraq. For the 
purposes of this concluding discussion, then, I think it is beneficial to approach each 
type of simulation in turn, beginning with the live-action modes of Full Battle Rattle 
and Three Dead before moving on to the gaming network of Watson is Down and the 
VR of Immersion.  
 The live-action simulations in Full Battle Rattle and Three Dead are the most 
difficult to relate back to the thesis’ overarching framework, simply because of the 
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decentred role of digital technology in both of these scenarios. Although this chapter 
parallels the preceding study of drones in many ways, the schema used in the previous 
chapter’s concluding discussion, whereby I examined the cinematic remediation of 
digital technology in terms of immediacy/hypermediacy as well as embodiment, is not 
quite applicable as such to these two films. Indeed, the very notion of remediation may 
appear somewhat suspect here given that the semi-scripted, live-action role play has 
little to distinguish it from the pro-filmic field of cinema. Nonetheless, the study of 
these two films does contribute to the broader debate around the politics of immersion. 
 One interesting point of comparison that can be made with drones here is that 
these pseudo-cinematic recreations of Iraq and Afghanistan in the California desert18 do 
evince some similarities with the parallels drawn in Good Kill and Five Thousand Feet 
is the Best between the desert landscapes of war zones and those of the Las Vegas area. 
The drone films used this geographic mirroring to reinforce the sense that remote 
warfare enacts a collapse in distinctions between military and civilian space. The same 
effect might in theory be ascribed to Full Battle Rattle and Three Dead, with their 
cinematic staging serving to obscure the fact that they are US-based simulations rather 
than representations of actual conflict (which is especially notable in the opening 
sequence of Full Battle Rattle) and thus creating a comparable sense of geographic 
indistinction. However, where drone mediation serves to splice two distinct but real 
spaces through prosthetically-enhanced action at a distance, any effects that these 
simulations have on actual combat space is much more indirect and can only be posited 
in terms of their somewhat more dilute influence on wider military policy and 
subjectivity. Rather than connecting disparate spaces, then, these simulations instead 
function to ‘cinematically’ replicate combat space, detaching it from its context and 
rendering it as a kind of weightless self-contained fantasy space. Recalling the previous 
chapter’s discussion of this theme, one might say that these simulations similarly 
connote virtual transport to a space that demarcates itself as separate from the world (as 
per Griffiths’ definition of immersion), rather than evoking Hansen’s mixed reality 
paradigm which I used to characterise drone mediation’s ‘fluid interpenetration of […] 
virtual and physical realms’ (Bodies in Code 2).   
 These self-contained fantasy spaces are significantly delimited as such by the 
neutralisation of any substantial opposition or otherness. In Three Dead, Farocki 
                                                          
18 Specifically, the NTC’s recreation of Iraq in California’s Mojave desert (depicted in Full 
Battle Rattle); and the simulation of Afghanistan at a Marine base in Twentynine Palms, 
California (depicted in Three Dead).   
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explicitly aligns this with a mode of cultural imperialism through the rampant 
commercialisation of the simulated space, with Coca-Cola and Pepsi advertising boards 
appearing in the wake of the successful US military exercise. A comparable politics 
permeates the simulation in Full Battle Rattle, even if it is not foregrounded quite so 
overtly. As noted in my analysis, the NTC simulation attempts to model political 
interactions (as a test of cultural sensitivity training) as well as military engagement. 
Within this scenario, Medina Wasl ‘starts off neutral’, and the actions of the trainees 
determine the responses of both civilians and opposition fighters. Although this 
punishment/reward schema may have a certain functional efficacy, it does however 
serve to posit Iraq as little more than a blank slate prior to the arrival of the US troops. 
Despite the abject failure of the trainees in this regard, the simulation seems to assume 
that even the indiscriminate killing of civilians can be placated by bereavement pay and 
promises to develop the town’s infrastructure, thus universalising the distinctly 
capitalist assumptions which underpin the political modelling of this simulation. In 
place of any oppositional ideology, the simulation contains only ‘insurgents’ portrayed 
by US soldiers who ultimately conform to the Battalion Commander’s dismissal of 
them as disruptive ‘thugs’. They do not embody or attempt to disseminate any 
alternative political stance, but appear solely as a strategic form of opposition.   
 Although the simulations depicted in Full Battle Rattle and Three Dead thus 
appear as immersive, self-contained fantasy worlds, the films’ formal structures 
preclude any correlative spectatorial immersion. The bookending of Three Dead’s live-
action simulation with CG scenarios akin to video game cutscenes lends the film a 
degree of hypermediacy which, coupled with the static framing and off-screen 
positioning of violence, significantly distances the film from the experiential mode’s 
evocation of an immersively embodied presence. This near-Brechtian alienation effect 
would seem to render the viewer somewhat less complicit, relative to the experiential 
war film, in the diegetic military actions, with the emphasis placed upon a critical 
examination of the function of the simulation rather than the subjective experience of 
taking part in it. The form of Full Battle Rattle similarly inhibits spectatorial immersion. 
Although the opening sequence, with its iconographic evocation of Iraq, suggests a 
deeply subjective perspective on the NTC by blurring the boundaries of the real and 
simulated, the majority of the film comprises a more conservative documentary format 
which combines a few action set-pieces with a range of interviews taking place outside 
of the ‘diegesis’ of the simulation (i.e. with the subjects generally not in character). The 
film thus steers a rather unsatisfactory middle ground between an immersively 
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subjective portrait of the simulation – which, while open to charges of complicity, might 
have provided a more substantial insight into the simulation’s potential reconfiguration 
of subjectivity – and analysis of the inter-subjective network of the simulation as such. 
Arguably, Gerber and Moss do attempt to explore the latter through the multiplicity of 
interviewees, ranging from Iraqi refugees to the simulation ‘architects’, though I would 
contend that this structure is multi-subjective rather than truly inter-subjective, since the 
concluding emphasis is ultimately placed upon a series of individual narrative arcs 
rather than what Protevi might term the trans-subjective ‘new cognitive group subject’ 
(411).     
 A more substantial expression of simulations’ capacity to reconfigure subjective 
experience can be found in Watson is Down. Farocki’s depiction of a tank crew’s 
networked training within the CG environment of Virtual Battlespace 2 coincides 
strikingly with Protevi’s account of how the ‘extended/distributed cognition’ of such 
applications transform individual agency into a ‘cybernetic organism, the fighting 
group’ (411; 412). In formal terms, this is adroitly conveyed by the framing which 
conveys this turn away from individual experience through a refusal to isolate any one 
subject, instead maintaining a medium shot of the four Marines grouped together 
throughout, diverging from this only for a close-up of the instructor’s hand (rather than, 
as one might expect, of an individual facial expression). This evocation of the trans-
subjective unit evinces some similarities with the networked drone assemblage as 
outlined in the previous chapter. In particular, it distinctly recalls the opening sequence 
of Good Kill, in which Nichols similarly uses close-ups of an eye, a hand and a foot to 
suggest a fracturing of individual subjectivity and a turn toward the trans-subjective 
human-technological assemblage. The perpetual use of radio communications in 
Watson is Down, even when the Marines are physically close enough to converse 
without them, combined with their absolute fixation on the screens, simultaneously 
evokes the highly immersive effect of the simulation. This also parallels the shallow-
focus elision of the cabin space within the same sequence of Good Kill, and as such 
both can be read as rendering an experience of immersive immediacy via the subjective 
logic of hypermediacy.  
 These similarities between the cyborg group subject of simulation training and 
the networked drone kill-chain appear to be indicative of a wider trend in the military 
deployment of digital technologies, whereby individual agency is increasingly displaced 
in favour of a trans-subjective unit. Of course, this distribution of agency is not 
specifically inaugurated by digital technology, as Protevi also links it to ‘team-building 
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applications’ including ‘rhythmic chanting’ which pre-date these more technical 
instantiations of the military unit (412). Yet the causes cited for the creation of a 
digitised form of this network in the works of Protevi and Derek Gregory do suggest a 
certain continuity. Protevi fundamentally posits this activation of a ‘de-subjectified 
state’ as a means of overcoming a ‘deep-seated inhibition against one-on-one, face-to-
face, cold-blooded killing on the part of some 98% of soldiers’, while Gregory argues 
that, historically, the ‘production and articulation of what is now called the kill-chain 
typically works to render bombing an abstract, purely technical exercise for those who 
execute it’ (406; “Lines of Descent” 42). In the case of the drone kill-chain, this sense of 
abstraction is not to be read simply as a kind of technological virtualisation or 
distanciation, since Gregory also emphasises that the intimacy of drone optics 
simultaneously effects a ‘time-space compression […] [which] has brought all those in 
the network much closer to the killing space’ (“From a View to a Kill” 196). I would 
suggest that it does, however, connote an abstraction of individual responsibility which 
may well serve the same function of bypassing the inhibitions of individual agency. 
This would certainly coincide with the procedural context of administering drone 
strikes, as highlighted by Medea Benjamin’s Drone Warfare and by Good Kill’s 
depiction of CIA drone missions, particularly the shift from individual targeting to 
semi-automated ‘signature strikes’ based on increasingly algorithmically-determined 
patterns of behaviour.        
 Protevi contends that individual agency is also overcome by the conditioning of 
‘non-subjective reflex[es]’ which ‘operate at the very edge of the conscious awareness 
of the soldiers and involve complex subpersonal processes of threat perception’ (408; 
411). Farocki’s depiction of the instructor injecting IEDs and generic insurgent figures 
within the simulated tank-training landscape can certainly be read as an example of this, 
with the drop-down menu of objects constituting a predefined catalogue of ‘key traits in 
the gestalt of the situation’ which the Marines must immediately, and possibly 
subconsciously, recognise (411). Somewhat more contentiously, Protevi also claims that 
situating such training within a CG environment ‘increase[s] the desensitisation effect’ 
(411). While this does coincide with Der Derian’s argument that representing the enemy 
as an ‘iconic symbol, a “target-of-opportunity” on a computer screen’ rather than ‘flesh 
and blood’ marks an increasing virtualisation of conflict, I have some reservations about 
this hypothesis (9). It must necessarily remain somewhat speculative, at least within the 
bounds of this chapter’s reading of Watson is Down, since there is no explicit 
comparison made here between killing within a CG environment and killing a ‘flesh and 
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blood’ target. As noted above, the characterisation of this kind of CG environment as 
innately desensitising also seems to contradict the starkly reality-conferring effect that it 
may have in comparable scenarios, not least the treatment of PTSD via Virtual Iraq as 
depicted in Immersion.        
 Although the CG environment of Virtual Iraq is derived from the Full Spectrum 
Warrior training application and video game, and evinces a strong degree of aesthetic 
continuity with the realm of Virtual Battlespace 2, it is significantly differentiated in 
terms of the subjective mode of navigation. In place of the trans-subjectively networked 
mode of operation exemplified by the tank crew in Watson is Down, there is a clear shift 
to a much more individualised interface in Immersion. The first-person point-of-view 
offered by Virtual Iraq is distinctly grounded in an embodied perspective that adjusts 
itself in relation to the HMD mediated movements of the user/patient, and as such can 
be more accurately characterised as VR. While both Virtual Battlespace 2 and Virtual 
Iraq take place within similar CG environments then, this tweak in the interface does 
have significant repercussions for the specific type of subjective experience delimited 
by the simulation. 
 Farocki mediates this with a split-screen aesthetic which simultaneously depicts 
the user and his first-person perspective embedded within Virtual Iraq. This formal 
structure would initially suggest that what we see in Virtual Iraq precisely mirrors the 
HMD mediated image presented to the user. However, as the diegetic treatment (of 
Kevin, in the main section of the film) progresses, it becomes increasingly evident that 
this is not quite the case. The Virtual Iraq scenario does not represent the traumatic 
incident recounted with any conventional degree of verisimilitude so much as it appears 
to evoke the memory and corresponding affect along the lines of Väliaho’s theorisation 
of VR as ‘completely abolish[ing] distinctions between internal and external worlds 
[…] becom[ing] simulations of the brain’s internal activity’ (77). If this endogenous 
image is detectable at all within Immersion, it is not to be found in the Virtual Iraq 
screen in any traditionally representative sense of the image, but rather can be posited as 
produced or evoked in the interstices between the two juxtaposed screens. The 
‘affective and emotional charges’ of ‘bodily memory’ (which Virtual Iraq targets in 
Väliaho’s account) are visible in the shot of the patient, with his deeply affective and 
embodied re-experiencing of the death of his partner expressed by body language (most 
notably a defensive crouch and heavy breathing) and stuttering, and further intensified 
by the collapsed spatio-temporal co-ordinates of his monologue which ultimately lose 
their grounding in recollection to become wholly absorbed in the ‘presence’ of the scene 
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evoked (70). It is precisely through this depiction of embodied affect that the viewer 
realises that what the patient sees in the Virtual Iraq scenario differs from what we see 
in its remediation both qualitatively and perhaps, given that it ‘fold[s] perception back 
into the subject’s endogenous apparitions’, quantitatively (66). 
 The apparent reality-conferring effect of this endogenously produced image 
seems to necessitate some revision of the notion of virtuality in relation to CG 
environments. Contrary to Protevi and Der Derian’s views, which align the virtual with 
a presumed distancing or desensitising effect of digital technologies, Hansen’s 
enunciation of virtuality as a ‘quality of human […] life’ rather than a ‘synonym of the 
digital’ corresponds more closely to the particular form of virtuality produced by the 
coupling of the PTSD-afflicted soldier with the Virtual Iraq interface (New Philosophy 
for New Media 50). More specifically, Hansen characterises the virtual as a 
technologically-enhanced yet embodied ‘capacity […] to be in excess of one’s actual 
state’, which serves as an apt description of Immersion’s subject, with the endogenous 
re-experiencing of the traumatic memory transporting him to another time and space in 
a virtual and fundamentally embodied manner (51). Somewhat more speculatively, one 
might also note the correspondence between Väliaho’s account of the pre-subjective 
nature of these ‘bodily memories’, which he denotes as ‘“affect programs”, that is, 
preprogrammed and automatic behavioural modules’ rather than ‘biographical 
memoires’, and Hansen’s claim that this type of virtual experience opens onto the 
affective ‘domain of the preindividual’ (70; 73; 267). Although this postulation of the 
pre-subjective nature of the VR experience is grounded in a neuroscientific framework 
which it is somewhat beyond the scope of this thesis to empirically interrogate, it does 
intersect intriguingly with the emergent military tendency to use digital mediation as a 
means of bypassing (conscious) individual agency or responsibility.  
The notion of Virtual Iraq as producing an endogenous experience which differs 
radically from the paradigm of representational verisimilitude can also be further 
explored in relation to Hansen’s theorisation of the VR image. In New Philosophy for 
New Media, Hansen presents a critique of Lev Manovich’s dualistic conceptualisation 
of the image as either representational (as in cinematic indexicality) or simulated 
(ascribed to animation and CG). He argues that this overlooks a third and ‘entirely 
different regime of visual experience’ exemplified by Jonathan Crary’s account of pre-
cinematic devices in Techniques of the Observer, in which ‘putting the body to work 
(even in quite minimal ways) has the effect of conferring reality on an experience, of 
catalysing the creation of a singular affective experience, that is, one that is qualitatively 
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different from (but can be deployed to supplement) the “verisimilitude” or “illusion” of 
the cinematic image’ (39). This alternate regime harnesses some degree of manual 
action in order to generate an affective production of the image within the body itself, 
which he loosely equates with ‘hallucination’:  
 
As a kind of test case for Manovich’s concept of simulation, the example of 
telepresence underscores the limitation of his general distinction between 
representation and simulation and suggests the necessity of triangulating this 
binary with a third term, namely, hallucination (by which I mean, following 
recent research in perception, the fact that the embodied mind actually creates 
what it sees). For, in addition to the actual action facilitated through a 
telepresence interface (say, virtual surgery), there necessarily takes place, within 
the body of the participant, an embodied experience: a bodily processing of the 
action that has the effect of “making it real” for the participant. Indeed, it is 
precisely this “hallucinatory” dimension, applied to virtual reality more generally, 
that explains the capacity for the VR interface to couple our bodies with (almost) 
any arbitrary space [emphasis in original] (41) 
 
While Hansen’s work may therefore suggest fascinating new possibilities in the realm 
of VR imaging which diverge radically from cinema’s representational paradigm, the 
specific use of the VR interface in this instance does however have the rather more 
narrowly circumscribed function of modulating the pre-subjective affect located at the 
neurological root of such experiences in order to overcome the condition of PTSD.  
Väliaho’s reading of this VR mediated form of biopolitical regulation intersects 
significantly with critiques of the cinematic trope of PTSD encountered thus far in the 
thesis. Firstly, the depoliticising function of PTSD as articulated by Barker (among 
others) finds an echo here in Virtual Iraq’s modulation of ‘politically subversive 
“guilt”’ into ‘de-politicised “acceptance”’ (69). As in Westwell and Stahl’s critiques, 
this depoliticising effect is once again achieved by internalising the experience of 
warfare. Väliaho, however, extends the scope of this claim even further, such that it is 
not only media representations which serve to internalise conflict by containing it 
within a diegetic construct of individual conscience, but rather the actual military-
technological apparatus itself which resituates the ‘reality of the liberal war the soldiers 
wage’ from ‘the brain’s orientation toward and interpretation of the external world’ to 
‘the media technological regulation of basic affect programs and the endogenous 
imagery they produce’ (76).    
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The depiction of PTSD in Immersion can justly be considered, then, as the most 
extreme instantiation of these depoliticising and internalising tendencies. However, 
considering the form of the film itself, one should note that Farocki seems to present an 
implicit critique or undermining of the therapeutic value of Virtual Iraq. This may be 
partially ascribed to the hypermediated presentation, with the split-screen aesthetic and 
the viewer’s relative lack of immersive or endogenous investment (compared to the 
patient) in the VR realm establishing a sense of distance which to some degree 
precludes spectatorial co-option in this depoliticised and internalised vision of war. 
Primarily, though, it is the open-ended structure of the film which disrupts any sense of 
therapeutic closure and instead evokes the endlessness of this process. Immersion ends 
with Kevin reinitiating the traumatic narrative (perhaps suggesting that the process itself 
is recursive), despite protesting that the treatment may be aggravating rather than 
appeasing his condition. This creates a diegetic temporal circularity which is mirrored 
by the exhibition context, as (according to Farocki’s website19) gallery installations of 
Immersion were in fact also projected on a loop. Structurally, then, there is a distinct 
parallel between the recursive loop of PTSD as activated by the VR interface here and 
the circularity of the drone operator’s traumatically disturbed sense of presence/identity 
in Omer Fast’s Five Thousand Feet is the Best. Further comparisons with drone 
mediated PTSD are somewhat complicated, however, by the fact that 5,000ft (in accord 
with the studies of Gregory, Holmqvist and Williams) aligns PTSD with the hyper-
vision and fractured presence effected by drones, while the Virtual Iraq simulation 
attempts to treat the pre-existing condition. Nonetheless, Farocki’s formal evocation of 
a comparable circularity may suggest a certain scepticism regarding the therapeutic 
closure attained by this process, evoking an endless re-circulation of traumatic affect as 
the inescapable ‘reality’ of contemporary hypermediated warfare.  
Having addressed the mediating roles of the body, drones and simulations, the 
following chapter will turn to the broader role of digital media in the contemporary war 
film. Rather than specifically military technologies per se, I will examine the role of 
various digital formats such as video diaries in Redacted, Battle for Haditha, Stop-Loss 
and In the Valley of Elah. The chapter will also enact a slight shift in focus to more 
explicitly address the spectatorial modes of subjectivity delineated by these remediated 
digital elements, as a complement to and extension of the predominant emphasis placed 
upon diegetic military subjectivities thus far in the thesis.            
                                                          
19 See http://www.harunfarocki.de/installations/2000s/2009/serious-games-iii-immersion.html 
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5. Hypermediated Spectatorship 
 
In chapter two, I argued that the embodied aesthetic of The Hurt Locker 
represents the epitome of a particular trend in war cinema that privileges first-person 
‘experiential’ accounts of war. Drawing on Roger Stahl’s concept of the ‘virtual-citizen-
soldier’, which posits a direct link between medial constructions of distinctly embodied 
experience and an assumed injunction to virtually or imaginatively occupy the soldierly 
body, it was suggested that these films (also including Restrepo) tend to achieve a rather 
limited understanding of war by restricting the narrative perspective to that of an 
embodied military point-of-view and thus typically eliding any engagement with the 
wider political or technological context. Across the subsequent chapters, I have 
demonstrated how emergent digital military technologies have begun to transfigure 
notions of embodied subjectivity through, for instance, the virtual presence of the drone 
operator and the networked subjectivities conditioned by simulations. This final chapter, 
through close readings of Battle for Haditha, Redacted, Stop-Loss and In the Valley of 
Elah, will focus on films which deny the viewer the kind of embodied first-person 
perspective on war that is promulgated by The Hurt Locker and instead flood the 
diegesis with cinematic remediations of digital media, including, but not limited to, the 
interfaces of television news, video diaries and their concomitant online platforms, and 
surveillance footage. The chapter is broadly split into two sections, the first of which 
explores how the remediated digital elements of Battle for Haditha and Redacted are 
combined with experimental docu-fiction structures in an attempt to authenticise their 
representations and perhaps instigate a reconfigured, digitally ‘connected’ relationship 
to the reality of the Iraq War, while simultaneously dissecting this mediatisation of 
contemporary warfare and exploring its consequences throughout the new media 
ecology. The second section examines the use of military video diaries in Stop-Loss and 
Elah, focussing particularly on the ways in which they are used as synecdoche for the 
experience of war, and on their framing of spectatorship as it relates to both military and 
civilian perspectives on the diaries’ mediation.  
The heavily remediated aesthetics of these films would seem to challenge the 
post-Vietnam hegemony of the embodied/experiential mode, proposing an 
understanding of war that is rooted less in the cinematic emulation of first-person 
witnessing than it is in a hybridised sense of the diverse medial frames through which 
contemporary warfare is viewed. Clearly, this aesthetic shift represents an attempt to 
revise or update the conventions of the genre in line with contemporary media-
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technological developments, and thus falls very much under the purview of this thesis’ 
primary research questions. Broadly, then, this chapter aims to examine the ways in 
which the war film is altered by being brought so directly into contact with the 
competing frames of the wider new media ecology. The previous chapters’ thread of 
subjective experience will not, however, be neglected here since this study will largely 
be oriented around an analysis of the mode of spectatorship implied (or, to use Crary’s 
terminology, the ‘observer’ that is ‘constructed’) by the incorporation of digital media 
interfaces in these films.  
Whether directly citing from archives of television news footage or attempting 
to simulate a video diary, it has become a critical commonplace to designate such 
cinematic remediation as an authenticising tactic. Stacey Peebles’ essay for the recently 
published volume The Philosophy of War Films, for instance, explicitly aligns this 
propensity with the lineage of vérité, arguing that the use of a diverse range of ‘lenses’ 
or ‘digital vérité elements’ can lend some degree of ‘immediacy’ which makes ‘the 
experience […] more powerful for the audience’ (134-135). Such realist readings of 
remediation would imply, therefore, that the role of first-person embodied witnessing 
has ceded some degree of authenticising power to the sense of connectivity engendered 
by the digital media platforms that now permeate these films as well as media coverage 
of the war itself. This chapter will address the degree to which this supposition is 
manifested in the films under discussion, as well as pursuing further the links between 
this hypermediated mode of viewing and the emergent models of subjectivity already 
discussed in relation to drones and simulations. How, for instance, does the sense of 
connectivity targeted by this heavily remediated aesthetic compare to the ‘cybernetic’, 
networked and trans-subjective identity outlined (in the previous chapter) in relation to 
Farocki’s Serious Games and the work of John Protevi?  
To clarify, this is not an exercise in reception studies per se. The study does not 
make use of any empirical audience research; rather, the aim is to extrapolate from the 
hypermediacy of these films’ formal construction to assess the mode of audience 
reception implied thereby in a manner similar to that employed in Jonathan Crary’s 
Techniques of the Observer and Suspensions of Perception. Rather than borrowing 
Crary’s somewhat transcendent view of digital media as ‘relocating vision to a plane 
severed from a human observer’, however, I aim to study the complex and inseparably 
hybrid relationship between cinema and the digital as it is manifested in the films under 
discussion in a manner similar to Crary’s assessment of the differing modes of 
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perceptual experience and subjective attention conditioned by the possibilities of pre-
cinematic visual technologies (Techniques of the Observer 1). 
Navigating the relationship between diegetic constructs of subjectivity and that 
of audience reception is obviously a somewhat delicate procedure, and requires the use 
of a further theoretical model since Stahl’s ‘virtual-citizen-soldier’, while useful as a 
delineation of certain embodied/experiential genre tendencies, loses some degree of 
applicability with reference to this chapter’s cinematic corpus given their relatively 
greater emphasis on a dispersed ensemble of characters (and the various medial frames 
through which their experience is filtered) rather than the embodied point-of-view of 
any single protagonist. Given the apparent shift in these films from an individualistic 
mode of projecting oneself into the soldier’s embodied experience to a hypermediated 
depiction of warfare that may entail a more complex a form of spectatorial subjectivity 
than the kind of identification suggested by Stahl, this chapter’s analysis will draw 
extensively on Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin’s Remediation: Understanding 
New Media.  
As has been the case throughout the thesis, this chapter will be concerned with 
cinematic remediations of digital forms. Previously, however, the focus on digital 
technologies of a specifically military provenance (such as drones) enabled a sharper 
degree of differentiation between the remediated content and the remediating medium 
than may be the case with some of the digital forms discussed in this chapter. This is not 
to imply that drones, or even simulations, do not evince some degree of convergence 
with cinema (indeed, I have addressed precisely this theme elsewhere in the thesis20), 
simply that this medial distinction is perhaps less defined with military video diaries.    
Deborah Scranton’s The War Tapes, for instance, is composed entirely of video 
diaries shot by three National Guard soldiers during their deployment in Iraq, and thus 
may render the very notion of remediation somewhat debatable. Nonetheless, I will 
argue that distinctions can still be drawn primarily in terms of distribution and 
exhibition – with video diaries typically uploaded to and accessed via YouTube or other 
online platforms – and in terms of spectatorship, given that the diaries tend to address a 
diverse yet connected network of family, friends and fellow soldiers. This latter aspect 
will be key to the following discussions of how video diaries are remediated in Stop-
Loss and In the Valley of Elah, since the chapter’s overarching emphasis on digital 
                                                          
20 See, for instance, the discussion of Virilio’s War and Cinema and commercial/amateur uses 




modes of reorienting the subjective experience of spectatorship will in this instance 
focus on how these films’ remediations of the video diary navigate this sense of 
networked connectivity.  
Drawing on Bolter and Grusin’s definitions of immediacy and hypermediacy, I 
will explore the effects of the densely remediated aesthetics of the above mentioned 
films via the contrasting spatial dynamics of immediacy’s ‘unified visual space’ and the 
‘heterogeneous’ or ‘windowed’ space of hypermediacy (34). The latter is also implicitly 
linked to postmodern forms of reflexivity, which will be especially significant in 
relation to the critical framework for spectatorial ethics invoked later in the chapter. 
Bolter and Grusin’s account of immediacy and hypermediacy as ‘complementary rather 
than contradictory’, with hypermediacy manifesting an equivalent ‘desire’ for the ‘real’ 
experience that is provided by ‘transparent media’ in a more immersive fashion, also 
dovetails intriguingly with questions of the authenticising role of remediation in the war 
film (233; 53). As such, the following analyses will consider not only how the films 
construct a hypermediated aesthetic, but also the ways in which this is used to evoke in 
the spectator a sense of ‘immediacy’ or ‘authentic’ experience.  
Finally, the section of Remediation entitled “The Remediated Self” will be 
particularly useful in attempting to synthesise notions of remediation and hypermediacy 
with my emphasis on the subjective experience of the viewer. Bolter and Grusin’s 
outline of the viewer’s experience is encapsulated most concisely in the following 
citation:   
 
Accordingly, there are two versions of the contemporary mediated self that 
correspond to the two logics of remediation. When we are faced with media that 
operate primarily under the logic of transparent immediacy (virtual reality and 
three-dimensional computer graphics), we see ourselves as a point of view 
immersed in an apparently seamless visual environment. In a virtual environment, 
we have the freedom to alter our selves by altering our point of view and to 
empathise with others by occupying their point of view – techniques pioneered in 
film and now extended and intensified in digital media. At the same time, the 
logic of hypermediacy, expressed in digital multimedia and networked 
environments, suggests a definition of the self whose key quality is not so much 
“being immersed” as “being interrelated or connected” (232) 
 
The viewing experience under the ‘logic of transparent immediacy’ described here 
coincides to a significant degree with the mode of subjectivity ascribed to films such as 
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The Hurt Locker and Restrepo, via Stahl’s ‘virtual-citizen-soldier’, in chapter two. The 
restriction of narrative perspective to an embodied point-of-view in these experiential 
war films delimits the subjective experience of the audience to an immersive mode of 
empathetic identification by ‘occupying’ an embodied ‘point of view’ – or, to reiterate 
Stahl’s terms, ‘demotes the camera/eye from its objective status, implies a subjective 
body in its place, and invites the viewer into that body’ (43). This POV then serves a 
transparent function as a window onto ‘an apparently seamless visual environment’, as 
highlighted by earlier analyses of the rigorously three-dimensional constructions of 
space in The Hurt Locker. Bolter and Grusin further describe transparent immediacy as 
perpetuating a ‘visual construction of empathy’ which is typically ‘intimate, embodied, 
emotional’ and suggest that this constitutes ‘a common narrative strategy, almost the 
only strategy, in the “dramas” on American television and in whole genres of popular 
film’ (246). Though they do not specify which genres, I have suggested that the 
embodied/experiential tendency that I have identified as a dominant mode of the war 
genre fits quite neatly into this categorisation.  
 In contrast, hypermediacy is said to induce a viewing experience lacking in this 
sense of immersion, yet compensating with some sense of ‘being interrelated or 
connected’. Though Bolter and Grusin do not expound much upon this somewhat vague 
definition, it does nonetheless serve as an apt general description of the films under 
discussion in this chapter given the manner in which they tend to preclude any 
invitation toward identification with an embodied point-of-view, and instead juxtapose 
diverse medial frames which interrupt the continuity of any immersion. The notion of 
‘being connected’ is obviously integral to emergent forms of spectatorship engendered 
by digital media ranging from the ubiquity of mobile yet connected devices to the 
interactivity solicited by online video-sharing platforms. Yet, while cinema has a 
venerable legacy of remediation (particularly theatre, television, etc.), the issue of how 
the war film may represent or translate these digital aspects of connectivity and 
interactivity remains rather underexplored. As such, the following readings of Battle for 
Haditha, Redacted, Stop-Loss and In the Valley of Elah will closely examine how the 
spectatorship of video diaries – to give but one example – is reframed by being detached 
from the interactive online context in which one would usually encounter it and 
repositioned within the hybrid war film. This question seems especially pertinent for an 
era in which the war zone is no longer the enclave of only military personnel and 
intrepid reporters, but rather brought into a much more intimate relationship with the 
civilian realm due to the plethora of media content now available near-instantaneously. 
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It is precisely this sense of ‘being connected’ that may be manifested in the films under 
discussion as indicative of a shift in what constitutes authentic or realist experience 
from the first-person witnessing simulated by a transparent or embodied point-of-view 
towards a hypermediated aesthetic that achieves this instead through the invocation of 




The four films selected for analysis here can be broadly subdivided into two 
pairs. The second section of the chapter will focus on remediations of military video 
diaries in Stop-Loss and In the Valley of Elah, both of which are set largely in the US, 
use the diaries as synecdoche for the experience of combat, and thus interestingly 
reframe issues around their spectatorship in a civilian context. This first section groups 
Battle for Haditha (henceforth Haditha) with Redacted, which are notable first of all for 
the sheer density of digital elements remediated. Haditha incorporates various television 
news excerpts and military press releases as well as amateur digital video recordings, 
examining the complexity of propaganda and competing historical narratives among the 
new media ecology; while Redacted is composed entirely of remediated forms such as 
video diaries, CCTV, online video platforms, etc. Furthermore, Haditha and Redacted 
hew particularly closely to actual events of the Iraq War and employ innovative docu-
fiction structures to reinforce this claim to authenticity. This linking of remediated 
aesthetics and docu-fiction experimentation in the two films is in itself suggestive of 
Bolter and Grusin’s definition of hypermediated spectatorship, for if the claims to 
authenticity are explicitly bolstered by the incorporation of elements of digital media, 
this would imply that the ‘real’ is constructed here by digital connectivity rather than 
transparent immediacy.     
 Battle for Haditha is based on an incident which occurred in the eponymous city 
on 19th November 2005, in which US Marines killed 24 civilians, ostensibly in response 
to an IED attack on their convoy. It was initially reported (by the US military) that 15 
civilians were killed in the explosion, with a further eight ‘insurgents’ killed by the 
Marines’ retaliatory fire. This account was contradicted, however, by the evidence of 
Thaer Thabet al-Hadithi’s video of the aftermath of the incident, which depicted the 
victims as unarmed civilians, including women and children. This video was sent to a 
Time magazine reporter four months later and prompted further investigation. Given 
that the 2007 hearings (contiguous with the film’s production) saw several charges 
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against the perpetrators dropped, the film may well be considered a politically-charged 
attempt to redress this injustice and perhaps prompt further legal action. Ultimately 
though, out of the eight Marines charged over the incident, only one was convicted (in 
2012) for dereliction of duty and all escaped jail time. 
Broomfield’s recreation of this incident is pitched in the ambiguous margins 
between documentary and fiction. For instance, although the characters are all renamed 
and fictionalised to some degree, Michael Brooke’s Sight & Sound review of the film 
notes how Broomfield nonetheless employed non-professional actors with ‘near 
identical backgrounds to the real-life protagonists’ and allowed them to contribute to the 
partially improvised dialogue (56). This grounding of the film in real events, coupled 
with the apparently authenticising production methods, may appear to evince some 
overlap with the lineage of films based upon embedded reportage as detailed in chapter 
two. Manohla Dargis’ New York Times review seems to presume this connection in 
describing the film as ‘located at the familiar intersection of nonfiction and fiction, 
where raw documentary grit receives an imaginary glaze’ (“The Killing of Innocents”). 
Yet it is perhaps significant to emphasise here that Haditha (as well as Redacted) is not 
rooted in embedded journalism, a fact which may well contribute to its formal 
differences from the embed-based films, with the lack of an original first-person witness 
allowing for the development of a more hypermediated aesthetic.   
 Haditha opens with a series of four short interviews, all of which are with US 
military personnel discussing the reasons for their presence in Iraq. These monologues 
exhibit a sense of political alienation that is largely familiar from the ‘grunt docs’ 
discussed in chapter two; claiming, for instance, ‘I don’t know why we’re here’ and 
subsequently falling back on more individualistic motivations of survival and the 
deferred goal of returning home. Formally, this opening passage also serves to establish 
some sense of the film’s hybrid, remediated aesthetic, as the distinctly cinematic 2.35:1 
framing is combined with a somewhat grainy digital image that evokes the texture of 
amateur military video diaries. Dargis specifically cites this incorporation of ‘digital 
artifacts’ as contributing to the overall ‘documentary vibe’ (“The Killing of Innocents”). 
Although these video diary connotations fulfil the same kind of authenticising role as 
they do in, for example, Restrepo, they are nonetheless lacking the sense of ‘affective 
and traumatic intensities’ that I earlier identified, via Pisters, as operating in the latter 
film (242). In this instance, their over-familiar content and introductory brevity preclude 
any form of empathetic or identificatory viewer response. Furthermore, the dismissal of 
Iraq as the ‘butthole of the world’ and absence of political motivation throughout these 
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interviews does not really contextualise the conflict in any meaningfully specific 
manner. One might argue that the monologues unveil the dehumanising prejudices that 
enable US military personnel to kill without remorse (particularly the designation of 
war as ‘the ultimate style of hunting’), yet this section of the film ultimately seems to 
serve a role more akin to the cliché or archetype in evoking an overdetermined, but 
nonetheless authenticising, set of contemporary genre tropes. Furthermore, if this 
opening section evokes the decontextualisation inherent to such representations of war, 
the remainder of the film can be seen as counteracting this through an illustration of the 
diverse contexts in which the Haditha killings were understood and appropriated.    
 The ensuing narrative is composed around three broad yet distinct perspectives: 
a unit of US marines assigned to Haditha, two local men who plan and carry out an IED 
attack under the auspices of al-Qaeda operatives, and an extended family who, through 
the mere proximity of their home to the IED attack, become the inadvertent victims of 
the film’s conflict. The focus on Iraqi civilian life, with the inhabitants of Haditha 
inescapably pressured into complicity with both al-Qaeda and the US military, is one 
the most distinctive facets of Broomfield’s film and works rather effectively in 
redressing the elision of quotidian Iraqi life from so many contemporary US war films. 
However, my focus throughout the rest of the analysis here will primarily be on the 
other two narrative perspectives, since it is these sections of the film that engage most 
explicitly with the mediatisation of warfare and are represented via a more highly 
remediated aesthetic.        
 In the first strand of the film to diverge from the perspective of the US military, 
Broomfield’s camera closely tracks a middle-aged Iraqi man (Ahmad) as he returns 
home from the local market. Complaining to his wife about the killing of an English 
teacher by al-Qaeda (the aftermath of which he has just witnessed), he proceeds to 
switch the television from a children’s program to an Iraqi news channel. Broomfield 
immediately expands the diegetic news broadcast into a full-frame remediation, aligning 
the viewer’s perspective with that of Ahmad. Given that the broadcast remains 
unsubtitled throughout, this engagement of Ahmad’s point-of-view is not merely 
structural but also, to some extent, cultural. The broadcast, apparently a genuine 
archival excerpt rather than a simulation or reconstruction, segues from brief clips of 
burning cars and vehemently protesting Iraqis – seemingly in reaction to American 
killings of civilians – into a well-known clip of George W. Bush, dressed in a US Army 
uniform, proclaiming the support of ‘liberated’ Iraqis fighting ‘for their country’ against 
insurgent ‘thugs’. This speech is actually asynchronous with the film’s diegetic events, 
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drawn from an event at Fort Carson, Colorado on 24th November 2003, in a brief 
departure from strict historical verisimilitude in favour of thematic resonance. Finally, 
Broomfield recomposes the frame, incorporating a profile view of Ahmad shaking his 
head and making a dismissive hand gesture in reaction to the speech.  
 This instance of remediation serves a dual purpose. Firstly, Ahmad’s reaction to 
Bush – positioned as it is immediately prior to his planning of an IED attack with the 
support of local al-Qaeda operatives – seems to posit the news footage as a motivating 
factor for his actions against the US military occupation. It is clearly not the sole reason 
for the attack, as is revealed by a later discussion with co-conspirator Jafar in which 
Ahmad speaks bitterly of his enforced redundancy from the Iraqi army as a result of the 
US invasion. Nonetheless, the strategic placement of the Bush clip at this point in the 
film does invite a reading of it as leading quite directly to the IED attack, and frames the 
film’s subsequent events as (at least in part) a critique of the notion that the US military 
occupation was broadly supported by the Iraqi population. Secondly, the remediation 
serves to explicitly link the fictional, diegetic killing of the English teacher with 
concurrent events in the wider conflict in Iraq, thus further stitching together the film’s 
fictional and non-fictional elements.   
 The aftermath of Ahmad and Jafar’s IED attack on a US marine convoy 
provides the next key instance of remediation in Haditha, as Broomfield charts the 
production and dissemination of a propaganda video depicting the ensuing rampage. 
From their vantage point atop a deserted nearby building, Ahmad and Jafar film the 
explosion on a small handheld digital video camera. Retreating to a safer distance, they 
then meet up with the Sheik who instructs them to ‘film everything to show what the 
Americans are doing’. Though the film’s representation of the killings mostly diverges 
from this remediated point-of-view, Ahmad and Jafar return to the scene the following 
morning to film the mourning ceremonies and recriminations against the Marines. They 
also interview a twelve-year-old girl named Safa, the sole survivor of her family, with 
Ahmad interrupting the filming to coach her response, feeding her the statement that the 
‘Americans hit me over the head’. Broomfield cuts abruptly from this sequence to a 
screening of the completed video, orchestrated by the Sheik in order incite a wave of 
anti-American sentiment in his audience. The video is thus depicted as integral to this 
propaganda campaign, as the Sheik claims that ‘The Marines have lost the battle for 
Haditha; everyone has joined us’. The official response of the US military to this 
incident is briefly conveyed via the remediation of a typed press release (also read aloud 
in voiceover), with Broomfield exerting some degree of editorialising influence by 
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highlighting the phrase ‘killing eight insurgents’. Four months later, Ahmad and Jafar’s 
video appears on the fictional US television news channel ‘Newsline’ under the 
headline ‘Student footage reveals marine cover up’. Broomfield presents this as a full-
frame remediation, replete with the hypermediacy typical of such platforms, including a 
scrolling bar of headlines along the bottom of the frame and frequent crosscutting 
between the studio and evidential video footage. Also included is a brief clip of George 
W. Bush apparently responding to the diegetic events, noting his ‘troubled’ reaction and 
the initiation of an investigation into the Marines’ actions. The film then concludes with 
a military tribunal as murder charges against four of the Marines are outlined. 
 Clearly, the density of remediation in this final section of the film renders it 
particularly significant to Broomfield’s dissection of the relationship between war 
cinema and the wider new media ecology, and thus invites further close reading. In 
general terms, Broomfield appears to be suggesting that the mediatisation of warfare, 
via Ahmad and Jafar’s video and its subsequent global dissemination, is integral to 
understanding how the film’s events are framed, understood and harnessed for political 
action. In many ways, this diagnosis coincides with the account of ‘diffused war’ 
developed by Andrew Hoskins and Ben O’Laughlin in their 2010 work War and Media: 
The Emergence of Diffused War. The authors define ‘diffused war’ as a new paradigm 
(coinciding with the invasion of Iraq) in which the ‘mediatisation’ of war leads to ‘more 
diffuse causal relations between action and effect’ (3). Attributing this primarily to ‘the 
proliferation of remote and mobile audiovisual recording devices’ and the ‘more chaotic 
patterns of vectors and greater connectivity’ that are thereby instigated, Hoskins and 
O’Laughlin argue that there is therefore a ‘radical new potential for a mediatised record 
of events to emerge […] at unprescribed and unpredictable times’ with ‘phenomena’ no 
longer reducible solely to ‘the actions of major institutional actors’ (9; 121; 30).      
 This diminishing of centralised control is exemplified, in Diffused War, by the 
notion that anyone can potentially act in the name of al-Qaeda, and this is mirrored quite 
directly in Haditha by the difference in identity established between Ahmad and the 
wider organisation. During a meeting early in the film, their dialogue highlights the al-
Qaeda operatives’ awareness that Ahmad drinks alcohol and would thus be precluded 
from any formal membership or alliance. Furthermore, Ahmad expresses numerous 
ideological differences from al-Qaeda, most emphatically his scepticism regarding the 
martyrdom of the Iraqi civilians who, through mere proximity, are subjected to the 
vengeful actions of the US Marines. Likewise, the US military officers’ attempt to 
control the media narrative of Haditha (signified here by the above outlined press 
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release) is compromised by the unanticipated emergence of Ahmad and Jafar’s video on 
‘Newsline’. The reporter explicitly notes that ‘the case first came to light when a Time 
magazine reporter received video footage shot by a local Iraqi journalism student…if it 
had not been for the Time magazine report, this case would never have come to light’. 
This is clearly consistent with Hoskins and O’Laughlin’s account of the manner in 
which amateur video recordings can ‘shape news narratives in sometimes unpredictable 
and random ways’ (9). The hypermediacy of this final section of Haditha, then, is 
geared toward a kind of medial analysis, with Broomfield narrativising and 
contextualising the remediated elements to emphasise the propagandistic nature of these 
competing, mediatised fragments of war reporting.  
 The use of a second clip of George W. Bush – which, in this case, is drawn from 
the aftermath of the actual Haditha killings, and represents Bush’s first response to the 
event – also seems to reinforce the sense of authenticisation achieved via blurring the 
boundaries between fiction and non-fiction that was initially established during the 
film’s opening sequence. In this instance, Bush appears to be responding to the events 
of the film itself, reluctantly acknowledging the civilian deaths and setting an 
investigation in process. This constitutes a particularly distinctive attempt to suture the 
film’s diegesis into the historical narrative of the Iraq War. Indeed, the remediated 
elements highlighted above seem to consistently gesture outside of the (cinematic) text 
toward the real-life context, thus potentially inviting the viewer to, at the very least, 
acknowledge the connectedness of the film to the war itself, but perhaps also to instigate 
a more interactive response whereby the viewer is encouraged to engage with the 
ongoing (at the time of the film’s release) legal proceedings against the US Marines. As 
such, Broomfield’s film innovatively conjoins hypermediated spectatorship with 
documentary techniques in order to cinematically reconfigure connectivity and 
interactivity as integral to contemporary forms of reflexive and politically-engaged 
spectatorship for the era of mediatised warfare.      
 This turn to hypermediated spectatorship is, however, somewhat inconsistently 
evoked by Haditha, since the central section of the film (prior to this concluding wave 
of remediation) offers a rather more familiar viewing experience oriented around an 
empathetic response to the subjective experiences of its characters. Essentially, this can 
be characterised as a fundamentally humanist impulse to the film that invites empathy 
with the civilians caught between the US military occupation and insurgent violence, 
with Ahmad’s troubled conscience, and with the psychological disturbances of Corporal 
Ramirez, the prime instigator of the civilian killings. The latter, in particular, is afforded 
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a notable degree of psychological depth through scenes in which he is refused 
permission to see a doctor for symptoms of PTSD and, following the civilian killings, 
suffers a wholesale breakdown. To be clear, this does not seem to be a reductive 
apologia for the psychotic individual who is assigned sole, individual responsibility for 
the massacre. Broomfield places a greater than usual emphasis (relative to the genre as a 
whole) on institutional responsibility, observing, for instance, how the Marines’ training 
exercises clearly encourage a reckless targeting of ‘men, women and children’. 
Nonetheless, there remains a suggestion that the cinematic ‘truth’ underlying the 
ensuing media spectacle is grounded in the subjective experiences of the lead characters 
and an empathetic understanding of their actions under duress. This returns the film to 
the realm of the experiential, perpetuating the fallacy which is also present in Hoskins 
and O’Laughlin’s assumption that the ‘truth of an experience is the person’s subjectivity 
– their point of view, as the person they are’, without which one cannot ‘know what 
happened’ (66-67).  
Contemporary work on the ethics of cinematic spectatorship21 is frequently 
critical of such tendencies. Developing Lilie Chouliaraki’s critique of ‘regimes of pity’ 
and Susan Sontag’s assertion that ‘the manufacturing and experiencing of sympathy can 
thus be strategies of disavowal, ways of denying our agency and responsibility’, Libby 
Saxton argues in Film and Ethics: Foreclosed Encounters that representations of war 
which ‘foster a narcissistic pity which masquerades as altruism […] shirk the ethical 
work of investigating how the viewer’s privileges are connected to, or, in certain cases, 
predicated upon, the suffering of the person seen’ (67). These aspects of Haditha 
undermine the appeal to hypermediated spectatorship to some degree, substituting 
empathy and identification for the distinctive combination of connectivity and 
politically-charged interactivity that is elsewhere evoked. Arguably, then, Broomfield 
does not quite follow through on the radical implications of reorienting the viewing 
experience solely around hypermediated connectivity. The film certainly diverges 
substantially from the immersive viewing typical of the experiential mode, since one is 
not merely invited to identify with a singular, embodied point-of-view; yet its emphasis 
on hypermediated engagement with contemporary warfare is perhaps, ultimately, a little 
                                                          
21 The choice of ethical theorists here is determined largely by their focus on spectatorial subject 
positions relative to the mediation of violence/conflict. As discussed in the literature review, 
phenomenological approaches to the ethical value of cinema and digital media, such as Vivian 
Sobchack’s, have been disregarded due to the limited applicability of their reductive positions 
on the inherent ethical value of supposedly distinct media.    
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compromised by the ongoing reliance on internalised subjective experience as the 




 Brian de Palma’s Redacted is based upon the Mahmudiyah killings of 12th 
March 2006, in which five US soldiers raped and killed a fourteen-year-old Iraqi girl 
and murdered her family in the village of Yusufiyah, near Al-Mahmudiyah. In 
retaliation, the Mujahideen Shura Council (subsequently incorporated into the Islamic 
State of Iraq and the Levant), kidnapped and killed two soldiers from the unit, releasing 
a video of their bodies. The incident was briefly covered-up, with the soldiers involved 
blaming Sunni insurgents, yet it was revealed three months later following the 
testimony of another soldier from the unit. The trials of the soldiers involved were 
ongoing at the time of the film’s production, and in 2009 convictions and severe jail 
sentences were brought against them. This context immediately creates several parallels 
with Battle for Haditha, with both films clearly highlighting abuses by US soldiers and 
gesturing outside of the filmic text to real legal proceedings concurrent with the films’ 
releases.         
Similarly, the expository opening credits of Redacted establish a blurring of 
fiction and nonfiction that may initially recall the form of Haditha. Where the structure 
of Broomfield’s film, however, is not entirely without precedent and is ultimately 
legible as a mode of documentary re-enactment with some degree of fictionalised 
character development, Redacted positions itself as a somewhat more challenging, even 
paradoxical, construction. It is, de Palma declares (in the opening titles), ‘entirely 
fiction’ while ‘inspired by an incident widely reported to have occurred in Iraq’, yet 
simultaneously an attempt to ‘visually document imagined events’. The evidentiary 
status of the original events is thus immediately placed in contention, as signified by the 
legal hedging of ‘widely reported’ followed by the further slip into the realm of the 
‘imagined’, while the form of the film itself is expressed as both ‘fiction’ and, with 
more evidentiary connotations, a ‘document’. 
In broad terms, Haditha and Redacted also share a proclivity for remediation 
that positions their aesthetic closer to hypermediacy than immersive immediacy. 
Haditha engages these remediated points-of-view sporadically, with the greatest 
concentration to be found in the authenticising evocation of video diaries and 
documentary techniques during the opening sequence, and the final section with its 
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hypermediated portrayal of the political and legal repercussions of Ahmad and Jafar’s 
video circulating through various media platforms. Yet Redacted pushes this 
hypermediacy to such an extreme that there is no scene, no point-of-view within the 
film that is not already mediated in one way or another, thereby literalising Bolter and 
Grusin’s claim that ‘all mediation is remediation’ (55). The two principal remediated 
forms are the video diary of US Army Private Angel Salazar, entitled ‘Tell Me No 
Lies’, and ‘Barrage’, a French documentary focussing on US-Iraqi interactions at the 
army checkpoint. Also included, albeit more briefly, are CCTV footage from the Army 
base, a Skype-like interface for video calls, an epistolary video diary blog (‘Just a 
soldier’s wife’), online platforms hosting jihadist recordings and the more US-centric 
‘Get Out Of Iraq Campaign’, as well as two news channels named CEN (‘Central Euro 
News’) and ATV (seemingly a pastiche of Al-Jazeera).   
The prevalence of social media among Redacted’s remediations highlights the 
general mediatisation of war in a fairly similar manner to Haditha, countering any sense 
of localisation in favour of an instantaneous networked connectivity such that, for 
example, the characters communicate with family members in the US more than they do 
with the inhabitants of Samarra. De Palma thereby collapses the distance between ‘over 
here’ and ‘over there’, bringing the space of the war zone into a more intimate 
relationship with the civilian realm. The diegetic space in which Redacted plays out is 
also extremely limited, being confined primarily to the barracks, checkpoint, and single 
civilian residence. Rather than a unified sense of geographic space then, de Palma 
employs what Bolter and Grusin would undoubtedly denote as a hypermediated 
‘windowed’ space, with increasingly virtual transitions from one remediated form to 
another.  
These remediations, however, differ from Haditha in the crucial sense that they 
are all (with the exception of the closing montage sequence, which I will return to in the 
discussion below) simulated. In contrast to Haditha’s use of actual televisual archival 
excerpts in order to suture the film’s diegesis into the wider historical narrative of the 
Iraq War, the consistent and at times heightened artificiality of the medial frames cited 
in Redacted seems to point in another direction, one that is less concerned with 
authenticisation per se. Certainly, these remediations do not work, in Bolter and 
Grusin’s terms, to preserve the ‘illusion of immediacy’ or erase the visibility of the 
process of remediation itself (44-45). As such, they raise the question of whether, by 
making the viewer particularly aware of the fact of remediation, de Palma is attempting 
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to establish some degree of distanciation which may open up space for a potential 
critique of the partiality inherent to the medial frames contained within the film.  
As I have demonstrated in relation to Restrepo and Battle for Haditha, the video 
diary is not typically used in such a reflexive manner, but is more commonly evoked as 
a means of authenticising the film’s aesthetic and establishing claims to realism. This 
claim to authenticity is certainly espoused by Redacted’s diegetic diarist (Salazar), and 
expressed most explicitly in the title ‘Tell Me No Lies’. It is also integral to Patricia 
Pisters’ account of the video diary – predominantly constructed around a reading of 
Redacted – as inaugurating a ‘new logistics of perception’ which ‘bring[s] back reality 
to the heart of the vortex of our multiple screens’ (250). Yet de Palma provides a couple 
of early hints as to the performativity of this truth-seeking diarist construct, through the 
information that Salazar intends to use the finished film as a component of his 
application for film school and through the reflexivity of encountering fellow soldier 
McCoy ‘making a video of you making a video of me’. Pisters attempts to reclaim this 
latter sequence as part of a fundamentally realist paradigm, arguing that the mutual 
filming and ‘promises to take care of each others’ videos should they die in combat’ 
work to ‘confirm the soldiers’ existence’ (239). Certainly, there is some sense of an 
emergent inter-subjective network at play here which may connote the realising force of 
connectivity, albeit within a specifically militarised perspective. However, while this 
may be an apt description of the role of the video diary’s more general function within 
the genre, I would suggest that Pisters’ argument is constrained by focussing only on 
this opening sequence and thus neglecting to discuss the diary’s mediating role with 
reference to later events in the film – particularly the reflexive debate over the 
complicity of filming the rape of an Iraqi teenage girl and the murder of her family.  
This incident is actively perpetrated by two soldiers, Rush and Flake, who are 
perhaps too easily dismissible as stereotypical ‘bad apples’. Their characterisation and 
clear individual culpability appear somewhat reductive in comparison to Battle for 
Haditha’s more nuanced depiction of institutional responsibility and the abuses that 
may be engendered by standard operating procedure. Nonetheless, the issues of 
Salazar’s complicity in filming the incident and the viewer’s complicity in watching it 
are dramatised rather more effectively. Salazar justifies his presence at the scene, in an 
argument with McCoy, by attempting to stake out a position of impassive objectivity, 
claiming ‘I’m the fly on the wall, I’ve got to get a record of what’s happening’. 
Following McCoy’s savage rejoinder, labelling him a ‘jackal’ akin to ‘all your greedy 
media buddies who sold their soul for a talk-show and a book deal’, Salazar lets slip a 
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more self-interested motive, realising that the extremity of the potential content could be 
his ‘free pass into film school’. The manner in which the ensuing rape and murder is 
shot serves to emphasise the viewer’s position of guilty, passive complicity through the 
explicit alignment of perspective with Salazar. His camera is helmet-mounted, lending a 
distinctly embodied quality to the first-person point-of-view, and the sequence plays out 
as an unbroken five minute take, with Rush and Flake soliciting the gaze of the camera 
throughout. This real-time temporality particularly heightens the sense of presence 
established by the first-person POV, as well as the corollary of the viewer’s inability to 
intervene, while Rush and Flake’s performative awareness of the camera’s collusion in 
their action creates a further sense of unease since the viewer’s suturing into the scene 
becomes a key determinant in the unfolding of the violence. During the fallout from this 
incident, de Palma explicitly reiterates this point regarding the viewer’s complicity as 
McCoy – who at this point has become something of viewer-surrogate figure, 
empathetic to the extent that his passive witnessing and guilty conscience seemingly 
mirror the viewer’s position – notes that ‘there are things you shouldn’t see… just 
because you’re watching it doesn’t mean you’re not a part of it’.  
This suggests that the reflexivity of de Palma’s remediation of the video diary 
points beyond the discursive framework of authenticity and realism around which 
Pisters’ understanding of it is constructed. The sense of connectivity evoked here is not 
entirely commensurate with a networked confirmation of existence, but is more 
specifically figured as an ethical connection between the viewer, the diarist and the 
perpetrators of a violent spectacle which solicits the gaze of the former. It is also 
important to emphasise that this relationship is dependent upon the militarisation of 
perspective enforced by the alignment of the spectator’s point-of-view with that of the 
diarist. As such, the video diary in Redacted is not merely exploited for its 
authenticising connotations but reflexively questioned in terms of the partial perspective 
and ethically compromised vision of war that it may offer the viewer. Martin Barker’s 
reading of the film as ‘tak[ing] most seriously not just the look of soldiers’ videos, but 
also their implications for who is telling the stories, and what their accounts of war may 
reveal or hide’, thus seems to achieve a more pertinent level of insight than Pisters’ 
broader account of the video diary’s function (36).  
The ethical framework evoked here contrasts markedly with Battle for Haditha, 
as de Palma largely dispenses with empathy and individual psychology in favour of a 
clinical depiction of the connection and power imbalance between the complicit 
Western viewer and suffering of the Other. Indeed, the reflexivity that characterises 
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Redacted’s hypermediated aesthetic seems to position the film within a lineage 
identified by Michele Aaron in Spectatorship: The Power of Looking On. Aaron argues 
that the reflexivity of films such as Peeping Tom (1960) and Strange Days threatens the 
fundamental disavowal of the cinematic spectacle by aligning the viewer’s perspective 
with that of the murderer and thus burdening the spectatorial position with 
‘sadomasochistic intent’ (93): 
 
Primarily, these highly self-reflexive films inhibit the spectators’ ability to do that 
“artful forgetting” by constantly reminding us that we are watching a film. We 
cannot suppress our status as spectators for the films are all about spectatorship. 
The radical charge of this spotlighting of the spectators’ experience (as the films’ 
self-consciously merged-perspectives make evident) is a fundamental avowal of 
the real. (94)  
 
The remediation of the video diary in Redacted thus establishes a form of 
hypermediated spectatorship that targets this ‘fundamental avowal of the real’ not 
merely in a formally authenticising sense, but via a reconfiguration of digital 
connectivity as ethical complicity which overtly works to undermine what Aaron terms 
the ‘irresponsibility or neutrality of looking on’ (97). This sense of complicity is 
substantially distinct from that of the experiential mode, however, given the central role 
afforded here to hypermediated reflexivity. In contrast to the immersive immediacy 
through which the viewer was invited to experientially partake in a militarised 
subjectivity in films such as Restrepo or The Hurt Locker, the reflexive nature of this 
remediation may instead serve to highlight this complicity as such and thereby delineate 
‘how the viewer’s privileges are connected to, or, in certain cases, predicated upon the 
suffering of the person seen’ rather than merely reproduce this structure (Saxton 66-67). 
Furthermore, Pisters’ argument that the ‘dynamic multiplicity’ of remediated 
perspectives employed in the contemporary hypermediated war film will ensure a 
balanced, representative ‘ethics of power’ seems to be refuted by Redacted (241). The 
sense of connectivity as complicity is not merely confined to Salazar’s video diary, but 
shown as comprehensively permeating the new media ecology. For instance, the 
checkpoint shooting of a pregnant woman is initially remediated through the French 
documentary ‘Barrage’, with its languorous pace and procedural analysis of checkpoint 
activity suggesting a degree of critical detachment that is lacking elsewhere. Yet for this 
incident, the gentle pans and slow tracking shots are instantly supplanted by the 
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immediacy of a handheld, first-person point-of-view tracking the woman as she is 
dragged from the car and taken to hospital. This segues into an ‘ATV breaking news’ 
report, in which the reporter invasively and voyeuristically follows the woman’s 
stretcher as it transported through the hospital corridors, and attempts to carry out an 
impromptu interview with the brother at her bedside as she dies. Similarly, the death of 
the army unit’s sergeant in an IED explosion is represented initially via the video diary 
and subsequently replayed (with only the slightest of differences in the camera angle) 
on a jihadist website, while the military retaliation to this incident is conveyed via an 
‘Embedded Journalist Exclusive Report’, with flak-jacketed press storming a civilian 
residence alongside the army.  
This juxtaposition of remediated frameworks thus seems to suggest continuity – 
in terms of a militarisation of perspective – across the medial frames, rather than 
diversity and balance. Indeed, this becomes a quite literal weaponisation of media with 
the later emergence of a hostage video depicting the beheading of Salazar. The phrasing 
of the ‘ATV’ news reports seems particularly pertinent here, as the anchor declares: 
‘The Mujahideen Shura Council said it issued the video as revenge for the rape and 
killing of a fifteen-year-old Iraqi girl by US troops [emphasis added]’. In contrast to 
Battle for Haditha, which portrays insurgent use of new media as disruptive of the 
centralisation of power and is thus consistent with the thesis of Diffused War, Redacted 
seems to anticipate what Hoskins and O’Laughlin later devised under the rubric 
“Arrested War”, whereby such emergent disruptions have been subsumed by 
mainstream media. In a short article posited as a kind of post-script to Diffused War, 
they argue that: 
 
There is nothing that can escape mainstream media now, nothing that mainstream 
media has not already foreseen escaping and that it has devised strategies to 
accommodate (the media ecology premediates itself, in Grusin’s terms). This 
means that there are no aspects of war and conflict that can escape the framing 
and analysis of mainstream media. This seems to make war more controllable by 
those fighting it, although not necessarily more intelligible and accessible to 
audiences seeking to be informed about it. But what is certain is that the 
mainstream has re-asserted its role and function within the latest turn of the media 
ecology.     
 
This account, though somewhat abstract, appears to be consistent with de Palma’s 
figuration of his remediated frames as subsumed under a singular rubric that precludes 
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the diverse ‘ethics of power’ postulated by Pisters (241). The exhaustively 
hypermediated aesthetic of Redacted thus seems fundamentally geared toward a 
condemnation of these medial frames for perpetually soliciting the kind of complicit, 
sadistic gaze that emerges from the above analyses, rather than enabling any 
oppositional or critical perspective. This strategy also coincides interestingly with 
Garrett Stewart’s account of the genre in his recent work Closed Circuits: Screening 
Narrative Surveillance, in which he argues that: 
 
Such a high proportion of the action in these recent screen treatments seems tied 
to the neo-Deleuzian agent as spectator – that is, to the soldier as himself an 
embedded videographer of his own tedium and ordeal, hooked on (as well as up 
to) the laptop relays (and morbid replays) of his digital record. Such war films are 
hampered by the very ethos of optical recording by which the narrated events are 
themselves navigated. As a result, these film narratives can make little sense of 
the remediated senses themselves under siege by the war machine, a machine that 
is thoroughly computerised and, indeed, increasingly remote […] In this 
cinematographic syndrome, there is little distance, little chance of a measured and 
critical narrative detachment, little vision apart from an immersive wired sighting. 
(188) 
 
The sole portion of Redacted that seems to escape this diagnosis is the closing 
montage, labelled ‘Collateral Damage’, in which de Palma remediates photographs of 
Iraqi civilian casualties. Following the release of the film, there has been some debate 
over the censorship of these photographs, with de Palma apparently angered by the 
decision of the distributor to blur the faces (Provencher 38). However ironically, this 
redaction actually serves to strengthen the film’s claim that any critical or oppositional 
point-of-view has been systematically elided from media representations of the war. 
Into this collage, de Palma inserts a single uncensored photograph of the teenage girl 
subjected to rape and murder by the US army – or, more specifically, of the actress in 
character. This suggests a similar kind of suturing of the film’s diegesis into the 
historical record as is effected in Battle for Haditha through the intertextual use of 
George W. Bush interview clips. Certainly, it is possible to read this final sequence as 
such; yet I think it is important to also acknowledge that, in the context of Redacted’s 
wider indictment of media complicity in the war, this image is intended to symbolise the 
emergence of a singular, oppositional perspective which is posited as distinct from the 
film’s other remediations. As the sole non-redacted photograph, it suggests the 
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emergence, from amidst the film’s partial and complicit remediated framework, of an 
uncensored and critical point-of-view. 
  
* 
      
 In generic terms and aesthetic terms, Stop-Loss and In the Valley of Elah 
(henceforth Elah) may appear quite distinct from Haditha and Redacted. Neither film 
contains quite the density of remediation evident in Redacted, with borrowings from 
other media limited to military video diaries and, in Elah, the occasional background 
noise of television news reports on the Iraq War. Both are set predominantly in the 
United States rather than Iraq, and deploy more conventionally fictional narrative 
structures than the docu-fiction experimentation of Broomfield and de Palma’s films. 
Yet it is precisely this juxtaposition of video diaries with US-set narratives that provides 
an interesting case study of the tendency toward an emergent hypermediated viewing 
experience in the contemporary war film.  
 As I suggested in the earlier discussion of digital convergence in relation to 
Bolter and Grusin’s account of the ‘logic of hypermediacy’, the use of military video 
diaries in documentaries such as The War Tapes highlights how malleable the notion of 
cinema as a distinct medium has become, with the very concept of remediation stretched 
to its limits in this convergence of the video diary with the documentary war film. A 
similar argument can, of course, be made in relation to the hypermediacy of Redacted, 
whereby all mediation becomes remediation. In Stop-Loss and Elah, however, the 
distinctions between domestic and military space are significantly demarcated by the 
formal differences between a traditionally ‘cinematic’ aesthetic and the remediation of 
military video diaries. Given that both films are set in the US and thus at a distance 
from the locus of actual combat experience, the war itself comes to be almost 
exclusively mediated by digital video diaries. This simultaneously elevates the diary to 
the status of a privileged and singularly authentic signifier for the war itself, and 
establishes a diegetic replication of the process at issue here – in other words, a situation 
in which the characters are rendered spectators of a war that is accessed only via its 
digital mediation. The precise forms that this spectatorship takes – particularly in terms 
of networked connectivity, interactivity and their relationship to memory – will be a key 
concern in the analysis which follows.     
 It also worth briefly noting, before getting into closer readings of these two 
films, that the context in which they frame the video diaries evinces a distinct concern 
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with authenticity. Though they do not attempt the kind of painstaking recreation of 
specifically identifiable events familiar from Haditha (and, to a slightly lesser extent, 
Redacted), both Stop-Loss and Elah do nonetheless claim a similar grounding in the 
reality of the Iraq War. In Elah, this is established most explicitly, if somewhat loosely, 
via the opening title’s declaration that the film is ‘inspired by real events’. Stop-Loss, 
which is transparently constructed around the issue from which the film derives its title, 
further reinforces the relationship between its protagonist’s dilemma over his forced re-
enlistment and the reality of this situation by concluding with a series of statistics on the 
US military’s stop-loss policy. In doing so, both Peirce and Haggis seem to be working 
to establish a sense that their films reflect something of the reality of the Iraq War, and 
this striving for authenticity certainly suggests at least one function of the aesthetic 
choice to mediate the war through video diaries.  
  So, as I have briefly noted, Stop-Loss is largely set in the US, and charts the 
attempts of three friends from the same army unit to re-adjust to civilian life following 
their deployment in Iraq. Prior to this, however, is a short preface (of around ten 
minutes) that is set in Iraq. This segment of the film is introduced by the remediation of 
a video diary, explicitly marked as such by the scrolling titles ‘Episode 312… The Men 
of Shadow 3 Going the Fuck Home’. The choice of font here, which simulates a 
handwritten scrawl, is immediately evocative of a sense of amateur authenticity. 
Furthermore, the serial numbering (‘312’) of the diary entry, as well as the explicit 
specification of the unit depicted (‘Shadow 3’), suggest that the implied series of videos 
is not confined to any one individual’s production, but rather evokes a unit-wide 
continuity. This latter connotation is particularly significant in quelling the individualist 
connotations of the diary (particularly as drawn from its literary precursor) and instead 
associating the mediatisation of military experience with a collective, trans-subjective 
identity. Indeed, the film refuses to ascribe any individual authorship for these diaries 
throughout, and even suggests that the camera is typically passed around, resulting in a 
collective and collaborative mode of expression. 
Content-wise, the video begins amidst a quiet interlude at the base camp, in 
which Tommy (one of three principal characters, all soldiers from the same unit) picks 
up his guitar and initiates a collective rendition of the song “Courtesy of the Red, White 
and Blue”. The video then segues into a series of loosely connected, rather mundane 
fragments of quotidian military life, ranging from short clips depicting soldiers cleaning 
their weapons to still photographs of grouped soldiers posing for the camera, which are 
cut to the diegetic performance of the song. This rapid montage ultimately creates a 
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kind of crossover form which merges the military video diary with the conventions of 
the music video, evoking what is often termed an ‘MTV aesthetic’ (it is perhaps also 
worth noting that the film is actually produced by MTV). Among other effects, this 
serves to highlight the significance of the specific choice of music as a central aesthetic 
factor in engendering the sense of group identity depicted. Indeed, the single “Courtesy 
of the Red, White and Blue (The Angry American)”, by the country singer Toby Keith, 
does come freighted with a significant degree of political baggage, having been the 
centre of a public feud with the Dixie Chicks, who dismissed it as ‘ignorant’, and also 
censored by the network ABC. The lyrics explicitly posit the Iraq War as a righteous 
response to 9/11, and venerate military revenge through such lines as ‘we lit up your 
world / like the fourth of July’, or ‘we’ll put a boot in your ass / it’s the American way’. 
This sense of vengeful patriotism is inextricably bound up with the collective identity 
established via this initial remediation of the video diary.  
This opening diary segment is followed by the film’s sole combat sequence in 
which the unit track and kill a group of insurgents who have launched an attack on their 
roadside checkpoint. The firefight results in the death and serious wounding of several 
US soldiers, which sets up the context for the film’s primary subsequent use of the 
video diary as a form of memorialisation. The next remediation of the video diary 
occurs immediately after this combat scene, and begins with the scrolling title ‘In 
Memory of our Fallen Brothers’. It depicts the group huddled together in a circle, hands 
outstretched and piled in the centre, their movements lent an ethereal quality by the low-
frame rate employed. Music – in this instance, non-diegetic – is again used to bridge the 
film’s short fragments, and the track is of a similarly militaristic provenance (“Matter of 
Time” by 4th25, a group of soldiers who recorded the album while serving in Iraq). The 
clips in this instalment are notably more graphic than in the first video, interweaving 
images of the dead and wounded soldiers with decontextualised combat scenarios and 
even glimpses of body bags being lined up. As such, this example clearly echoes 
Pisters’ account of the video diary as both highlighting and compensating for (by 
‘confirm[ing] the soldiers’ existence’) the enhanced sense of mortality inherent to the 
soldiers’ situation (239). This is further reinforced by the film’s subsequent 
remediations of the video diary during a visit to the family of one the deceased soldiers 
(‘Preacher’), and during Tommy’s funeral.  
Alongside this elegiac function, the video diary is also depicted as intimately 
bound up with the living soldiers’ memories in a rather more traumatic fashion. Pisters’ 
article makes note of this during her brief reading of Stop-Loss, arguing that ‘war diaries 
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become recurring flashbacks, undeletable memories’ (245). This is most clearly 
expressed in Brandon’s extended flashback to the opening combat sequence, in which 
the civilian casualties of that battle are revealed. The sequence employs the same 
slowed frame-rate as the opening of the ‘Fallen Brothers’ diary segment, as if to 
emphasise how the video diaries come to stand in for combat experience not only for 
the audience, but also for the soldiers’ themselves in a remarkable expression of the 
mediatisation of memory, or what Garrett Stewart terms ‘flashback as digital playback’ 
(Closed Circuits 179). Through the familiar framework of PTSD, the diaries become a 
traumatic bridge between past and present, disrupting the soldiers’ attempts to readjust 
to civilian life. This association between digital screens and traumatic memory is further 
reinforced by a later sequence in which Brandon, having seemingly escaped to New 
York, encounters a screen in Times Square showing combat footage as part of a 
recruitment advert for the army. Peirce demonstrates an ironic subversion of the utopian 
promise of digital connectivity, reconfiguring the mobile spectator as one who is 
haunted by the omnipresence of screens, which here seem to return or invert the gaze 
and serve only as an unwelcome recollection of traumatic combat experience.    
Ultimately, this externalisation and materialisation of collective memory is what 
binds the film’s group of soldiers together in this post-combat context, despite the 
gradual evolution in the form of this trans-subjectivity from the camaraderie and 
ideological unity conveyed by the videos’ content to a more conflicted form of 
embodied recurrence associated with PTSD. This shift is evident in the first screening 
of a video diary excerpt following their return from Iraq, in which the content – a 
glorification of macho energy – contrasts unambiguously with the creeping sense of 
disillusion conveyed by the actors’ expressions as they gather around the laptop screen. 
It is also heightened by the immediately preceding scenes depicting violent incidents 
leading to Steve and Tommy’s separation from their fiancées, which link their shared 
propensity for intense and embodied recurrences of their experiences during the war to 
an estrangement from civilian life.  
Pisters’ reading of Stop-Loss and Elah further links these ‘recurring flashbacks, 
undeletable memories’ to what she describes as a ‘state of desubjectification necessary 
in combat’, which manifests as symptoms of PTSD since it is ‘not a simple on/off 
switch but has lasting, de-realising consequences on the mind’ (245-246). This notion is 
rather inconsistently expressed in Stop-Loss, since the combat sequences are clearly 
overwritten with distinctly personalised sentiments, such as the heroic attempts to 
protect close friends and individually inscribed acts of mourning or elegy, such that the 
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collective identity portrayed feels closer to a conventional camaraderie rather than the 
kind of networked, pre-conscious trans-subjectivity outlined via Protevi and Väliaho’s 
work in the previous chapter. Some sense of this ‘desubjectification’ is, however, 
conveyed by Brandon’s urban skirmishes while on the run, particularly a sequence 
depicting his retribution on a group of car thieves. During the fight, Brandon 
experiences what may be described as a merging of the present scenario with an 
invocation of militarily-instilled combat reflexes. Having disarmed his assailants, the 
camera tightens its focus on Brandon as the diegetic sound is gradually supplanted by a 
stereotypically ‘Iraqi’ soundscape composed of indistinct voices, an escalation of traffic 
noise and eventually the eruption of gunfire. Brandon’s cold-blooded stare intensifies as 
he barks his orders, ‘Okay hajjis, on your knees’. Peirce’s rendition of PTSD here 
clearly evokes a collapsed distance between past and present, and between military and 
civilian realms, through Brandon’s apparently pre-conscious activation of a militarised 
state of mind that may aptly, in this instance, be termed ‘desubjectification’.   
The video diaries in Stop-Loss, however, are only tangentially connected to this 
pre-subjective state via the militarily-conditioned impulses of the soldiers. This 
exceptionalist approach, whereby the soldiers’ experiences in Iraq seem to predetermine 
their response to the video diaries in a manner that specifically precludes their re-entry 
into civilian life, serves to maintain quite a sharp distinction between the effects of the 
medium for those within the military network and for its broader effects on (cinematic) 
spectatorship. As such, it would certainly be a stretch to claim that the diaries evoke any 
form of de-subjectified spectatorship, despite Peirce’s attempts to express how this 
functions for Brandon and invite the audience to subjectively partake in this 
hallucination to some degree. Nonetheless, the film does generally depict military video 
diaries as enacting several key changes in the way that war is mediated. Most notably, 
they are portrayed as enabling a collaborative, collective authoring of the experience of 
combat which aesthetically and thematically serves to both establish a sense of trans-
subjective identity and, subsequently, a haunting, inescapable form of mediatised 
memory. While these effects remain confined to the military network in Stop-Loss, Elah 
more rigorously explores how video diaries may transpose such military subjectivities 






Paul Haggis’ In the Valley of Elah similarly utilises the military video diary as a 
kind of synecdoche for soldiers’ experience of the war, though in this case it actually 
becomes the film’s exclusive mode of mediating combat. The complete absenting of 
any other mediating perspective on the war is immediately suggestive of the culturally-
determined value of authenticity ascribed to the medium, and in itself indicative of the 
(above outlined) trend in the contemporary war film toward emergent digital modes of 
rendering combat experience. In contrast to Stop-Loss, however, the soldier that shot 
this content (Mike Deerfield) is missing from the very start of the film – and soon to be 
found dead – such that the diegetic spectatorship of the diary takes place within more of 
a civilian context. Structurally, Haggis’ film is composed around two interlocking 
investigations: that of a local police officer (Emily Sanders) into Mike’s death; and 
Hank Deerfield’s parallel investigation of his son’s video diaries, which initially seem 
to proffer an explanation for his disappearance, and ultimately serve to reveal the 
behavioural transformation of Mike from a naïve and idealistic young recruit into the 
sadistic ‘Doc’, thus nicknamed for his propensity to torturously probe the wounds of 
Iraqi captives. 
Due to Mike’s phone being ‘seriously fried’ by the ‘intense heat’ of Iraq, the 
video diaries unfold serially throughout the film as a technician emails the unscrambled 
fragments to Hank. This aspect of the film is the focus of Nicholas Chare’s article 
“Warring Pixels: Cultural Memory, Digital Testimony, and the Conflict in Iraq”, which 
argues for ‘a greater recognition of the materiality of the digital and an 
acknowledgement of its indexical properties’, primarily by detailing the film’s emphasis 
on Mike’s phone as an essentially material and fragile container of the videos (334). 
Certainly, the film does place a greater than usual emphasis upon the evidential 
materiality of both the phone and its videos and photographs, with the latter particularly 
conveyed through a sequence in which Hank prints an enlarged still and runs his thumb 
over it, highlighting simultaneously the tangibility of the image and the significance of 
what is later revealed to be a child’s dead body in the street.  
Chare further proposes that the film’s ‘episodic’ remediations of the video diary 
form a valuable corrective to the unassimilable ‘glut of images […] [that] overwhelmed 
any capacity of spectators to filter them or to engage critically with specific 
representations’, which, in an echo of Hoskins and O’Laughlin’s ‘diffused war’, Chare 
defines as the characteristic feature of television news coverage of the Iraq War (335). 
Specifically, he locates this possibility of critical contextualisation in the remediated 
video diaries’ fragmentation, noting that instances in which the image freezes ‘open a 
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space for thinking’ by ‘inviting reflection on what surrounds them’ (342). Although this 
fragmentation is essential to the film’s mystery/investigation structure, I would suggest 
that the close readings of the diary content that the film invites are rather a consequence 
of cinematically narrativising them in this way, especially in contrast to the way that 
such videos would appear to the YouTube viewer.   
Though it remains unclear whether the videos unspool chronologically (i.e. 
according to their timecodes), their presentation within Elah outlines a clear arc from a 
buoyant optimism to an increasingly desensitised nihilism, and ultimately sadism. This 
trajectory can be productively situated in relation to actual YouTube videos from Iraq, 
as outlined in Christian Christensen’s study “Uploading Dissonance: YouTube and the 
US Occupation of Iraq”, which encompasses the full range of the medium from amateur 
atrocity footage to the official/propagandistic output of the MNFIRAQ (‘Multi-National 
Force – Iraq’) channel. I will also examine the further ways in which Haggis juxtaposes 
the diaries with remediated television news excerpts from the Iraq War, and with the 
parallel, present-tense investigation of Mike’s death, for the allusive links that are 
thereby created regarding the state of the nation and the blurring of military and civilian 
realms.  
The first video depicts Mike and his unit casually throwing a football before a 
raucous audience of Iraqi children, with Mike charitably offering the children their ‘first 
time’ playing with a ‘real American football’. This innocuous content clearly echoes 
what Christensen terms the ‘good deeds’ genre among the MNFIRAQ videos, 
particularly ‘Troops Give Gifts to Iraqi Children’, designed to ‘create the impression 
that the US military has a good rapport with Iraqi civilians’ (166). However, in this case 
the video ends with Mike berating the children as they steal the ball and run away, 
presaging the diaries’ subsequent darker turn. As befits the film’s investigative 
structure, then, the videos begin by presenting the public face of the Iraq War, with just 
a sparing hint at the frustration and anger soon to be unleashed. This tone is also echoed 
in the fragments of television news remediated during the opening section of the film, 
which capture a distinctly optimistic post-invasion period characterised by Bush’s 
proclamations that ‘freedom is on the march, and we are safer because of it’, or 
‘because we have done the hard work, we are entering the season of hope’.   
The second video, heavily marred by glitchy transitions that leap from day to 
night, and across discontinuous scenes, begins with a (literal) window on the escalating 
destruction in Iraq, showing an iconographic urban roadside littered with exploded 
vehicles. It abruptly cuts to a low-angle on Mike driving in a convoy, distressed by 
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something in the road ahead. As the passengers fearfully bark orders for him to ‘speed 
up’, there follows a distinctly audible thump as the vehicle fails to avoid the collision. 
This is by far the most ambiguous of the diary entries, and the as-yet-unsolved mystery 
at its core drives Hank’s continued investigation. It is subsequently reframed as the 
central crisis which irrevocably alters Mike’s character, when in a later interview a 
soldier from his unit reveals that they ran over a child.    
The remaining diary instalments are unabashedly graphic in their violent 
content, diverging starkly from the ‘sanitised’ and superficially ‘victimless’ violence 
that Christensen identifies in the MNFIRAQ videos (163-165). They begin to segue 
instead into the realm of ‘unofficial’, amateur footage which Christensen describes as 
frequently ‘disturbing’ not only in terms of their content, but also for the directorial 
pleasure evinced, such as ‘British Troops Beating Young Iraqis on Camera’ in which 
the soldier filming the incident ‘can be heard laughing violently and encouraging his 
fellow troops […] even mak[ing] moaning noises suggesting a pleasure that borders on 
the sexual’ (168). A diary sequence in which Mike’s unit clear a bombed-out building, 
for instance, shows Mike voyeuristically scanning a charred corpse, noting with 
dispassionate wonder how the clothes remained untouched, and finally, callously, 
placing a Spitfire Wheels (a skateboarding brand) fireball sticker on the head of the 
victim. This scene immediately follows the discovery of Mike’s burned body, in an 
explicit parallel apparently intended to convey how such violence cannot be constrained 
to the realm of war and inevitably permeates the soldiers’ civilian behaviour. The final 
diary sequence represents Mike’s ultimate descent into sadism as, gleefully encouraged 
by his unit, he asks a hooded captive ‘where it hurts’ and proceeds to stick his fingers 
into the open wound, thus earning his ‘Doc’ sobriquet. 
The latter videos are juxtaposed with remediations of television news which 
evince a clear undermining of Bush’s earlier declarations of victory through a shift to 
counter-insurgency rhetoric (particularly with reference to Fallujah), thus allusively 
mapping Mike’s moral and psychological deterioration onto the wider contextual 
degeneration from the ostensibly successful invasion to the escalating chaos in occupied 
Iraq. The climax of this theme is a didactic final sequence in which Hank hoists an 
inverted US flag as an ‘international distress signal’. The final unveiling of Mike’s 
evolution into ‘Doc’ is also paralleled by the conclusion of the investigation into his 
death, with Penning’s confession providing a further framework in which to read the 
diaries. A sense of the two characters’ equivalence is sketched through Penning’s 
observation that the ‘Doc’ scenario was ‘pretty funny’ and simply Mike’s ‘way to 
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cope’, and further reinforced by his claim that ‘on another night it would have been 
Mike with the knife and me in the field’. The murder is narrated passively, as if acting 
on uncontrollable instinct, through the line ‘I look down and I’m stabbing him’. More 
than a simple avoidance of moral responsibility, this hints at the notion of military 
‘desubjectification’ familiar from Pisters’ reading of Stop-Loss and Elah, as well as 
Protevi’s work on the conditioned responses instilled by military training simulations. 
Though this theme is rather hazily evoked, the collective pleasure and sadistic gaze 
solicited by the final diary instalment do nonetheless give a clearer impression of how 
this may function as a form of trans-subjectivity when compared to the rather more 
conventional camaraderie on display in Stop-Loss’ video diaries. The film’s twinned 
investigations also serve to emphasise how (to borrow Pisters’ terms) this is ‘not a 
simple on/off switch’, as Elah matches the killing in Iraq to tangential incidents of 
domestic violence among the community of returning soldiers, as well as, of course, 
Mike’s murder (246). This sense that the violence cannot be constrained to the warzone 
also has significant ethical implications regarding the viewing of the later diary videos, 
subverting the sadistic pleasure taken in the pain of the Other by ultimately turning it 
back upon the initial perpetrator. 
The theme of spectatorship is further developed through the film’s distinctive 
rendering of the way that Hank engages with his son’s video diaries, which, in addition 
to the investigative structure, is also clearly concerned with notions of trans-subjective 
memory. In a few cases, this scenario is very straightforwardly represented with Hank, 
in his hotel room at night, receiving an email and opening the next video file. Yet 
Haggis soon begins to elide this preface to the videos, cutting rather abruptly into full-
frame remediations of the diary, and immediately following them with a shot of Hank 
waking in the morning, as if to suggest that they are slipping into the more imaginative 
realm of fantasy or nightmare. This lingering aura of fantasy reaches its climactic 
fulfilment in a remarkable sequence in which Hank imaginatively reconstructs the 
incident in which Mike’s convoy ran over the child. A part of this sequence is 
composed of the ambiguous video diary footage that Hank has already seen, yet in this 
fluid reconstruction, the diary material is supplemented by a series of diegetically-
unmotivated camera angles, and further augmented by cutaways to Hank sitting at the 
wheel of his car to clarify the internal status of the sequence. 
Developing his notion of ‘flashback as digital playback’, Garrett Stewart’s 




You don’t have to have been there. You only have to be willing to envision it, to 
internalise the optic record as your own inherited flashback […] The whiplash 
exchange between then and now, us and them, is the immediate political charge of 
this climactic montage. Digital surveillance via optical data mining, here on a 
one-to-one basis, breaking as it does with the system of suture, has brought the 
trauma into focus from another space and time. (Closed Circuits 182) 
 
Where in Stop-Loss this notion of ‘flashback as digital playback’ is effected through an 
aesthetic and thematic convergence of the soldiers’ memories with their video diaries, in 
this case the terms are intriguingly reversed, such that Hank imaginatively inhabits the 
video diaries’ ‘digital playback’ as if it were his own memory or ‘inherited flashback’. 
Furthermore, while Stop-Loss posited this form of trans-subjective, mediatised memory 
as an exceptionalist construction clearly limited to its network of military personnel, 
Elah posits a similar effect as traversing its military origins to take place within the 
civilian realm. This radically posits the complicity of even the civilian viewer in the 
sadistic spectacle of the video diaries, collapsing the ‘us and them’ distance inherent in 
viewing war footage through the intimacy and (imaginative) interactivity of digital 
connectivity. One might even compare this model of spectatorial subjectivity with the 
experience of the drone operator as outlined in chapter three. There remains, of course, 
a clear distinction in moral culpability as defined by the difference between this 
imaginative, spectatorial interactivity and the actual, lethal effects of the drone 
operator’s weaponised interactivity. Nonetheless, the notion of digital connectivity as 
instantiating a peculiarly intimate form of viewing at a distance, akin to a kind of virtual 
presence, does unite the subjective experience of the drone operator with the model of 
spectatorial subjectivity established by Elah.  
 Finally, it is worth noting how the film’s use of the video diary to enact this 
imagined presence strikingly replicates the definition of hypermediated spectatorship 
outlined earlier in this chapter with reference to Bolter and Grusin’s Remediation. They 
argue that hypermediacy and transparency are ‘opposite manifestations of the same 
desire: the desire to get past the limits of representation and to achieve the real’, which 
they define ‘not in any metaphysical sense’, but rather ‘in terms of the viewer’s 
experience […] [as] that which would evoke an immediate (and therefore authentic) 
emotional response’ (53). This ‘response’ is elsewhere glossed as a ‘sense of presence’ 
(22). Since Elah precisely and exclusively evokes this virtual presence as being enabled 
via the remediation of the video diaries – hence, achieved via digital connectivity rather 
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than the kind of immersive cinematic immediacy epitomised by The Hurt Locker – it 
appears to fully and richly instantiate a contemporary manifestation of spectatorship as 
evoking a transparent sense of presence via hypermediacy. In doing so, it clearly 
signifies a historic shift in the relationship between the war film and the wider media 
ecology. The Stewart citation above implicitly recalls an earlier passage in Closed 
Circuits in which he contrasts digital mediation with the appeal of cinematic spectacle 
relative to other media during the Vietnam era: 
 
Apocalypse Now wanted to suggest that although you think you’ve seen it on TV, 
you’ve never seen it like this. You had to have been there, and 70mm is the next 
best thing […] Sure, you may think you’ve seen it all on YouTube and cable 
networks, and this time you’d be right, you have: seen it the way the military 
itself has, at both ends of a lethal stealth – aerial hits and surveillance ambushes 
alike – each recorded in the real time of pending annihilation, zoom versus pan, 
impersonal targeting over against the jittery focus of patrol (173-174)  
 
This cinematic appeal to embodied immediacy, or a sense of having ‘been there’ is 
clearly supplanted by digital connectivity and interactivity in all the above films, but 
particularly Elah, which privileges digital remediation as the definitive contemporary 
means of conveying an authentic sense of presence and thereby understanding the 
soldiers’ experience of the Iraq War, thus signifying the evolution of the war film from 




Collectively, the four films discussed in this chapter can be seen as 
representative of a shift in the contemporary war film toward a form of hypermediated 
spectatorship engendered by their remediated aesthetics. This contrasts most notably 
with the model of spectatorship implied by the experiential mode, which I have argued 
is best characterised by Roger Stahl’s notion of the ‘virtual-citizen-soldier’ and tends to 
foster an embodied identification with military subjectivities. It is precisely this 
experiential emulation of first-person witnessing that is supplanted by the alternative 
realising force of digital connectivity as the privileged signifier of an authentic depiction 
of contemporary conflict in the films covered by this chapter. Although the 
hypermediated aesthetic thus serves a broadly authenticising function, it differs 
substantially from the authentication of embodied, first-person witnessing in the 
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experiential mode. While Restrepo in particular harnesses this transparent perspective as 
a means of exploring the quotidian experience of soldiering and the visceral pleasures of 
combat, thereby obscuring the wider political and technological context in favour of a 
complicit identification with its military subjects, the remediation of digital interfaces 
here works to somewhat more reflexively posit digital connectivity as authenticating in 
the sense of evoking an interactive engagement with the real political context of the Iraq 
War.    
Battle for Haditha exudes the most explicit concern with developing such realist 
vectors, aligning its remediations with docu-fiction techniques in order to suture the 
film’s diegesis into the mediatised history of the Iraq War. The film’s remediated 
elements consistently function as an explicitly political motivation for the character’s 
actions, with Ahmad’s al-Qaeda sponsored bombing grounded (at least in part) as a 
reaction to George W. Bush’s dismissal of Iraqi protesters as ‘thugs’, and the Sheikh’s 
propaganda video of US military abuses apparently serving such a successful recruiting 
function that he proclaims ‘The Marines have lost the battle for Haditha; everyone has 
joined us’. There is also a documentarian propensity evident in the analytical 
delineation of how such digital content feeds into diverse, competing political 
appropriations of the Haditha killings, as Broomfield charts the ways in which the terms 
of political debate are increasingly determined by the global dissemination of this kind 
of video evidence. In doing so, it is implied that an authentic understanding of the Iraq 
War cannot be constructed around a transparent emulation of first-person witnessing, 
but fundamentally depends upon a more reflexive form of spectatorship attuned to 
complex contemporary relationship between hypermediacy and political context.   
 As I have argued, the primary function of these remediations and of the docu-
fiction style is to engender a form of hypermediated spectatorship which perceives the 
film as fundamentally continuous with, or at least connected to, the real context of the 
Haditha killings and the ongoing (at the time of the film’s production) legal proceedings 
against the perpetrators. This particular form of spectatorial hypermediacy, however, 
has little in common with the hypermediated military subjectivities outlined across the 
previous two chapters. Where the military logic of hypermediacy can be broadly posited 
as geared toward the formation of trans-subjective networks which bypass individual 
agency in order to enable a de-subjectified state of killing, in the case of Haditha 
spectatorial hypermediacy points instead to the interactive formation of like-minded 
political communities. This digitally networked collectivity does not entail any 
comparable form of de-subjectification, nor does it seem to be complicit in militarising 
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the viewer’s perspective as is the case with the experiential mode. Indeed, this form of 
spectatorship appears distinctly antithetical to the complicity of immersive 
identification, since it is founded upon a reflexive and critical distance from the diegetic 
military actions. 
In ethical terms, one can theorise this spectatorial position as one which 
privileges reflexivity over empathy or pity. Some vestiges of empathy still remain, 
particularly in the characterisation of Ramirez’s PTSD (which does serve to internalise 
the conflict to some degree), though relative to the genre as a whole Haditha does 
generally maintain a more reflexive distance. For Libby Saxton, this repudiation of 
‘regimes of pity’ creates the possibility of an ethical turn to ‘investigating how the 
viewer’s privileges are connected to, or, in certain cases, predicated upon, the suffering 
of the person seen’ (67). It also resonates with Lilie Chouliaraki’s argument that ‘the 
language of pity […] is insufficient to properly translate distant suffering for the 
Western spectator’, with a ‘reflexive distance from the society of intimacy’ posited as 
necessary for the creation of a ‘cosmopolitan public culture’ (217).  
The issue of whether Haditha’s evocation of interactive, digitally networked 
spectatorship offers any concrete outlet for what Chouliaraki terms ‘public action’, or 
whether it simply constitutes a more abstract sense of ‘disapproval’, is debatable though 
(123). Certainly, the docu-fiction tendency to embed remediated fragments of actual 
coverage of the Iraq War within the film’s diegesis does at least suggest the possibility 
of a politically engaged mode of viewing which looks outside of the text for ways to 
engage with the real context of the Haditha killings. However, these legal proceedings 
take place outside of the realm of influence of the vast majority of the film’s viewers. 
Yet at the same time Broomfield does not really seem to imply that imprisoning the 
individuals involved constitutes an effective solution to the problem. Indeed, there is a 
discernible inference that this outcome would be mere scapegoating and does not 
address the more fundamental issue of institutional responsibility, as emphasised 
through the training sequences which explicitly encourage an indiscriminate targeting of 
‘men, women and children’ in the kind of insurgency scenario that subsequently 
unfolds. While the lack of a specific outlet for ‘public action’ may thus reflect the 
‘narrow repertoire of participatory positions that [Western] public life makes available 
for the ordinary citizen’, perhaps the more pertinent question is what kind of collectivity 
emerges from the film’s broader critique of the US military’s actions in Iraq 
(Chouliaraki 12). This coincides with Chouliaraki’s overarching concern in The 
Spectatorship of Suffering with the question of whether media ‘reproduce the 
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spectators’ communitarian concerns in the zone of safety or cultivate new connectivities 
between spectators and distant sufferers’ (196). In this regard, I would tentatively posit 
that Haditha does attempt to engender ‘new connectivities between spectators and 
distant sufferers’. Although fully substantiating this claim may entail an analysis of the 
film’s international distribution network which is somewhat beyond the scope of this 
chapter, from the textual evidence available I’d suggest that the emergent collectivity is 
not defined by a myopic focus on individual culpability with reference to legal 
proceedings taking place within ‘the zone of safety’, but rather by a more 
comprehensive critique of US military actions which reflexively foregrounds the 
suffering of Iraqi civilians as the inextricable consequence of the dogmatic Western war 
on terror.    
On a formal level, the remediated aesthetic of Redacted seems to imply a similar 
mode of hypermediated spectatorship to Haditha given the privileging of digital 
connectivities over immersive presence. However, the films evince substantial 
differences regarding the function of these digital networks and the implications of 
hypermediated spectatorial subjectivity. Instead of striving for a reflexive docu-fiction 
suturing of the film’s diegesis and the real political context, the remediations in 
Redacted appear to be more concerned with a performative (rather than authenticising) 
enactment of the ways in which the remediated forms are complicit in perpetuating 
escalating cycles of violence due to the voyeuristic and sadistic points-of-view provided 
by military video diaries, jihadist websites and embedded reportage (to cite just a few 
examples). This correlates with a bleak view of hypermediated spectatorship which, in 
stark contrast to the interactive and oppositional political stance of Haditha, is defined 
by a sadistic complicity in military violence.  
More than any other film covered in this chapter, Redacted’s hypermediated 
aesthetic creates a distinctly ‘windowed’ sense of space which serves to collapse the 
geographical distance between military and civilian realms in a manner somewhat akin 
to that of drones. Of course, the remotely operated weaponry of drones is in this case 
supplanted by predominantly public and communicative forms of remote connectivity, 
but this fusing of windowed space does create a comparable scenario in which the 
soldiers are simultaneously enmeshed in military duties and civilian life. Social media 
figure prominently among the remediated digital elements, and serve to maintain a 
sense of ‘remote’ intimacy between, for example, McCoy and his father, with such 
hypermediated forms of communication largely usurping face-to-face interactions. On a 
diegetic level, then, the networks formed by digital interactivity tend to reassert existing 
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connections and divisions rather than engendering the kind of new and international 
critical collectivities implied by Haditha.  
This insularity feeds into the characterisation of spectatorial connectivity too, as 
even the platforms which ostensibly provide a space for political critique of the war 
(such as the ‘Get Out of Iraq’ campaign site) are depicted as extolling – in visceral 
detail – violent retribution against the perpetrators of the Mahmudiyah killings rather 
than engaged political debate. Although Redacted does offer multiple points-of-view on 
the conflict, I think it is a mistake to read this as a typically postmodern diverse 
multiplicity or, in Pisters’ terms, a representative ‘ethics of power’ (241). De Palma 
seems to imply that there is more continuity than difference among these forms, with 
the key unifying factor being this sadistic point-of-view. Furthermore, since each of 
these remediated networks (whether pro- or anti-US) are portrayed as so entrenched in 
their own, self-enclosed moral convictions, there is no site of meaningful exchange or 
debate, only the incitement of further violence against the other.  
Thus the version of spectatorial hypermediacy depicted in Redacted is 
essentially defined by complicity in the violent spectacle of not only the war as such, 
but also unsanctioned acts of violence. Indeed, the central rape/murder sequence marks 
the most explicit undermining of the ‘neutrality of looking on’ through the metafictional 
debate around Ramirez’s complicity in filming the scene as part of the video diary 
(Aaron 97). Although effected in a strikingly different manner from the complicity I 
have delineated with reference to the experiential mode, it is basically equivalent to the 
veneration of the visceral pleasures of combat in Restrepo or The Hurt Locker. In this 
case, though, it is not achieved through immersive identification with an embodied 
perpetrator of violence, but rather by a reflexive staging of hypermediated spectatorship 
as loaded with ‘sadomasochistic intent’ (Aaron 93). This particular form of reflexivity 
differs slightly from Haditha’s reflexive blurring of the boundaries between 
documentary and fiction. Redacted does parallel this docu-fiction structure to some 
degree (particularly in the opening titles); yet where Haditha harnesses this ambiguity 
in an attempt to establish the text as pertaining to the ‘real’ rather than the realm of mere 
fictional representation, the reflexivity of Redacted primarily concerns a performative 
and at times overtly metafictional staging of spectatorship whose realising force is 
derived from this ‘inability to suppress our status as spectators’ (Aaron 94).  
Despite these vastly differing characterisations of spectatorial hypermediacy in 
Haditha and Redacted, it is interesting to note that both seem to evoke interactivity as 
delimiting a spectatorial experience which is essentially collective rather than 
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individualistic. This runs distinctly contrary to the prevailing tendency among film 
scholars to posit digital spectatorship as an erosion of the communality of the cinema 
auditorium in favour of increasingly personalised home/remote viewing scenarios. In 
these films, the hypermediated aesthetics evince a fundamental integration of cinema, 
digital networks and the real political context of the Iraq War, thus positing interactivity 
as a collectivising force which may even override any shift in the locus of viewing as a 
key determinant of the mode of spectatorial subjectivity.       
Although a cursory glance at the aesthetics of Stop-Loss and In the Valley of 
Elah might suggest that they are somewhat less indicative of a shift toward 
hypermediated spectatorship than Haditha and Redacted, the manner in which they 
stage and thematise the spectatorship of military video diaries does coincide 
significantly with this chapter’s discussion of digitally connected modes of spectatorial 
subjectivity. Indeed, the digitally networked collectivities that are implicitly evoked by 
Haditha and Redacted are manifested rather more literally in Stop-Loss via the network 
(of friends returning from duty in Iraq) which is circumscribed by the collective 
production and viewing of the video diaries. Initially, this collectivity figures as military 
camaraderie which manifests in the communal authorship of the diaries and the 
ideologically-binding force of vengeful patriotism elicited from the song “Courtesy of 
the Red, White and Blue”. It verges on the properly trans-subjective collectivities 
delineated by Protevi, broadly coinciding with the type of ‘team-building applications’ 
(such as ‘rhythmic chanting’) that he cites alongside simulations as generating the 
‘fighting group’, yet lacks the cyborg sense of de-subjectification found in, for example, 
Farocki’s Watson is Down (412).  
On re-entry into civilian life, however, the founding terms of this collectivity 
undergo a process of transformation, as the more ideological form of unity derived from 
the Iraq-set opening is supplanted by the shared experience of embodied manifestations 
of PTSD. These affective disturbances are tightly linked to the diaries as a form of 
mediatised collective memory which supply the ‘recurring flashbacks, undeletable 
memories’ constitutive of PTSD (Pisters 245). This particular representation of PTSD 
may appear somewhat peculiar in its very ‘collectivity’, relative to the tropes typically 
employed within the genre, since (as I have noted across the previous chapters) PTSD 
more often appears in a distinctly individualised form. From the individual Head-
Mounted Display systems used to treat real soldiers, to fictional representations which 
internalise and depoliticise conflict by containing it within the realm of individual 
conscience (such as Good Kill), none of the depictions of PTSD encountered thus far 
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convey an equivalent sense of collectivity. Yet it is not entirely without precedent in 
theoretical terms at least, since Väliaho locates the source of PTSD in pre-subjective 
‘affect programs’ which are also cited as the target of the simulation training in 
Protevi’s account of military trans-subjectivities (Väliaho 73; Protevi 408). Pisters also 
links the manifestations of PTSD in Stop-Loss to the ‘the state of desubjectification 
necessary in combat […] [which] has lasting, de-realising consequences on the mind’ 
(247). 
The clearest example of this ‘desubjectification’ occurs during Brandon’s brawl 
with two car thieves, as the sound design evokes a hallucinatory regression into a 
combat state of mind, and a disoriented Brandon mistakes the thieves for ‘hajjis’. Here, 
the hypermediacy of the video diaries as a materialisation of collective memory aligns 
with an experience that can only be described as one of immediacy, with the collapsed 
temporality effecting a sense of Brandon’s virtual transport back to Iraq. This is echoed 
in irrational outbursts of violence among others in the network, as well as Steve’s 
garden trench-digging incident. In each of these cases, the symptoms of PTSD are 
fundamentally embodied, and seem to refute the trope of internalisation through their 
distinctly physical and networked, mediatised presentation. An interrelationship 
between PTSD and the political context is also minimally established through the film’s 
critique of the US Army’s stop-loss procedure, with Brandon’s trajectory throughout the 
film essentially being one of escape from both a forced re-enlistment and the inevitable 
re-activation of a de-subjectified state that this entails.  
This haunting form of hypermediated spectatorship as PTSD is, however, 
posited as pertaining exclusively to the military network established around the 
production and viewing of the film’s diegetic video diaries. Peirce does not imply that 
this is a generalised condition of digitally networked spectatorship; indeed, the 
foregrounding of de-subjectified states seems to bind it quite specifically to the types of 
military training that Protevi describes as constitutive of a ‘new cognitive group subject’ 
(411). As such, Stop-Loss marks a particularly notable conjunction of the military logic 
of hypermediacy discussed in the previous chapter with the digitally networked forms 
of spectatorship at issue here. In stark contrast to Battle for Haditha, which frames 
spectatorial hypermediacy as a potential site of interactive and critical political 
engagement, Stop-Loss evokes a continuity between military and spectatorial 
hypermediacy on the level of de-subjectification.   
In the Valley of Elah similarly explores hypermediated spectatorship through the 
networked connectivity of military video diaries. The diaries once again figure as a 
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mediatised form of memory, unfold serially throughout the film and, in a distinct 
parallel with Stop-Loss, are narrativised in such a way that they demarcate a comparable 
trajectory from buoyant camaraderie to psychological disintegration and PTSD. Both 
films are clearly concerned with the proliferation of violence among returning soldiers, 
with Penning’s confession to Mike’s murder similarly evoking a de-subjectified state 
which closely resembles that of Brandon in Stop-Loss. Although this murder, as well as 
several other tangential incidents of domestic violence among the military community, 
may also suggest that there is an equivalent collective dimension to the film’s rendition 
of PTSD, it is actually rather more individualised than in Stop-Loss given that the 
diaries are framed by the investigatory structure as pertaining primarily to how the war 
has affected Mike (and possibly led to his death).  
Despite this individualisation, the representation of PTSD once again refutes the 
tropes of internalisation and depoliticisation. The former is countered by the 
mediatisation of Mike’s memories (as well as the film’s emphasis on the materiality of 
the digital), while the latter is forcefully repudiated through the allusive alignment of 
the diary extracts with remediations of television news coverage of the Iraq War, 
implicitly mapping Mike’s individual and psychological deterioration onto the 
contextual transition from celebrations of a successful invasion to the difficulties of 
occupation and counter-insurgency. As such, the individual trauma here is not a 
reductive abstraction of political disaffection into ‘a personal ahistorical trauma that can 
be overcome’ since the suffering is directly contextualised by the film’s remediations 
(Westwell 81). Additionally, the positioning of Mike’s death at the opening of the film 
precludes any possibility of PTSD functioning as a therapeutic salve within the realm of 
individual conscience.  
Elah is perhaps most interesting, however, in the way it differs from Stop-Loss 
by positing the trans-subjective mediatisation of memory as traversing the specifically 
military realm within which Peirce contains it. Where this trans-subjectivity effect is 
strictly circumscribed within the military community in Stop-Loss due to their shared 
propensity for a regression into de-subjectified states, in Elah the networking of 
memory between Mike and Hank emerges from the military realm into the civilian. 
Furthermore, although the link between them is furnished by the digitally connected 
logic of hypermediacy which characterises all of the films covered in this chapter, it 
also contains a strong sense of the physical presence which is typically provided by 
immediacy. This sense of presence is conveyed by Hank’s virtual inhabiting of Mike’s 
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frazzled diary extract, which is supplemented (in this sequence only) by additional 
footage in order to create a more fluid and transparent reconstruction of the scenario.  
The remediation of the video diary in this sequence can therefore be designated 
as evoking an experience of immediacy which is effected by the subjective logic of 
hypermediacy. While the film remains grounded in a hypermediated form of 
spectatorship which foregrounds the networked role of digital video diaries, it also 
reasserts the value of first-person witnessing to some degree, suggesting that a viable 
understanding of the conflict is derived not only from the hypermediated connectivity of 
the video diaries, but also from a transparent form of bearing witness to the atrocities 
that Mike has committed. This is not to say that Elah advocates a kind of balance 
between hypermediacy and immediacy; rather, it is one of the few contemporary war 
films to express the interdependency of these ‘logics’, offering the immersive presence 
of the experiential mode but qualifying this precisely as the reality-effect of a 
hypermediated connectivity.  
By extending this into the civilian realm, the film also implies some degree of 
spectatorial imbrication in the network. Yet, clearly, this is not quite the same vicarious 
enjoyment of the body at risk exhibited by the experiential mode of mediation. The 
viewer is not quite invited to partake in a militarised diegetic pleasure through an 
embodied mode of identification, since the extra layering of Hank’s presence here (as 
further mediating the viewer’s approximation of Mike’s experience) burdens this scene 
with a particularly traumatic sense of witnessing. Analogising this sense of immediacy 
via hypermediacy with that of drones, I noted earlier that it constitutes a distinctive form 
of remote intimacy or virtual presence. One might even extend this claim to note that 
the figuration of the hypermediated network in Elah serves, like the drone kill-chain, to 
‘br[ing] all those in the network much closer to the killing space’ (Gregory, “From a 
View to a Kill” 196). Elah determines spectatorial imbrication through this kind of 
networked intimacy, suggesting that, in the era of instantaneous digital transmission of 
war footage, the witnessing of such violence is no longer constrained to a purely 
military realm but inevitably permeates civilian life as a form of ‘inherited flashback’ 










Having examined the mediating roles of the body, drones, simulations and 
digital media – and contextualised them in relation to the contemporary war film’s 
strategies of remediation – I am now in a position to formulate more generalised 
answers to the research questions posed at the outset of this work. Firstly, the 
relationship between embodiment and technological mediation in the context of 
contemporary warfare appears to be rather more complex than was initially 
hypothesised. Among the sources drawn upon in the literature review, there is a near 
unanimous positing of distanciation as the prime effect of recent military-technological 
developments. Virilio contends that the supplanting of the body by remote forms of 
mediation constitutes a fundamental ‘process of derealisation’, while Der Derian’s 
account of ‘virtuous war’ extends this claim into the contemporary realm of digital 
mediation to argue that the virtualising effects of remote, screen mediated combat have 
obscured or even ‘removed’ the embodied ‘reality of death’ (107; 9). The parallels 
drawn between gaming, military simulations, and actual digital weaponry interfaces 
(particularly drones) in the works of Lenoir and Stahl evoke a process of convergence 
which also tends to be framed as an indicator of virtualising distanciation, as in Ahmed 
and Wilkerson’s Guardian article “Dealing remote control death” which suggests an 
aesthetic and moral equivalence between gaming and drone operation in precisely this 
manner.  
 However, Stahl’s work provides some indication of a countervailing tendency in 
which embodied experience and digital mediation are aligned in interesting new ways, 
rather than being considered as mutually exclusive. Theorising this relationship through 
the interactive appeal to become a ‘virtual-citizen-soldier’, he argues that gaming, 
television and cinema increasingly evoke a ‘post 9/11 fever to virtually enter the body 
of the soldier through a first-person aesthetic’ (79). Similar conjunctions of embodiment 
and technicity can be found in Gregory, Holmqvist and Williams’ studies of drone 
mediation, as well as Väliaho’s work on military simulations. The former refute the 
typical characterisation of drones as virtualising and morally distancing (as in the 
aforementioned Guardian article), arguing that the interface is better considered as a 
form of ‘hyper-vision’ whose intimate detail has ‘brought all those in the network much 
closer to the killing space’ (Holmqvist 545; Gregory, “From a View to a Kill” 196). The 
proliferation of PTSD among drone pilots further suggests that there is an embodied and 
potentially traumatic component to this ‘hyper-vision’, however geographically remote 
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the operator may be. Similarly, the treatment of PTSD in virtual reality environments is 
considered by Väliaho to have a fundamentally ‘endogenous’ reality-effect which 
enables the therapeutic modulation of pre-subjective ‘affective and emotional charges’ 
or ‘bodily memory’ (70). However problematic the classification of PTSD may be as a 
depoliticisation of soldiers’ responses to war (as well as a cinematic trope; a theme to 
which I will return in the discussion below), its association with drones and simulations 
does nonetheless suggest that these ostensibly distancing technologies are perhaps not 
quite as disembodied in their effects as some critics claim.  
 Though these ostensibly contradictory tendencies toward distanciation and 
embodied immediacy may appear irresolvable, on closer consideration they actually 
seem to constitute a dual, though not mutually exclusive, trajectory. In a purely 
geographical sense, the process of distanciation that Virilio dates back to WWI and the 
origins of cinema undoubtedly continues unabated. Bracketing the intimacy effected by 
drone optics for a moment, it is inarguable that drones epitomise the increasingly 
remote and post-human waging of warfare by supplanting embodied presence with 
unmanned vehicles. While I am sceptical of Der Derian and Protevi’s framing of the CG 
environments used in military simulations as inherently virtualising or desensitising, 
there is nonetheless a different sense of distanciation which emerges through networked 
simulation training in order to overcome the ‘deep-seated inhibition against one-on-one, 
face-to-face, cold-blooded killing on the part of some 98% of soldiers’ (Protevi 406). In 
this context, Protevi contends that individual agency or responsibility is displaced by the 
activation of ‘de-subjectified state[s]’, most often appearing in the form of networked, 
trans-subjective collectivities in which ‘the practical agent of killing is not the 
individual person or subject, but the emergent assemblage of military unit and non-
subjective reflex or equally non-subjective “affect program”’ (407; 408). As I have 
suggested, this broadly coincides with certain aspects of the administration of drone 
strikes, which may similarly work to undermine the weight of individual responsibility 
by the dispersal of agency through the kill-chain.   
 Thus, the tendency toward distanciation can primarily be defined geographically 
(concerning the remote waging of war), and in terms of a trans-subjective dispersal of 
individual agency. Alongside this perennial distancing of the body from the scene of 
warfare, the tendency toward immediacy can be more precisely located in digitally 
networked, typically screen-based modes of mediating this distance. Indeed, in many 
accounts this distance is not merely mediated but essentially collapsed, with the 
emergent media’s extraordinary capacity for interpellation creating a peculiar form of 
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remotely mediated intimacy. This technological fusing of disparate spaces also serves to 
effect a degree of convergence between military and civilian subject positions relative to 
the space of warfare, as in Der Derian’s claim that wars are increasingly ‘fought in the 
same manner as they are represented by real-time surveillance and TV “live-feeds”’ 
(xxxi). In the case of drones, the distancing of the body is counteracted by the screen 
mediated ‘exposure to high-resolution images of killing, including the details of 
casualties and body parts that would never be possible to capture with the human eye’ 
(Holmqvist 542). This is slightly more complicated in the realm of simulations, though 
the NTC and ICT training applications do typically strive to engender an immersive 
combat experience from the safe distance of California desert recreations of Iraq and 
Afghanistan, while the VR interface of the Virtual Iraq treatment for PTSD effects a 
similarly remote activation of endogenous immediacy. Generally, then, one can 
characterise this imbrication of distance and immediacy as a regime of combat 
mediation which twins the connected or networked subjective logic of hypermediacy 
with the more transparent sense of presence that is associated with immediacy. The 
former reflects the digitally networked and remotely operated interfaces which 
characterise the contemporary military-technological apparatus, while the latter is 
brought back into focus by the reality-conferring effect of screens which offer a 
hypermediated revival of the same sense of presence previously realised by embodied 
witnessing. 
 These emergent trends in the military-technological context have significant 
repercussions for the contemporary war film, particularly in terms of the remediated 
relationship between the body and digital technologies, and in terms of the subject 
positions that are thereby delineated. As such, my film analyses have focussed 
predominantly on issues of remediation, immediacy, hypermediacy and embodiment, as 
well as the ethical implications of both diegetic (military) and spectatorial (civilian) 
subjectivities.  
 As noted above, the experiential mode can justly be characterised as 
foregrounding embodied perception to the exclusion of technological mediation, in what 
likely constitutes an attempt to reassert the singularity of cinematic embodiment and its 
evocation of first-person witnessing as the privileged mode for mediating warfare in the 
face of burgeoning competition from gaming and new digital connectivities such as 
social media platforms. This exclusion largely applies to military as well as media 
technologies, since the films tend to frame this kind of remote mediation as detracting 
from the visceral pleasures of combat. This is implicit in Restrepo’s transparent and 
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embodied first-person aesthetic, and more bluntly declared by the long-range artillery 
operator who laments ‘I just wish they were closer so I could’ve actually seen them 
when I killed them’. The binary relationship between embodiment and technological 
mediation is more substantially thematised in The Hurt Locker through the contrast 
drawn between Thompson’s robotically mediated IED disposal and James’ pleasure in 
putting his body at risk by disarming them manually. This division has been framed as 
‘an implicit critique of the distance – both moral and physical – of remote targeting and 
weaponry’ (Burgoyne 12). Yet I have suggested that such arguments tend to overlook 
the fact that James willingly jettisons any form of technological distanciation in order to 
maintain the pleasure of (or even addiction to) the contact high of unmediated, 
embodied presence. Bigelow’s reflexive framing of this theme would also suggest that 
the very notion of critiquing technological distanciation through embodiment is 
somewhat undermined by both the diegetic and, implicitly, spectatorial ‘addiction’ to a 
visceral form of military-cinematic pleasure. Considered in relation to the wider 
context, such critiques are also problematic in assuming that technological mediation 
and embodiment are mutually exclusive, rather than, as Hansen argues, 
‘complementary’, such that ‘neither one can be understood as a fall or contamination (or 
even a humanisation) of the other’ (Bodies in Code 79). 
 The same underlying assumptions permeate the first wave of cinematic 
remediations of drones, particularly Body of Lies, Syriana and Zero Dark Thirty. By 
maintaining a sharp aesthetic and ontological distinction between drone mediated space 
and the ground-level realm mediated by the embodied point-of-view of the heroic CIA 
agent, these films perpetuate the same fundamental division between the body and 
technology as the experiential mode. This opposition is perhaps most notably 
encapsulated by the extremes of, on the one hand, Body of Lies’ hypermediated 
presentation of drones as part of uniform digital surveillance aesthetic, and on the other, 
Zero Dark Thirty’s embodied mediation of the concluding raid on Osama bin Laden’s 
compound. Each of these films purports to be broadly critical of drone warfare, in part 
enacted by privileging the immediacy of embodied points-of-view as a key determinant 
of spectatorial pleasure and maintaining a hypermediated ‘othering’ of the drone 
aesthetic. This seems to betray a certain unease with the notion of transparently 
remediating drones, as if any overlap between the drone interface and the cinematic 
aesthetic would potentially constitute a form of spectatorial complicity in the 
virtualisation of war. Yet this again relies on the problematic assumption that military-
technological mediation is solely distancing and that the body is a site of potential 
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resistance to this rather than fundamentally imbricated in the production of novel forms 
of remotely mediated immediacy. This latter aspect, the ‘hyper-vision’ of drone optics, 
is entirely neglected by each of these films, which thus provide a rather narrow 
interpretation of and partial engagement with the military-technological context as 
outlined above (Holmqvist 545).   
 Furthermore, the type of subject positions articulated by each of the films which 
maintain this fundamental division between embodiment and technological mediation 
tend to undermine any critique of war by proffering an embodied mode of address 
which encourages a complicit form of identification with military subjects. This appears 
to have developed from the Vietnam era subjectivisation of the war film, in which 
embodiment and internalisation were foregrounded as a means of depoliticising and 
detechnologising cinematic representations of conflict. Embodied mediation continues 
to serve as means of obscuring the political and technological context here, though the 
bodies in question now tend to be those of actively serving military subjects rather than 
the scarred and traumatised figure of the Vietnam veteran. This shift is augmented by 
journalistic embedding, with the journalist’s point-of-view elided from cinematic 
adaptations of such material in order to strengthen the alignment of diegetic and 
spectatorial subjectivities, as well as the proliferation of what I have termed the ‘grunt’s 
truth’ rhetoric. The latter offers a self-justifying form of depoliticisation through the 
problematic assumption that the grunt is inherently disconnected from the politics of the 
war and interested only in the quotidian enjoyment of the visceral excitement of killing. 
 Contemporary forms of embodied mediation thus tend to be complicit not only 
in depoliticising the subjective experience of war but also fostering a potentially 
disturbing link this kind of diegetic military pleasure in violence and a mode of 
spectatorial engagement predicated on embodied identification. While the question of 
whether the viewer actually derives pleasure from acts of killing remains open and 
contentious, the identificatory space opened up by such texts nonetheless does not 
foreclose the possibility of precisely this kind of vicarious enjoyment of mediated 
violence. I have argued that this link is most aptly defined by Stahl’s notion of the 
‘virtual-citizen-soldier’, which outlines the viewer’s position as one demarcated by 
‘identification with and sympathy for the soldier [which] combine with exhilarating 
alchemy in a kind of death simulator’ (43). It also coincides, somewhat more broadly, 
with Bolter and Grusin’s outline of the ‘version of the contemporary mediated self… 
under the logic of transparent immediacy’, by which the viewer ‘empathise[s] with 
others by occupying their point of view’ (232). The sense of empathy foregrounded in 
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both of these accounts demonstrates precisely how the embodied first-person mode of 
address circumvents the supposed neutrality or apoliticism attributed to it by the 
‘grunt’s truth’ rhetoric. Finally, I have also drawn upon the works of Ryan, Griffiths and 
Hansen to explore the immersive quality of this form of spectatorship. In particular, the 
evocation of embodied presence as a means of exploring the subjective experience of 
war, as well as the de-framing effect of this immersive sense of being enveloped within 
the combat space, contribute to generating a representation of war defined solely by the 
individualistic approximation of military subjectivity, without any elucidation of the 
wider political or technological context in which the conflict takes place. At its most 
reductive, this decontextualisation effect may engender a regressive fantasy of face-to-
face combat within an oddly depoliticised and detechnologised representation of war. 
Ultimately, for Stahl, this immersive and embodied form of ‘militainment’ comes to 
supplant ‘propaganda’ as a new mode of civilian/spectatorial ‘authorisation’ by virtue of 
the ‘integration of war into existent practices of consumption’ (138).  
 However, this division between embodiment and technology does not permeate 
the entirety of the corpus here, and indeed I have encountered many films which 
intertwine the logics of hypermediacy and immediacy to posit a more complex diegetic 
relationship between the body and digital forms of military-technological mediation. In 
the realm of drones, both Good Kill and Five Thousand Feet is the Best evoke a 
hypermediated subjective logic of networked connectivity, most notably in the way that 
the former fragments the bodies of drone operators in the opening sequence to fashion a 
representation of the hybrid human-technological drone ‘assemblage’ as described by 
Williams (381). This is conjoined with a depiction of drone optics that differs from 
Body of Lies, Syriana and Zero Dark Thirty by virtue of its striking immediacy, both in 
terms of a transparent alignment of drone and film cameras, and in terms of the high-
resolution intimacy outlined by Gregory and Holmqvist. Farocki’s Serious Games 
similarly engages a mode of military subjectivity defined by the networked 
hypermediacy of simulated training environments. The framing and editing in the first 
film of this series, Watson is Down, expresses a form of collective operation that 
distinctly parallels Protevi’s account of the ‘extended/distributed cognition’ of the trans-
subjective ‘cybernetic organism, the fighting group’, while Immersion uses a split-
screen aesthetic to evoke the endogenous immediacy of the Virtual Iraq treatment for 
PTSD (411; 412). The films covered in my final chapter (Battle for Haditha, Redacted, 
Stop-Loss and In the Valley of Elah) were included more for their articulation of 
spectatorial rather than (diegetic) military subjectivities, but it is worth noting 
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nonetheless that their aesthetics do evince a more fluid interpenetration of embodied and 
digitally mediated (though in this case, of media rather than strictly military 
technologies) points-of-view than the experiential mode and the first wave of CIA drone 
films. 
 Curiously, PTSD figures more prominently in this second group of films than it 
does in those which promulgate an embodied perspective to the exclusion of 
technological mediation. This marks a substantial difference from the Vietnam era 
figuration of PTSD as an internalising and depoliticising withdrawal which relocates 
war to the realm of an individual conscience. Indeed, PTSD demands to be treated 
somewhat differently here given that it is now intimately bound up with the immediacy 
of remote forms of mediation and thus rather more materialised and (technologically) 
contextualised than in previous incarnations. This is not to say, however, that the 
internalising trope has disappeared completely, but rather that this corpus reflects a 
greater diversity in the ways in which PTSD is represented. For instance, in 5,000ft, the 
recursive and psycho-geographic disturbance of identity and spatio-temporal continuity 
is posited as a specific effect of drones’ radical fusion of military and civilian space, as 
well as the transparent trauma of witnessing death through the hyper-vision of drone 
optics (as outlined by the voiceover of the drone pilot in the film’s documentary strand). 
Although Good Kill does initially indicate a similarly contextualised grounding for its 
portrait of PTSD (particularly via the moral critique of CIA practices), the film 
ultimately resorts to a more problematic reinstatement of internalisation via the 
concluding act’s troubling manner of cathartically cleansing Egan’s conscience. Finally, 
Immersion encapsulates perhaps the most extreme form of internalisation through the 
endogenous imagery produced by the user’s interactive experience of Virtual Iraq, yet 
the radically new conjunction of the body and VR here necessitates a 
reconceptualisation of the virtual as an embodied ‘capacity […] to be in excess of one’s 
actual state’ rather than a form of affectless distanciation (Hansen, New Philosophy for 
New Media 51). 
 While the films which maintain a division between embodied and technological 
forms of mediation can be ascribed a relatively consistent set of characteristics – 
particularly an immersive and complicit mode of embodied identification – the 
spectatorial subjectivities evoked by this second grouping of films (i.e. those which 
more pertinently reflect the new regime of combat mediation as conjoining the 
subjective logic of hypermediacy with a remotely mediated form of immediacy) evince 
a much greater variety. This is perhaps to be expected given that the embodied mode of 
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address has distinct lineage within war cinema while the remediated aesthetics of the 
drone interface, for instance, are relatively new and thus not yet bound up with any 
established set of genre tropes. Contrary to the implicit assumptions of those films 
which foreground embodiment to the exclusion of military technologies, however, the 
act of remediating these technological interfaces here does not inherently delimit a 
spectatorial position of complicity in the virtualisation of war. This is in part because, as 
I have argued, this assumption is embedded within a somewhat outmoded 
conceptualisation of combat mediation. Yet even if one sets aside the notion of 
‘virtualisation’, it would still not quite be accurate to say that the remediation of these 
technologies necessarily entails the propagation of the militarised point-of-view of 
drone targeting or simulation training as a civilian mode of imaging war. Indeed, many 
of these films deftly negotiate a diegetic evocation of hypermediated, conditioned and 
de-subjectified military subjectivities while retaining scope for more critical spectatorial 
positions.  
 For example, the remediation of drones in 5,000ft does evoke some degree of 
spectatorial immersion in drone mediated perception, yet this is fundamentally effected 
in terms of the disturbed subjective experience of blurred military and civilian space 
rather than complicity in drone targeting per se. This is primarily because Fast’s 
remediation of drones (while maintaining a sense of their high-resolution intimacy and 
aligning them with the film camera) performs a series of significant inversions such that 
the roving drone point-of-view in the documentary strand of the film turns its focus on 
civilian US landscapes rather than remote combat spaces, and the Hellfire missile in the 
fictional strand is deployed against, rather than by, a metafictional surrogate of the 
drone pilot. One might argue that the disorienting fracturing of identity and spatio-
temporal continuity constitutes a form of virtualisation, if by ‘virtual’ one specifically 
denotes a sense of embodied presence which is distributed across military and civilian 
space, but certainly not in the sense of an affectless and morally-disengaged form of 
killing. The recursive mise-en-abyme structure and looped projection align diegetic and 
spectatorial subject positions but, in contrast to the complicity entailed by embodied 
identification, this psycho-geographic disorientation on both levels of subjectivity 
seems to denote a more context specific evocation of the ways in which drone 
operators’ remotely mediated immediacy increasingly converges with the civilian 
experience of digitally mediated conflict. Furthermore, the film does not neglect to 
address the traumatic aspect of this new, technologically enhanced form of intimate yet 
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remote witnessing, and thus redresses the visceral pleasure offered by the embodied 
mode of address. 
 Farocki’s Serious Games similarly evokes hypermediated military subjectivities 
without translating this into a complicit spectatorial position. This is largely due to the 
employment of a split-screen aesthetic in Watson is Down and Immersion (though the 
oscillations between live-action and CG in Three Dead fulfil a comparable distancing 
function). The former simultaneously depicts the networked, hypermediated operation 
of the trans-subjective military unit and the CG training application in which they are 
collectively immersed; but by maintaining this dual perspective precludes any 
correlative spectatorial immersion in the affect- and reflex-conditioning realm of Virtual 
Battlespace 2. The split-screen serves a similar purpose in Immersion, depicting the 
HMD-wearing soldier/patient juxtaposed with his/her first-person point-of-view within 
the Virtual Iraq application. While the endogenous experience of the user here may 
mark the most extreme instantiation of depoliticised and internalised PTSD, this is not 
an experience that the viewer explicitly partakes in. I have suggested that Farocki uses 
the split-screen form to evoke this hallucinatory dimension as a process occurring in the 
interstices of the two frames, such that the affective disturbance visible in the patient’s 
embodied performance determines an experience of Virtual Iraq which differs strikingly 
from the viewer’s. As such, the juxtaposition of radically differing regimes of the image 
here engages analytically with the hypermediacy of contemporary warfare without co-
opting the viewer into the depoliticised and internalised depiction of combat engendered 
by VR. Further parallels with 5,000ft can be identified in Immersion’s circular narrative 
structure and looped projection, which in this case serve to disrupt the sense of 
therapeutic closure typically concomitant with PTSD as a cinematic trope.   
 Hypermediated modes of spectatorial subjectivity are evoked by the films 
covered in my final chapter to differing effects, yet the forms of networked connectivity 
demarcated by these films bear little resemblance to the de-subjectified states or 
dispersal of agency found in the hypermediated logic of military subjectivities22. While 
Redacted depicts digital mediations of the war as unanimously perpetuating a sadistic 
perspective which contributes to escalating cycles of retributive violence, Battle for 
Haditha deploys a similarly hypermediated aesthetic to suggest the formation of critical 
                                                          
22 There is a partial exception to this tendency in Stop-Loss, which does posit some continuity 
between military and spectatorial subjectivities, though this is because the mode of 
spectatorship staged in the film is that of the specifically circumscribed group of soldiers whose 




and interactive political collectivities through the metafictional suturing of the film’s 
diegesis and non-fictional remediated fragments of Iraq War reportage. Both, however, 
essentially characterise hypermediated spectatorship as reflexive rather than empathetic, 
thus highlighting the shifting determinants of an authentic understanding of 
contemporary warfare from an approximation of embodied witnessing to a reflexive 
engagement with the hypermediated politics of this digitised context. In the Valley of 
Elah conjoins this hypermediated sense of digital connectivity, associated in this case 
with the networked spectatorship of military video diaries, with a sense of immediacy 
via Hank’s hallucinatory inhabiting of his son’s diary footage as a kind of ‘inherited 
flashback’ (Stewart 182). The immediacy afforded via hypermediacy here differs 
substantially from the embodied form of immediacy promulgated by the experiential 
mode; rather than fostering a complicit form of identification with military subjects, it 
transposes the sense of witnessing common to both into a specific effect of the fusion of 
military and civilian realms engendered by the networked connectivity of digital 
mediation. This constitutes a unique replication of the emergent regime of immediacy 
via hypermediacy on the level of spectatorial subjectivity, and one which thereby 
implies that the digital mediation of war, like the networked drone kill-chain, may 
‘br[ing] all those in the network much closer to the killing space’ (Gregory, “From a 
View to a Kill” 196).     
 For scholars and critics who posit the embodied ‘reality’ of war as a privileged 
cinematic perspective from which to critique military-technological distanciation, it may 
seem somewhat suspect to celebrate film’s hybridisation with digital modes of 
mediating war in this manner. Yet I have demonstrated that it is actually the 
immersively embodied mode of address which tends to foster a rather problematic 
complicity in military-cinematic violence, while the films which evince a greater 
willingness to remediate these digital forms not only provide a more pertinent reflection 
of the contemporary regime of combat mediation but also seem to delimit more critical, 
reflexive and politically-engaged spectatorial positions. 
 Arguably, the identification of this trend toward a new, hypermediated form of 
ethically and politically engaged war cinema is made possible by the adoption of a 
hybrid critical framework that attends to the digital reconfiguration of war cinema and 
thus redresses (to return to the issue with which I began the thesis) what David Slocum 
refers to as the ‘dearth of attention to the intersection of military discourse, film and 
other media over the last decade’ (187-188). Slocum’s critique of outmoded approaches 
to the war genre – explicitly, the question of ‘whether the critical frameworks developed 
196 
 
for the analysis of the Second World War, Vietnam, or even the Cold War are 
appropriate to the war on terror’ – seems especially pertinent given that the forms of 
political opposition articulated by many of these films are quite explicitly bound up with 
the digitally reconfigured spectatorial relationship to contemporary mediations of 
warfare (192).  
Indeed, the highly fragmented political nature of the cinematic corpus which I 
have analysed here might further be considered as reflective of a distinct erosion of the 
ideologies previously employed to shape the political or discursive meaning of warfare. 
Certainly, the invocation of grand narratives of patriotic sacrifice so prevalent in WWII 
cinema finds little if any echo in Iraq and Afghanistan war films. The transformation of 
the historically specific into what Westwell terms the ‘mythic’ level of history, 
exemplified by Wake Island’s linking of ‘difficult work requiring great sacrifice at the 
local level’ with ‘the progressive advancement of American liberal democracy’, is 
largely absent even from ostensibly pro-war contemporary films.  
This is particularly evident in debates around the politics of The Hurt Locker. 
For instance, although Slavoj Žižek contends that film’s ‘ideology’ is basically 
equivalent to ‘the sentimental celebration of the US Army’s humanitarian role’ in John 
Wayne’s more bluntly propagandist The Green Berets (1968), it is nonetheless posited 
as present ‘in its very invisibility’, while Robert Burgoyne suggests that Bigelow’s film 
‘departs radically from genre convention, disdaining the formulas of older war films – 
the pathos formulas of sacrifice and loss’ in favour of a ‘private experience and pleasure 
in war’ which ‘takes place outside any larger meta-narrative of nation or history’ (13). 
Thus, even if The Hurt Locker is read as broadly enunciating a position in favour of US 
intervention in Iraq, it does so in terms that differ strikingly from the mythic discourse 
of a film like Wake Island. Distilling the narration of history down to the perspective of 
a soldier’s decontextualised and embodied sensory impressions ensures that it remains 
pointedly specific, with the film’s implicit ideology/politics hinging on the 
interpretation of a somewhat ambiguous individualisation of combat experience. Zero 
Dark Thirty – perhaps one of the most problematised and stigmatised of contemporary 
war films given its apparent advocacy of torture – adopts a similarly individualised and 
procedural approach to the manhunt for Osama bin Laden, while Restrepo’s complicity 
derives from the particular rendition of individualistic and embodied identification with 
a depoliticised construct of ‘grunt’ subjectivity rather than any mythic invocation of 
American values, identity, or historical destiny.  
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Likewise, the initial framing of the Vietnam War as a localised struggle between 
two ideologies competing for global dominance seems to lack any correlation with the 
context of Iraq and Afghanistan, especially during the invasion / early occupation 
timeframe of most of the films discussed here (though the later emergence of 
ISIS/Daesh might be considered partially analogous). Although this meta-narrative 
became more subject to contestation as the conflict continued, it did nonetheless 
envelop the war with a degree of ideological significance that is rarely even articulated 
in the present context. The overarching notion of a ‘War on Terror’ is perhaps the 
closest contemporary equivalent to these ideologically-driven grand narratives, yet this 
has failed to imbue recent conflicts and my cinematic corpus with any degree of the 
‘mythic’ resonance underlying WWII and (albeit to a lesser degree) Vietnam. Typically, 
it manifests in little more than peripheral cinematic remediations of George W. Bush 
speeches, and is often dismissed as a feeble rhetoric serving only to obscure the falsified 
evidential grounds for the invasion of Iraq.   
Contemporary cinematic critiques of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars are equally 
subject to political or ideological fragmentation, especially in comparison to the 
Vietnam era’s more unified and cohesive anti-war movement. Even the most stridently 
anti-war films among the corpus, among which Redacted is often singled out as such, 
tend to ground their critiques in highly specific contexts, and may be perceived as 
singling out aberrant instances of the US military’s abuse of power rather than 
establishing a comprehensive ideological opposition to the war. Garrett Stewart’s 
“Digital Fatigue” laments precisely this lack of oppositional cohesion, claiming that in 
the ‘new digital milieu, anything approaching to [sic] oppositional cinema in a realist 
combat mode risks being thwarted by the requisite authenticities of its own 
visualization’ (47). Comparing cinematic critiques of the Iraq War with those of 
Vietnam, Stewart continues:     
 
Retrospection is invaluable, but also needed is another kind of distance, technical 
rather than historical: a stylistic distance lately telescoped or vanished altogether 
in the new Iraq regime of participant record. The fact that the U.S. is still in the 
thick of the Mideast killing isn’t all that prevents a clear ethical and political 
perspective, then. On top of this, indeed layered directly over it, the continuous 
video traces of such violence within plot leave next to no space for the visual 
rhetoric of exposé. In analytic as well as digital terms, there’s no exposure time, 
no lag for ironic or polemical reframing. There’s only the electronic tracking of 
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terror moment by moment. The legacy of oppositional cinema, and its leverage, is 
in large part forfeited by just this relentless instantaneous videography. (47-8) 
  
However, contrary to Stewart’s contention that ‘oppositional cinema’ is compromised 
by the necessity of remediating such digital interfaces, I have suggested that this process 
goes beyond a mere striving for aesthetic authenticity to enact a subtle but significant 
development in the spectatorial relationship to mediated conflict. As such, 
contemporary cinematic forms of critiquing war may have undergone a wide-ranging 
transformation from previous eras in which ideological conflicts were more overtly 
staged, with resistance now to be located in a rather more micro-level enunciation of 
ethical subject positions which establish a critical and politicised distance from diegetic 
military actions.   
This shift is, as I have argued, necessarily effected by a host of contextual 
factors – most prominently, the proliferation of new digital networks for mediating 
conflict within both the military-technological apparatus and the civilian realm. Given 
that this enacts a convergence of military and spectatorial subject positions relative to 
the contemporary mediation of war, then, the turn from embodied modes of 
representing warfare through an individualistic approximation of military subjectivity to 
a nuanced spectatorial ethics of digitally-connected, remote yet intimate witnessing, is 
key to the continuing relevance of oppositional war cinema. I have found evidence of 
this right across the spectrum of contemporary representations of war, from mainstream 
Hollywood genre pictures such as In the Valley of Elah and Good Kill, through more 
independent/auterist productions like Battle for Haditha or Redacted, to the gallery 
contexts of Five Thousand Feet is the Best and Serious Games. These films, I believe, 
directly address the vital issue of war’s transformation by digital technologies and 
produce a pertinent spectatorial ethics of digital connectivity through which viewers 
finally confront warfare not merely via the imaginary occupation of the soldierly body, 
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